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Abstract
In this thesis we analyse the issue of decidability for two modal logics which contain least binders.
Towards this goal, we begin the work with a brief survey of modal logic, PDL, the modal µ-calculus
and algebraic filtrations as exposited by Conradie et al. The first such modal logic we analyse is
the fragment of the modal µ-calculus corresponding to PDL; the second logic is the equational
theory of the class of ρ-algebras (motivated by the least root calculus of Pratt). We offer a new,
algebraic, proof for the decidability of PDL by showing that PDL has the finite model property
with respect to the class of dynamic algebras. We then show that the equational theory of the class
of ρ-algebras has the finite model property with respect to the class of ρ-algebras; this is based on
the proof of Pratt but differs in an important detail. The finite model property results for these
two modal logics are achieved by an algebraic filtration method based on that of Conradie et al.
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1. Introduction
Given a formula ϕ and a deductive system Λ, a classical question is whether there exists an algorithm
that can check in finite time if ϕ is a theorem of Λ i.e.
Is the Λ-provability problem, a decidable problem?
A deductive system Λ will be called decidable if the Λ-provability problem is decidable. The goal
of this thesis is to algebraically address the issue of decidability for two modal logics involving least
binders. The first is a fragment of the modal µ-calculus and the second is a similar fragment based
on the least root modal language put forward by Pratt in [34].
To better understand these algebraic perspectives on decidability, we shall discuss how they were
first proved and the background leading up to the results. We begin with an overview of modal
logic. The historical information in this chapter is taken from [15], [1], [33], [4] and [34].
1.1 Modal logic
The phrase “in the past” is an example of a modality in every day language. We can prefix it to a
statement p, thus giving a new statement with some bearing on when p is true. Other examples of
modalities abound in every day discussions involving possibility (eg. it is necessary), epistemology
(eg. it is known) and ethics (eg. it is immoral) to name but a few. Our interest in this work is in
the mathematics of modalities: modal logic.
The language of modal logic uses ∧,∨,¬ to denote conjunction, disjunction and negation respec-
tively and ⊥,> for truth values. The set of propositional variables is denoted by Φ and elements
thereof by p1, p2, ... etc. The symbol 3 is used to denote a unary modality. There may be more
than one modality and these may be of arity greater than 1; these are represented by symbols 4 in
a modal type τ . Modal formulas will be formed over propositional variables using the connectives
∧,∨,¬ and 4 from τ . The formula ¬p ∨ q will be given the shorthand p → q. The symbol  is
shorthand for ¬3¬ and is called the dual of 3.
Modal logic is the extension of propositional logic that includes the study of statements involving
modalities. Largely due to Boole [3] the study of modern propositional logic began in the setting of
algebra. In a similar manner, the study of modal logic began in the setting of algebra with one of
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the earliest algebraic analyses performed by MacColl between 1880 and 1906 [29]. MacColl denoted
statement “p is impossible” by pη.
In the papers of MacColl [29], much was made of the meanings and properties of logical operations
but there was not a rigorous notion of logical deductive systems, as is expected by modern standards.
The first truly modal deductive systems were introduced by Lewis in 1932 when he defined the
systems S1 through to S5 in [28]. Lewis intended to make a distinction between the ordinary
and algebraic meanings of implication. Since implication is equivalently defined via disjunction (p
implies q is equivalent to q or not p) Lewis defined disjunction in the former case to be the usual
“or” connective (he called this extensional disjunction) and in the latter case he defined intensional
disjunction to be “such that at least one of the disjoined propositions is necessarily true” [27].
In his systems Lewis thus introduced the 3 symbol for possibility which he used to define intensional
disjunction and in turn the notion of strict implication, as p strictly implies q if and only if ¬3(p∧¬q)
[27]. The Lewis systems S1–S5 contained axioms involving strict implications and were closed under
certain proof rules. In 1931 Go¨del aimed to have a deductive system formalising the modality of
provability [14]. He introduced the connective B, interpreting Bp as “p is provable” and he included
in his deductive system the axiom Bp → p. His definition of a logic has become standard [15].
A set of modal formulae Λ is a logic (in the basic modal language) if it contains all propositional
tautologies, the axioms (p→ q)→ (p→ q), 3p↔ ¬¬p and is closed under modus ponens,
uniform substitution and the rule: if ϕ ∈ Λ then ϕ ∈ Λ. A formula ϕ is said to be a theorem
of Λ if ϕ ∈ Λ. Logics are the standard deductive systems for modal logic and are geared towards
producing modal logic validities.
Briefly steering from the history back towards our first example of a modality, we can define 〈P 〉 p
to mean “p was true at some past time” and 〈F 〉 p to mean “p will be true at some future time”.
The duals of 〈P 〉 p and 〈F 〉 p are [P ]p = ¬ 〈P 〉 ¬p and [F ]p = ¬ 〈F 〉 ¬p and thus can be interpreted
as “it always has been p” and “it is always going to be p” respectively. This is an example of
a modal language with two modal symbols: 〈P 〉 and 〈F 〉. As seen from the discussion of the
deductive systems of Lewis and Go¨del, the axioms of a modal proof system are motivated by the
intended meanings of the symbols involved. Thus if we insisted that our notion of time be dense we
would consider as an axiom for a temporal logic: 〈F 〉 p→ 〈F 〉 〈F 〉 p. If we were in the unfortunate
situation that the future holds nothing new we would require the axiom 〈F 〉 p→ 〈P 〉 p.
Modal algebras supply an algebraic semantics for modal logic. A modal algebra A=(A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1,
f) is an algebra where (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) is a Boolean algebra and f is a unary operator on A: f(0) = 0
and f(x ∨ y) = f(x) ∨ f(y) for all x, y ∈ A. The operator f on A emulates the behaviour of a
modality 3 in a logic. A modal formula ϕ is a validity of a modal algebra A if every evaluation of
ϕ in A equals 1. And ϕ is a validity of a class of modal algebras A if ϕ is a validity of each member
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from A. In this way modal algebras offer an algebraic semantics for modal logic.
Given a structure G = (U,R) where R is a binary relation on the set U , the full complex algebra of G
is the structure G+ = (P(U),mR) where P(U) is the power set algebra of U and for any U ′ ⊆ U we
define mR(U
′) = {u ∈ U | there exists u′ ∈ U ′ such that Ruu′}. It can be easily checked that mR
is an operator on P(U) and thus G+ is a modal algebra. In 1951 Jo´nsson and Tarski established the
result that every modal algebra is isomorphic to a complex algebra (a subalgebra of a full complex
algebra) [21].
In 1963 Kripke introduced his relational semantics of modal logic in his analysis of S2, S5 and two
other logics [25]. The Kripke semantics of modal logic involve interpreting modal formulae to be
true relative to a possible world in a Kripke structure. A Kripke structure or frame F = (W,R)
consists of a non-empty set W (the possible worlds) and a binary relation R on W (the accessibility
relation). A valuation V : Φ → P(W ) is added to a frame to get a (Kripke) model M = (F , V ).
Models are used to give semantics to modal languages: the valuation designates at which worlds
propositional variables are satisfied and in turn where more complex modal formulae are satisfied.
For example the formula 3p is satisfied at a world w ∈ W if there is a world w′ in W such that
Rww′ and w′ satisfies p. A formula is a validity of a frame if it is satisfied at every point in the
frame under every valuation. It can be checked that the set of validities of a frame, denoted ΛF ,
is a logic. Since model valuations are the same as evaluations in a full complex algebra, it can
be shown that a formula is validity of a frame F if and only if it is a validity of the full complex
algebra F+.
Kripke’s semantics was a major breakthrough in modal logic because it offered clear insights into
how logics can be characterised. For example, using semantic tableaux Kripke showed that a
formula is a theorem of S5 if and only if it is true in all transitive and symmetric models [24]. The
ideas of Kripke were present in some form in the works of Hintikka, Kanger, Prior and Montague
(see Goldblatt’s article [15] for a full account of their contributions).
Given that there are two descriptions of modal validities, it is natural to ask if they match up i.e.
given a logic Λ and frame class F is it the case that Λ = ΛF ? The logic Λ is said to be sound
with respect to F if every theorem of Λ is a validity of F . The logic Λ is said to be complete with
respect to F if every validity of the class F can be derived in Λ (i.e. is a theorem of Λ). Proofs
of soundness are usually straightforward whereas those concerning completeness can be far more
difficult. The canonical model of a logic Λ is a natural tool in attempting a proof of completeness
for Λ and was first used by Lemmon and Scott in the “Lemmon Notes” of 1966 [26]. The canonical
model of Λ is constructed from the Λ-maximal consistent sets and is in fact a modal version of the
Henkin construction used for the completeness of first order logic [17].
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A logic Λ is characterised by a class of frames F if it is both sound and complete with respect
to F . The first logics that were studied all turned out to be characterised by a class of frames
[15]; in 1966 this led Lemmon to conjecture that this was the case for all logics [26]. However, in
1972 Thomason gave the first example of a logic lacking the frame characterisation property with a
tense logic [39]. Furthermore in 1977–1979 work by Blok showed that the majority of logics are not
characterised by any class of frames [2]. Blok used algebraic methods in his work, studying varieties
rather than the logics themselves. These incompleteness results demonstrated the inadequacy of
relational semantics of modal logic and led to a renewed interest in algebraic semantics.
Thomason was among those that spearheaded the renewed interest in the algebraic semantics in
the modern era (1972–onwards). In particular he introduced general frames in his paper [39].
Thomason used his general frame semantics to show that, in contrast to the relational semantics,
every logic is characterised by a class of modal algebras. Although his result shows completeness of
any logic with respect to a class of abstract modal algebras, it was not necessarily a completeness
result with respect to a class of full complex modal algebras. But the representation theorem of
Jo´nsson and Tarski shows that every modal algebra is isomorphic to a complex algebra [21]. The
Jo´nsson–Tarski theorem therefore gives a path towards relational completeness and it was during
this era that the importance of their work to modal logic finally came to be realised.
Two other active areas of modal logic research during this time were correspondence theory and
modal logic applied to computer science. Correspondence theory was initiated by van Benthem
and focuses on the extent to which modal languages can describe frames and models (see [1]). The
application of modal logic to computer science began mainly with Pratt and Pnueli and will be
briefly discussed in Section 1.3.
1.2 Decidability of a logic
In this section we will discuss the decidability of a logic Λ in a little more detail. Recall that Λ
is decidable if the Λ-provability problem is decidable i.e. there is an algorithm that can check in
finite time whether or not ϕ ∈ Λ for any modal formula ϕ.
In 1941 it was proved by McKinsey that S2 and S4 are decidable logics [31]. He did this by showing
that the logic in question has the finite model property with respect to a class A of algebras. This
property states that a formula is a theorem of the logic if and only if it is a validity of Afin (where
Afin denotes the finite members of A). McKinsey’s method for proving the finite model property
is the first example of an algebraic filtration [31].
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It was demonstrated by Harrop in 1958 that any logic Λ which has a finite number of axioms and
has the finite model property with respect to a class of algebras A, is a decidable logic [16]. A
schematic version of his argument is as follows: construct an algorithm that makes use of the finite
number of axioms of Λ to enumerate all the theorems of Λ; construct a second algorithm that
enumerates all of the finite algebras from A. These two algorithms in parallel can check in finite
time if ϕ is a theorem of Λ or not: if ϕ is a theorem of Λ then the first algorithm will halt; if ϕ is
not a theorem of Λ then, as Λ has the finite model property with respect to A, there exists a finite
algebra in A on which ϕ is not a validity which will lead the second algorithm to halt.
A logic Λ has the finite model property with respect to a class of frames F if: a formula is a theorem
of Λ if and only if it is a validity of Ffin. Note that by definition, if Λ is characterised by F and
the validities of F and Ffin are the same then Λ has the finite model property with respect to F .
The statement that the validities of F and Ffin are the same, is equivalent to saying that when a
model from F (i.e. a model based on a frame in F ) satisfies a modal formula then there is a finite
model from F which also satisfies the formula. In 1966 Lemmon and Scott developed a technique
for proving the finite model property in the Lemmon Notes [26]. Given a modelM that satisfies a
formula ϕ, they showed that one of the ways to attempt to prove there exists a finite model which
also satisfies ϕ is by constructing a filtration ofM. A filtration ofM is formed by first identifying
two worlds inM to be equivalent if they satisfy the same formulae in sub(ϕ) (where sub(ϕ) denotes
the subformulae of ϕ). A relation and valuation are then imposed on this finite quotient structure
to form a finite model that preserves the satisfaction of formulae from sub(ϕ). Note that Harrop’s
argument carries over to the frames as well and thus if a logic Λ has the finite model property with
respect to a class of frames then Λ is decidable.
Although a logic which has finitely many axioms and the finite model property is decidable, work
by Gabbay in 1972 showed that the converse is not true i.e. he showed that there are decidable
logics which are finitely axiomatisable but lack the finite model property [12]. Another method for
proving the decidability of a logic is by using automata: representations of machines which perform
computations on a given input (such as a finite string) by passing through a sequence of states (see
for example [35]).
1.3 Propositional dynamic logic (PDL)
Given a computer system, one wants to be able to verify whether the system satisfies certain
requirements. An example of a requirement is: the system eventually responds to an instruction;
this is referred to as a liveness property. Applying formal logic to test such requirements in computer
science goes back to the 1960s with Floyd–Hoare logic [19]. For example Hoare introduced the
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construct p{a}q which reads: if p holds before executing program a then q holds afterwards. This
line of work was proof theoretic with logics representing the properties of programs and was aimed
at testing the correctness of programs. In 1969 Pnueli introduced a semantic approach to questions
of program correctness in that he turned assertions about programs into assertions of satisfiability
or validity using models of temporal logic [30]. Apart from showing program correctness, formal
logic applied to computer science can also be used for showing two programs to be equivalent as
well as for comparing their expressive power (see [9]).
In 1976 Pratt introduced more expressive logics into the study of program correctness by building on
the ideas of Hoare [32]. In particular Pratt introduced a dynamic logic where modalities represent
the actions of programs. For example the formula [a]p expresses the statement: after program a
executes, p holds. Using this, Hoare’s construct p{a}q can be translated into dynamic logic as
p → [a]q. The dual of [a] is 〈a〉 with 〈a〉 p expressing that there is an execution of a after which
p holds. The program modalities from Pratt’s dynamic logic [32] are built from atomic programs
using dynamic constructs. These include pi1;pi2 expressing the program that executes program pi1
then program pi2, the program pi1 ∪ pi2 that non-deterministically executes program pi1 or program
pi2 and finally pi
∗ which expresses the program that executes pi a finite number of times. This
language is referred to as propositional dynamic logic, PDL. We use PDL to denote the logic
(deductive system) of PDL.
The language of PDL is interpreted on Kripke structures such that for each program modality
there is a relation on the Kripke structure (if a program a is deterministic then the relation R〈a〉 is
required to be a partial function). The relations in such a structure respect the dynamic constructs
of the programs, for example R〈pi1;pi2〉 = R〈pi1〉 ◦ R〈pi2〉 where ◦ represents relation composition;
R〈pi1∪pi2〉 = R〈pi1〉 ∪ R〈pi2〉 and R〈pi∗〉 = R∗〈pi〉 where R∗〈pi〉 represents the reflexive transitive closure of
R〈pi〉. Such a frame is called a regular frame.
A finite axiomatisation of PDL was given by Segerberg in 1977 [37]. This logic included axioms
that modelled the behaviour of the program constructs; the least trivial of which is the axiom which
resembles induction given as
p→ ([pi∗](p→ [pi]p)→ [pi∗]p).
The first proof of completeness for PDL was given by Parikh in 1978 with later proofs given by
Segerberg and Gabbay in 1982. Fischer and Ladner showed in 1979 that PDL has the finite model
property with respect to the class of regular frames by using a modified filtration incorporating their
Fischer–Ladner closure [11]. Loosely speaking their closure is needed to “educate” the filtration
about the dynamic constructs of programs. Together with the fact that PDL has finitely many
axioms, this shows that PDL is a decidable logic by Harrop’s argument [16].
Dynamic algebras were introduced by Kozen and Pratt in 1979 in order to algebraically interpret
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PDL; in the words of Pratt: “the class [of dynamic algebras] can be considered the algebraic home
of induction” [33]. A dynamic algebra is a modal algebra with operators for each modality; the
operators obey similar rules to those on a regular frame and the full complex algebra of a regular
frame indeed gives a dynamic algebra. In this work we will give a new proof that PDL is decidable
by using dynamic algebras (see Chapter 5).
There are also extensions of PDL: in 1979 Pratt introduced process logic which is PDL enriched
with temporal operators. Towards showing two program systems to be equivalent, Hennessy and
Milner introduced their logic in 1980 [18]. The Hennessy–Milner logic (HML) has unary modalities
representing actions in computer a system but differs from PDL in that the action labels have no
structure. HML is inadequate to express enduring properties in PDL such as 〈pi∗〉 p since formulae
in HML can only “see” up to the number of modal connectives [18]. In 1981 HML was enriched
with higher arity modalities by Emerson and Clarke [6]. Among them is the until binary modality,
U, which is interpreted over paths in a model (W,R, V ): given w ∈ W , a path from w is a finite
or infinite sequence of states w,w1, w2, w3... in W with Rww1, Rw1w2 etc. The formula ∃[ϕUψ]
is satisfied at w if there is a path (wi) from w and a j in N such that ϕ is satisfied at all wi with
0 ≤ i < j and ψ is satisfied at wj . In this way ∃[ϕUψ] expresses that there is a path from w on
which ϕ is satisfied until ψ is satisfied. This enrichment of HML is called computational tree logic
(CTL).
1.4 The modal µ-calculus
The modal µ-calculus is an enrichment of modal logic with least fixed point binders/quantifiers.
The modal µ-calculus provides a powerful and elegant framework for program semantics as well as
recursion. The notion of adding fixed point binders to modal logic first appeared in a paper by
Scott and De Bakker in 1969 [36]. Other authors who developed the theory from 1970–1981 include
Park, De Roever, Emerson and Pratt (see [15]). Hennessy and Milner used the largest fixed point
in their definition of an “observational equivalence relation” between programs [18].
In 1983 Kozen introduced the most widely used version of the modal µ-calculus: Lµ [22]. In addition
to using the usual binary connectives, negation and unary modal connectives, the formulae of Lµ
are formed using a least fixed point binder µ. The fixed point formulae can represent assertions of
safety or liveness regarding a computer system. Informally a liveness property refers to the assertion
that “something good will eventually happen” and a safety property refers to the assertion “nothing
bad will ever happen”.
Towards interpreting fixed point formulae in a model M = (F , V ), the valuation of the formula
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ϕ(X) gives a different set as X varies. In this way the valuation of ϕ(X) induces an increasing
function on P(W ) (increasing by a syntactic restriction on ϕ(X)). The formula µX.ϕ(X) is then
interpreted as the least fixed point of this function, guaranteed to exist by the theorem of Knaster
and Tarski proved in 1930.
Kozen gave a finite axiomatisation for Lµ in [22] but was only able to show completeness for a
proper fragment of Lµ. The problem of showing that the full Lµ is complete under Kozen’s finite
axiomatisation was only solved in 1995 by Walukiewicz [40]. In 1984 Kozen and Parikh demon-
strated that Lµ is decidable via automata [23]. As demonstrated by Streett [38] the decidability of
the modal µ-calculus cannot be shown using a filtration style technique due to Lµ formulae such
as µX.[a]X.
The modal µ-calculus strictly subsumes many temporal logics, including PDL and CTL men-
tioned previously [38]. We shall show algebraically that PDL is decidable which will in turn serve
to demonstrate that the fragment of the modal µ-calculus corresponding to PDL, denoted L∗µ, is
decidable. Alternation of fixed points makes the µ-calculus highly expressive and much work has
been done on classifying on which level modal languages fall in the so-called “µ-calculus alterna-
tion hierarchy” [4]. Whether the model checking of formulae containing alternating fixed points
necessarily takes exponential time is still an open problem [13].
Before Kozen introduced Lµ in 1983, Pratt examined a similar modal language, Lρ, with least root
binders in 1981 [34]. Unlike Lµ, Pratt’s least root language is amenable to filtration arguments.
This is achieved by imposing strong syntactic conditions on the minuends. The algebraic semantics
for Pratt’s fragment are given via R, the class of ρ-algebras. There is an overlap between the
languages Lρ and Lµ but, as shall be seen in Chapter 5, Lρ is not a subset of Lµ.
1.5 Thesis contribution and outline
As can be seen by the argument of Harrop, if one has a finitely axiomatisable logic which has the
finite model property with respect to a class of models, then the logic will be decidable [16]. The
objective of this work is to use this argument in an attempt to prove the decidability of two modal
logics with least binders by showing that they have the finite model property with respect to certain
classes of modal algebras.
In particular, the first such logic is PDL and is identified with the fragment L∗µ of the modal
µ-calculus. PDL is a finitely axiomatisable logic and thus we will show that PDL is decidable by
proving that it has the finite model property with respect to the class of dynamic algebras. In this
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way we offer a new proof for the decidability of PDL.
The second logic we will look at is ΛR, the equational theory of R, where R is the class of ρ-algebras
i.e. the algebraic class which interprets Pratt’s least root calculus [34]. We will only show that ΛR
has the finite model property with respect to R. Pratt provided a sketch of the proof in Theorem
3 of [34]; based on his sketch it is not clear that the constructed finite ρ-algebra falsifies least root
formulae. Hence we will provide a proof based on his sketch but filling in this important step. Both
of these finite model property results will be proved by an algebraic filtration method based on
that of Conradie et al. [7].
The layout for the remainder of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2 the necessary background
for relational and algebraic modal logic will be covered. PDL and the modal µ-calculus will be
formally introduced in Chapter 3. The more recent results in the development of modal logic begin
in Chapter 4 where we review the algebraic filtrations of Conradie et al. [7]. The main contribution
of this thesis lies in Chapter 5; there we give a new proof for the decidability of PDL (see Theorem
5.1.11 and Theorem 5.1.15) and then we review the result of Pratt (Theorem 3 of [34]) that ΛR has
the finite model property with respect to R (Theorem 5.2.22). In particular for Pratt’s result, we
fill in an important step which appears to be missing from his proof. Chapter 6 is the concluding
chapter where we review the work as well as discuss possible future research directions.
2. Modal Logic
The results in this chapter are taken from the sources [1], [8], [5] and [21]. For each result, the
proof is provided when we feel it offers some insight. When a proof is provided, we fill out more
details than those found in the source material.
In this chapter we explore various classical results in modal logic that are of interest in studying our
decidability question. We shall begin with an overview of the relational semantics of modal logic
in Section 2.1 as well as modal deductive systems in Section 2.2. We shall then discuss soundness
and completeness in Section 2.3 and the finite model property in Section 2.4. We then discuss the
previous topics again but through the lens of modal algebras. In particular, the algebraic semantics
of modal logic is looked at in Section 2.5 and then completeness with respect to algebras is discussed
in Section 2.6. Finally the duality between frames and algebras is briefly discussed in Section 2.7.
2.1 The relational semantics of modal logic
2.1.1 Definition. A type t is a pair (O, ζ) where O is a non-empty set of function symbols and
ζ : O → N. For f ∈ O, the number ζ(f) is the arity of f .
2.1.2 Remark. When the symbols of O are used to represent modalities we call the type a modal
type and denote it by τ . If τ consists only of a single modal symbol of arity 1, then τ is referred to
as the basic modal type with the modal symbol denoted by the diamond 3 i.e. τ = ({3}, {(3, 1)}).
Given a modal type τ = (O, ζ), we will usually denote the situation 4 ∈ O by 4 ∈ τ .
2.1.3 Definition. Let Φ be a non-empty set of propositional variables and p ∈ Φ. A τ -modal
formula ϕ is defined recursively as ϕ = ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | 4(ϕ1, ..., ϕζ(4)) where 4 ∈ τ . The set
of all such formulae is denoted by Form(τ,Φ).
2.1.4 Remark. Some formulae in Form(τ,Φ) are assigned the following shorthand:
formula shorthand formula
¬ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ→ ψ
¬⊥ >
¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ϕ ∧ ψ
¬4(¬ϕ1, ...,¬ϕζ(4)) 5(ϕ1, ..., ϕζ(4))
10
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When τ is the basic modal type, the dual of 3, ¬3¬, is denoted by .
We will now introduce objects with just enough structure to determine a modal formula’s truth.
In particular we will introduce frames and then models.
2.1.5 Definition. A τ -frame is a pair F = (W,R4)4∈τ where W is a non-empty set and R4 ⊆
W ζ(4)+1 for each 4 ∈ τ ; these are the accessibility relations of F .
2.1.6 Example. Let τ be a modal type with two modal symbols of arity 1: τ = {〈a〉 , 〈b〉}. An
example of a τ -frame is F = ({w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}, R〈a〉, R〈b〉) where R〈a〉 = {(w1, w2), (w1, w3),
(w1, w4), (w2, w3), (w2, w4), (w3, w4)} and R〈b〉 = {(w1, w2), (w1, w3), (w1, w5), (w2, w3), (w2, w5),
(w3, w5)}. The frame F is represented by the following diagram where elements of relations are
given by arrows; the dashed arrows are from R〈b〉. It can be seen that both relations are transitive
(i.e. R〈a〉u1u2 and R〈a〉u2u3 imply R〈a〉u1u3 for all u1, u2, u3 ∈W , and similarly for R〈b〉).
w4
w1 w2 w3
w5
2.1.7 Definition. Let F = (W,R4)4∈τ be a τ -frame, let 4 ∈ τ and let w ∈W . A R4-path from
w is a sequence of states (wi) such that w0 = w and R4wiwi+1 for all 0 ≤ i < n (if |(wi)| = n) or
R4wiwi+1 for all i (if (wi) infinite).
2.1.8 Example. In the frame from Example 2.1.6, w2w3w4 is a R〈a〉-path from w2.
2.1.9 Definition. A τ -model is a pair M = (F , V ) where F = (W,R4)4∈τ is a τ -frame and V is
a valuation: V : Φ→ P(W ). The τ -model M is said to be based on the τ -frame F .
2.1.10 Example. Let τ be the basic modal type and Φ = {p, q}. Then M = ({w1, w2, w3},
{(w1, w1), (w1, w2), (w3, w3) (w3, w1), (w3, w2)}, {(p, {w1}), (q,∅)}) is a τ -model. M can be repre-
sented by the following diagram.
p
w1 w2
w3
For a τ -model M = (W,R4, V )4∈τ and a propositional variable p, the set V (p) determines which
points in the model satisfy p; the semantics of more complex formulae are determined recursively
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over those of the propositional variables. The accessibility relation is needed for the semantics of
non-Boolean modal formulae.
2.1.11 Definition. Let ϕ,ϕ1, ..., ϕn, ψ ∈ Form(τ,Φ), let M = (W,R4, V )4∈τ be a τ -model with
w ∈W . The formulae in Form(τ,Φ) are interpreted in the following way:
M, w  p ∈ Φ if w ∈ V (p)
M, w  ¬ϕ if M, w 6 ϕ
M, w  ϕ ∨ ψ if M, w  ϕ or M, w  ψ
M, w  4(ϕ1, ..., ϕζ(4)) if there exists a (w1, ..., wζ(4)) ∈W ζ(4) such that
R4ww1...wζ(4) and M, wi  ϕi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ζ(4).
It is never the case thatM, w  ⊥. The formula ϕ is satisfied inM at w ifM, w  ϕ. The formula
ϕ is satisfiable in M if there exists a point in M at which ϕ is satisfied.
2.1.12 Example. Recall the model M from Example 2.1.10. M, w1  3p; M, w3  3p and
vacuously M, w2  p ∧q.
2.1.13 Remark. For a τ -model M = (W,R4, V )4∈τ with w ∈ W , we will sometimes denote
M, w  ϕ simply by w  ϕ when M is understood from the context.
2.1.14 Remark. The formula 3p is satisfied at a point w if p is satisfied at a point accessible from
w. Likewise p = ¬3¬p is satisfied at w if it is not the case that there is an accessible point from
w where p is not satisfied or equivalently, if w1 is accessible from w then p is satisfied at w1. This
motivates the interpretations of 3p and p as possibly p and necessarily p respectively.
2.1.15 Remark. Given that we have defined the semantics of any τ -modal formula ϕ, we can now
extend our valuation V to a V ∗ : Form(τ,Φ)→ P(W ) by V ∗(ϕ) = {w ∈W | w  ϕ}. In this way
w  ϕ iff w ∈ V ∗(ϕ) and it can easily be checked against Definition 2.1.11, with τ as the basic
modal type, that for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Form(τ,Φ):
V (⊥) = ∅
V ∗(p) = V (p)
V ∗(¬ϕ) = − V ∗(ϕ)
V ∗(ϕ ∨ ψ) = V ∗(ϕ) ∪ V ∗(ψ)
V ∗(3ϕ) = mR(V ∗(ϕ))
where −V ∗(ϕ) = W \ V ∗(ϕ) and mR : P(W ) → P(W ) is defined by mR(S) = {w ∈ W | (∃w′ ∈
S)(Rww′)}. Note that V ∗(ϕ) = lR(V ∗(ϕ)) where lR : P(W )→ P(W ) is defined by lR(S) = {w ∈
W | (∀w′ ∈W )(Rww′ =⇒ w′ ∈ S)}.
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2.1.16 Lemma. Let M = (W,R4, V )4∈τ be a τ -model and let w ∈W . The following are equiv-
alent for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Form(τ,Φ):
(i) M, w  ϕ→ ψ;
(ii) M, w  ϕ implies M, w  ψ.
Proof. (i) =⇒ (ii) Let M, w  ϕ → ψ and let M, w  ϕ. We will show that M, w  ψ. Since
M, w  ϕ → ψ we have by Definition 2.1.11 that M, w 6 ϕ or M, w  ψ. If M, w 6 ϕ we would
have a contradiction since we have M, w  ϕ by assumption. Thus we must have M, w  ψ.
(ii) =⇒ (i) Assume the conditional: M, w  ϕ implies M, w  ψ. We will show that M, w 
ϕ → ψ, in particular, M, w 6 ϕ or M, w  ψ. If M, w 6 ϕ we are done. Suppose M, w  ϕ.
Therefore by the assumed conditional M, w  ψ and we are done.
2.1.17 Definition. Let ϕ ∈ Form(τ,Φ) and let F = (W,R4)4∈τ be a τ -frame. The formula ϕ is
a validity on F if (F , V ), w  ϕ for all valuations V on F and all points w in F . This is denoted
by F  ϕ.
2.1.18 Example. Recall the frame F = (W,R〈a〉, R〈b〉) from Example 2.1.6 which had both rela-
tions R〈a〉 and R〈b〉 transitive. Let ϕ = 〈a〉 〈a〉 p→ 〈a〉 p, we shall show F  ϕ. Let w ∈W and let
V : Φ → P(W ). We need to show (F , V ), w  〈a〉 〈a〉 p → 〈a〉 p. Suppose w  〈a〉 〈a〉 p; therefore
there exists a w1 ∈ W such that R〈a〉ww1 and w1  〈a〉 p. Thus again there exists a w2 ∈ W such
that R〈a〉w1w2 and w2  p. Now since R〈a〉 is transitive, R〈a〉ww2 and thus w  〈a〉 p. Therefore
w  ϕ by Lemma 2.1.16 and thus F  ϕ. Similarly it can be shown that F  〈b〉 〈b〉 p→ 〈b〉 p.
2.1.19 Example. Let (4) = 33p → 3p. We will show that for a frame of the basic modal type
F = (W,R) that F  (4) implies R is transitive. Let F  (4) and let w1, w2, w3 ∈ W such
that Rw1w2, Rw2w3. We want to show that Rw1w3. Consider the valuation V : Φ → P(W ) by
V (p) = {w3}; this gives (F , V ), w2  3p and (F , V ), w1  33p. But w1  (4) since F  (4); this
all together gives by Lemma 2.1.16 that w1  3p. Therefore there exists a point w′ ∈W such that
Rw1w
′ and w′  p. But V (p) = {w3}, therefore w′ = w3 and Rw1w3. Thus we have shown that R
is transitive.
In light of Remark 2.1.15 the definition of a validity (Definition 2.1.17) could be reformulated to:
F  ϕ iff V ∗(ϕ) = W for all valuations V . Indeed this is used in the algebraic semantics of modal
logic (see Definition 2.5.10).
2.1.20 Definition. Let ϕ ∈ Form(τ,Φ) and let F be a τ -frame class (F is a class of τ -frames).
The formula ϕ is a validity on F if F  ϕ for all F ∈ F . This is denoted by F  ϕ.
We now look at the notion of local semantic consequence.
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2.1.21 Definition. Let Γ ⊆ Form(τ,Φ) and let M = (W,R4, V )4∈τ a τ -model. We say Γ is
satisfiable in M if there is a w ∈ W such that ϕ ∈ Γ implies M, w  ϕ. This is denoted by
M, w  Γ.
2.1.22 Definition. Let Γ ⊆ Form(τ,Φ), let ϕ ∈ Form(τ,Φ) and let F be a τ -frame class. The
formula ϕ is a local semantic consequence of Γ over F ifM, w  Γ impliesM, w  ϕ for all models
M based on frames in F and all points w in M. This is denoted by Γ F ϕ.
2.1.23 Example. Let τ be the basic modal type, let Γ = {3p,3p} and let F be the class of all
τ -frames. We shall show Γ F 33p. Consider a τ -model M and w ∈W such that M, w  Γ. We
need to show w  33p. Since w  3p there exists w1 ∈ W such that Rww1 and w1  p. Since
Rww1 and w  3p we have that w1  3p and thus w  33p.
2.2 Deductive systems of modal logic
In this section we take for granted the notions of a propositional tautology and lattice. The relevant
material can be found in [10] and [8], respectively.
We have seen how to generate well formed modal formulae as well as how to formally handle their
semantics. We shall introduce modal logic proof systems known as logics, the axioms of which are
motivated towards generating the validities on a frame class. For the sake of readability, most of
the definitions and theorems will now be given with respect to the basic modal type and can be
suitably generalized to an arbitrary modal type. When working with τ as the basic modal type,
we suppress τ in definitions and results, for example Form(τ,Φ) will be Form(Φ). We shall also
work with a countable set of propositional variables Φ.
2.2.1 Definition. A logic is a set of modal formulae Λ that contains all propositional tautologies
together with the following axioms:
(K) (p→ q)→ (p→ q)
(Dual) 3p↔ ¬¬p.
Λ is closed under modus ponens (m.p.), uniform substitution (u.s.) and generalization (gen):
if ϕ ∈ Λ then ϕ ∈ Λ. A formula ϕ is a theorem of Λ if ϕ ∈ Λ; this is denoted by `Λ ϕ.
2.2.2 Remark. Let F be a frame class. It can be seen using the model satisfaction (Definition
2.1.11) as well as the definition of frame validity (Definition 2.1.17), that the set ΛF of F validities
(ΛF = {ϕ ∈ Form(Φ) | F  ϕ}) is a logic.
The next theorem shows that logics can be defined using the diamond; we state it without proof.
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2.2.3 Theorem. Let Λ ⊆ Form(Φ) such that Λ contains all propositional tautologies and is closed
under modus ponens and uniform substitution. The following are equivalent:
(i) Λ is a logic.
(ii) `Λ 3⊥ ↔ ⊥;
`Λ 3(p ∨ q)↔ (3p ∨3q);
if `Λ p→ q then `Λ 3p→ 3q.
2.2.4 Remark. We will refer to the closure rule, if `Λ (p → q) then `Λ 3p → 3q, as 3-
generalization (3-gen).
We now want to show that for any set of modal formulae, one can find a smallest logic which
contains it. Towards this result we now define complete lattices.
2.2.5 Definition. A lattice L = (L,∨,∧) is a complete lattice if ∧C exists for all C ⊆ L.
2.2.6 Lemma. Let the class of all logics be denoted N . Then N = (N,∪,∩) is a complete lattice
with
∧
C =
⋂
C for all C ⊆ N .
Proof. Let C ⊆ N . The fact that ⋂C contains all the logic axioms and is closed under modus
ponens, uniform substitution and generalization is immediate. Thus
⋂
C ∈ N . Dually∨C = ⋂Cu,
where Cu = {Λ ∈ N | (∀Ψ ∈ C)(Ψ ⊆ Λ)}.
2.2.7 Corollary. Let Γ ⊆ Form(Φ). There exists a smallest logic containing Γ, denoted K ⊕ Γ.
In particular, if Ψ is a logic such that Γ ⊆ Ψ then K ⊕ Γ ⊆ Ψ.
Proof. Consider the following set of logics: C = {Ψ ∈ N | Γ ⊆ Ψ}. We have that C is non-empty
as Form(Φ) ∈ C. Define K ⊕Γ as ⋂C. The set K ⊕Γ ∈ N since N is a complete lattice (Lemma
2.2.6). Also Γ ⊆ K ⊕ Γ since Γ ⊆ Ψ for all Ψ ∈ C by definition of C. Finally if Ψ ∈ N such that
Γ ⊆ Ψ then Ψ ∈ C (by definition of C) and K ⊕ Γ ⊆ Ψ since K ⊕ Γ = ⋂C. Thus we have shown
that K ⊕ Γ is the smallest logic containing Γ.
2.2.8 Remark. The K⊕ mapping (i.e. Γ 7→ K ⊕ Γ for Γ ⊆ Form(Φ)) is an order-preserving
mapping: if Γ1 ⊆ Γ2 then K ⊕Γ1 ⊆ K ⊕Γ2. To see this suppose Γ1 ⊆ Γ2. Then Γ1 ⊆ Γ2 ⊆ K ⊕Γ2
(by Corollary 2.2.7) and since K ⊕ Γ1 is the smallest logic containing Γ1 (Corollary 2.2.7) we have
K ⊕ Γ1 ⊆ K ⊕ Γ2. Therefore the logic K, which is defined as K ⊕∅, is the bottom of N since for
any logic Ψ we have ∅ ⊆ Ψ and K ⊕Ψ = Ψ (Corollary 2.2.7). The logic Form(Φ) is the top of N.
2.2.9 Definition. A logic Λ is finitely axiomatisable if there exists a Γ ⊆fin Form(Φ) such that
Λ = K ⊕ Γ.
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We now look at the notion of Λ-deduction.
2.2.10 Definition. Let Λ be a logic, let Γ ⊆ Form(Φ) and let ϕ ∈ Form(Φ). The formula ϕ is
Λ-deducible from Γ if `Λ ϕ or there exists ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Γ such that `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ ϕ. This is
denoted by Γ `Λ ϕ.
2.2.11 Example. Recall Γ = {3p,3p} from Example 2.1.23. We shall show Γ `K 33p. Also
recall the 3-generalization (3-gen) rule from Remark 2.2.4.
(1) `K p→ > tautology
(2) `K > → (¬p ∨ p) tautology
(3) `K > → (¬3p ∨3p) u.s.: 2
(4) `K p→ (¬3p ∨3p) prop. logic: 1,3
(5) `K 3p→ 3(¬3p ∨3p) 3-gen: 4
(6) `K ¬3p ∨3(¬3p ∨3p) → defn.: 5
(7) `K 3(p ∨ q)↔ (3p ∨3q) thm 2.2.3
(8) `K 3(¬3p ∨3p)↔ (3¬3p ∨33p) u.s.: 7
(9) `K (p↔ q)→ ((r ∨ p)↔ (r ∨ q)) tautology
(10) `K (3(¬3p ∨3p)↔ (3¬3p ∨33p))→
((¬3p ∨3(¬3p ∨3p))↔ (¬3p ∨ (3¬3p ∨33p))) u.s.: 9
(11) `K (¬3p ∨3(¬3p ∨3p))↔ (¬3p ∨ (3¬3p ∨33p)) m.p.: 8,10
(12) `K ¬3p ∨3¬3p ∨33p m.p.: 6,11
(13) `K ¬¬p↔ p tautology
(14) `K ¬3p ∨ ¬¬3¬3p ∨33p u.s.: 13; then
u.s. and m.p.: 9,12
(15) `K ¬3p ∨ ¬3p ∨33p  defn.: 14
(16) `K ¬¬(¬p ∨ ¬q)↔ (¬p ∨ ¬q) u.s.: 13
(17) `K ¬(p ∧ q)↔ (¬p ∨ ¬q) ∧ defn.: 16
(18) `K (¬3p ∨ ¬3p)↔ ¬(3p ∧3p) u.s.: 17
(19) `K (¬3p ∨ ¬3p ∨33p)↔ (¬(3p ∧3p) ∨33p) u.s. and m.p.: 9,18
(20) `K ¬(3p ∧3p) ∨33p m.p.: 15,19
(21) `K (3p ∧3p)→ 33p → defn.: 20
Note that in lines 14 and 19 we skipped a few steps; these are similar to the steps from lines
9–12. Also note that at some points we have taken the associativity and commutativity of ∨ for
granted; these properties can be shown by a uniform substitution on a propositional tautology.
These omissions were to prevent the derivation from becoming longer.
It is no mere coincidence that we have Γ `K 33p and Γ F 33p (Example 2.1.23, where F is the
class of all frames). We shall see in the next section (Theorem 2.3.18) that K is strongly complete
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with respect to F i.e. Σ F ϕ implies Σ `K ϕ for all Σ ⊆ Form(Φ) and all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ).
2.2.12 Definition. Let Γ ⊆ Form(Φ) and let Λ be a logic. Γ is said to be Λ-inconsistent if
Γ `Λ ⊥; otherwise Γ is said to be Λ-consistent.
2.2.13 Remark. Let Λ be a logic, let F be a non-empty class of frames such that Λ ⊆ ΛF (recall
from Remark 2.2.2 that ΛF = {ϕ ∈ Form(Φ) | F  ϕ}) and let M be a model based on a frame
F = (W,R) in F with w ∈ W . We shall show that the set Γ = {ϕ ∈ Form(Φ) | M, w  ϕ} is a
Λ-consistent set. Suppose Γ is Λ-inconsistent; thus either `Λ ⊥ or there exists ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Γ such
that `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ ⊥. The former case causes a contradiction since Λ ⊆ ΛF gives that ⊥ is
a validity on the non-empty frame class F . For the latter case we also derive a contradiction and
thus show Γ to be Λ-consistent:
(1) `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ ⊥
(2) `Λ (p→ q)→ (¬q → ¬p) tautology
(3) `Λ ((ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ ⊥)→ (> → ¬(ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)) u.s.: 2
(4) `Λ > → ¬(ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn) m.p.: 1,3
(5) `Λ ¬¬p↔ p tautology
(6) `Λ ¬¬(¬p1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬pn)↔ (¬p1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬pn) u.s.: 5
(7) `Λ ¬(p1 ∧ ... ∧ pn)↔ (¬p1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬pn) ∧ defn.: 6
(8) `Λ ¬(ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)↔ (¬ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ψn) u.s.: 7
(9) `Λ > → (¬ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ψn) prop. logic: 4,8
(10) `Λ > tautology
(11) `Λ ¬ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ψn m.p.: 9,10.
Consider the statement `Λ ¬ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ψn from line 11 of the above derivation. Since Λ ⊆ ΛF
we thus have that w  ¬ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬ψn and therefore w 6 ψi for some i ∈ {1, .., n}. However
ψi ∈ Γ = {ϕ ∈ Form(Φ) | M, w  ϕ} which gives w  ψi, a contradiction. Therefore Γ is
Λ-consistent.
2.2.14 Theorem. Let Γ ⊆ Form(Φ) and let Λ be a logic. The following are equivalent:
(i) Γ is Λ-inconsistent;
(ii) there exists ψ ∈ Form(Φ) such that Γ `Λ ψ ∧ ¬ψ;
(iii) Γ `Λ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ).
Proof. (i) =⇒ (ii) Let Γ `Λ ⊥. Therefore either `Λ ⊥ or `Λ (ψ1∧ ...∧ψn)→ ⊥ for ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Γ.
If `Λ ⊥ then (ii) is true since we have the tautology `Λ ⊥ → (p ∧ ¬p) which shows that for any
ϕ ∈ Form(Φ) we will have `Λ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ and in particular the result Γ `Λ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ will hold. Suppose
alternatively that `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ ⊥ for ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Γ. Let χ = ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn, we thus have:
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(1) `Λ χ→ ⊥
(2) `Λ ¬χ see derivation in Remark 2.2.13
(3) `Λ p→ (q → (p ∧ q)) tautology
(4) `Λ ¬χ→ (χ→ (¬χ ∧ χ)) u.s.: 3
(5) `Λ χ→ (¬χ ∧ χ) m.p.: 2,4
(6) `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ (¬χ ∧ χ) χ defn.: 5.
We thus have that χ satisfies the condition from (ii).
(ii) =⇒ (iii) Let Γ `Λ ψ ∧ ¬ψ for some ψ ∈ Form(Φ) and let ϕ ∈ Form(Φ). We will show that
Γ `Λ ϕ. If `Λ ψ ∧ ¬ψ then `Λ ⊥ and the result is immediate (see lines 4 and 5 below). Suppose
`Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ) where {ψ1, ..., ψn} ⊆ Γ:
(1) `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)
(2) `Λ (p ∧ ¬p)→ ⊥ tautology
(3) `Λ (ψ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ⊥ u.s.: 2
(4) `Λ ⊥ → p tautology
(5) `Λ ⊥ → ϕ u.s.: 4
(6) `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn)→ ϕ prop. logic: 1,3,5.
(iii) =⇒ (i) is trivial.
2.3 Completeness with respect to frame classes
It is natural to ask whether our syntactic and semantic descriptions of validities match up i.e. given
a logic Λ is there a frame class F such that Λ = ΛF ?
2.3.1 Definition. Let Λ be a logic and let F be a frame class. The logic Λ is sound with respect
to F if Λ ⊆ ΛF .
2.3.2 Remark. Let Γ ⊆ Form(Φ) and let F be a frame class. Suppose we want to show K ⊕Γ ⊆
ΛF . Since K ⊕ Γ is the smallest logic containing Γ (Corollary 2.2.7), it suffices to show that ΛF
is a logic containing Γ. But by Remark 2.2.2 we already have that ΛF is a logic. Thus to prove
K ⊕ Γ ⊆ ΛF it suffices to only show Γ ⊆ ΛF .
2.3.3 Example. Let D = p→ 3p and define the class of right unbounded frames as ruFrm =
{(W,R) | (∀w ∈ W )(∃w1 ∈ W )(Rww1)}. We shall show K ⊕ {D} ⊆ ΛruFrm. From the previous
remark all we need to check is that ruFrm  D. To this end let F = (W,R) ∈ ruFrm, let w ∈W
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and let V : Φ→ P(W ). Suppose (F , V ), w  p. Since F ∈ ruFrm there exists w1 ∈W such that
Rww1. Thus w1  p and thus w  3p. Therefore w  D and ruFrm  D.
2.3.4 Example. Let F be a frame class. Since K = K ⊕ ∅ is the bottom of the logic lattice N
(Remark 2.2.8) and ΛF is a logic (Remark 2.2.2), we have that K is sound with respect F .
2.3.5 Definition. Let Λ be a logic and let F be a frame class. The logic Λ is strongly complete
with respect to F if Γ F ϕ implies Γ `Λ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ) and all Γ ⊆ Form(Φ). When
F  ϕ implies `Λ ϕ for all ϕ in Form(Φ), the logic Λ is said to be weakly complete or simply
complete with respect to F .
2.3.6 Remark. It can be checked that strong completeness implies weak completeness.
Now given a logic Λ and a frame class F , we can rephrase the statement Λ = ΛF as: Λ is sound
and complete with respect to F ; the logic Λ is said to be characterised by F . Demonstrating
Λ ⊆ ΛF comes down to showing that the Λ axioms are validities on F (Remark 2.3.2). However,
showing that Λ is complete with respect to F is in general not as straightforward as demonstrating
soundness. The following simple theorem will translate the problem of showing strong-completeness
to a model satisfaction problem.
2.3.7 Theorem. Let Λ be a logic and let F be a frame class. Λ is strongly complete with respect
to F iff every Λ-consistent set of formulae Γ is satisfiable in a model M based on a frame F in F .
Proof. =⇒ We prove the contrapositive. Let Γ be a Λ-consistent set of formulae that is not
satisfiable in any model based on a frame in F . Since Γ is Λ-consistent there exists a ϕ ∈ Form(Φ)
such that Γ 6`Λ ϕ (Theorem 2.2.14). Recall from Definition 2.1.22 that Γ F ϕ ifM, w  Γ implies
M, w  ϕ for all modelsM based on a frame in F and all points w inM. Since Γ is not satisfiable
in any model based on a frame in F we then vacuously have Γ F ϕ. Thus Λ is not strongly
complete with respect to F since we have Γ F ϕ and Γ 6`Λ ϕ.
⇐= We prove the contrapositive. Suppose Λ is not strongly complete with respect to F . Then there
exists a Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Form(Φ) such that Γ F ϕ and Γ 6`Λ ϕ. The set Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is Λ-consistent. To
see this suppose towards a contradiction that Γ∪{¬ϕ} is Λ-inconsistent. Therefore Γ∪{¬ϕ} `Λ ϕ
(Theorem 2.2.14) and thus either `Λ ϕ or `Λ (ψ1∧...∧ψn)→ ϕ for ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Γ∪{¬ϕ}. The former
case (`Λ ϕ) leads to a contradiction since Γ 6`Λ ϕ. In the latter case there are two scenarios: either
ψ1, ..., ψn ⊆ Γ or ψi = ¬ϕ for some i ∈ {1, ..., n}. If ψ1, ..., ψn ⊆ Γ then this contradicts Γ 6`Λ ϕ.
Suppose then that ψi = ¬ϕ for some i ∈ {1, ..., n} then we have `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ¬ϕ ∧ ... ∧ ψn) → ϕ
i.e. `Λ (χ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ ϕ where χ =
∧n
k 6=i,k=1 ψk. By definition of → we then have `Λ ¬(χ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∨ ϕ;
it can be shown that this implies `Λ ¬χ ∨ ϕ ∨ ϕ which in turn implies `Λ χ → ϕ, a contradiction
since Γ 6`Λ ϕ. Thus Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is Λ-consistent. The Λ-consistent set of formulae Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is not
satisfiable in any model based on a frame in F since if it were, we would arrive at a contradiction
as Γ F ϕ.
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Motivated by this theorem we begin the construction of a model on which all of the Λ-consistent
sets of formulae will be satisfied, a canonical model [26].
2.3.8 Definition. Let Λ be a logic and let Γ ⊆ Form(Φ). The set Γ is a Λ-maximal consistent set
(Λ-MCS) if Γ is a Λ-consistent set and Γ ⊆ Σ implies Γ = Σ for all Λ-consistent sets Σ.
2.3.9 Example. Recall Remark 2.2.13: Λ is a logic, F is a class of frames such that Λ ⊆ ΛF ,M is
a model based on a frame F = (W,R) in F with w ∈W and Γ = {ϕ | w  ϕ}. We shall show Γ is
a Λ-MCS. Γ has already been shown to be Λ-consistent. In order to show Γ is a Λ-MCS we will
show that any set of formulae that properly contains Γ must be Λ-inconsistent. Let Σ ⊆ Form(Φ)
such that Γ ⊂ Σ and let ϕ ∈ Σ \ Γ. We have w 6 ϕ and thus w  ¬ϕ. Thus ¬ϕ ∈ Γ. But Γ ⊂ Σ
thus ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. Therefore Σ `Λ ⊥ since `Λ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ ⊥. Thus Σ is Λ-inconsistent.
The following result shows that any Λ-consistent set can be extended to a Λ-MCS.
2.3.10 Lemma. (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) Let Λ be a logic and let Σ be a Λ-consistent set. There
exists a Λ-MCS Σ+ such that Σ ⊆ Σ+.
Proof. Consider Σ+ =
∞⋃
n=0
Σn where Σ0 is defined as Σ and Σn is defined inductively as:
Σn+1 =
Σn ∪ {ϕn} if this is Λ-consistentΣn ∪ {¬ϕn} otherwise
where ϕ1, ϕ2, ... is an enumeration of Form(Φ) (this is possible since we assume a countable Φ). We
have that Σn is Λ-consistent for all n. The proof comes down to the fact that if Σn is Λ-consistent
and Σn ∪{ϕn} is Λ-inconsistent then Σn ∪{¬ϕn} is Λ-consistent. We shall now look at why this is
true. Since Σn ∪ {ϕn} is Λ-inconsistent we have `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψl) → ⊥ for ψ1, ..., ψl ∈ Σn ∪ {ϕn}.
There exists a j ∈ {1, ..., l} such that ψj = ϕn (otherwise Σn would be Λ-inconsistent). It can be
shown that this leads to `Λ
∧l
i 6=j,i=1 ψi → ¬ϕn i.e. Σn `Λ ¬ϕn. Suppose towards a contradiction
that Σn∪{¬ϕn} is Λ-inconsistent i.e. `Λ (σ1∧ ...∧σm)→ ⊥ where σ1, ..., σm ∈ Σn∪{¬ϕn}. By the
same reasoning as before we have σk = ¬ϕn for some k ∈ {1, ...,m} and thus `Λ
∧m
i 6=k,i=1 σi → ϕn
i.e. Σn `Λ ϕn. But we also have Σn `Λ ¬ϕn i.e. Σn is Λ-inconsistent (Theorem 2.2.14), a
contradiction.
Thus given Σn is Λ-consistent for all n, we have Σ
+ is Λ-consistent. To see this suppose Σ+ is
Λ-inconsistent i.e. `Λ (ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn) → ⊥ for ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Σ+. By definition of Σ+ we have for
all i ∈ {1, ..., n} that ψi ∈ Σf(i) for some f : {1, ..., n} → N. Since Σn ⊆ Σn+1 for all n, we have
ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Σmax1≤i≤nf(i) and thus ⊥ is Λ-deducible from Σmax1≤i≤nf(i). This causes a contradiction
since Σmax1≤i≤nf(i) is Λ-consistent.
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To see Σ+ is a Λ-MCS consider Σ+ ⊂ Γ ⊆ Form(Φ) with χ ∈ Γ \ Σ+ and suppose the formula χ
is equal to ϕi in the enumeration of Form(Φ). By the definition of Σi+1 we have:
Σi+1 =
Σi ∪ {ϕi} if this is Λ-consistentΣi ∪ {¬ϕi} otherwise.
The set Σi ∪ {ϕi} is Λ-inconsistent else otherwise we would have Σi+1 = Σi ∪ {ϕi} which would
contradict the fact that ϕi 6∈ Σ+. Thus Σi+1 = Σi ∪ {¬ϕi} and therefore ¬ϕi ∈ Σ+ ⊂ Γ. From this
we deduce that Γ `Λ ϕi ∧ ¬ϕi i.e. Γ is Λ-inconsistent.
2.3.11 Theorem. Let Λ be a logic and let Σ be a Λ-MCS. The following hold:
(i) for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ) either ϕ ∈ Σ or ¬ϕ ∈ Σ;
(ii) Σ is closed under modus ponens;
(iii) Λ ⊆ Σ;
(iv) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Form(Φ) we have ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Σ iff ϕ ∈ Σ or ψ ∈ Σ.
Proof. (i) Let ϕ ∈ Form(Φ). Consider the set Σ ∪ {ϕ}. If Σ ∪ {ϕ} is Λ-consistent then, since Σ is
a Λ-MCS, we would have Σ = Σ∪{ϕ} and thus ϕ ∈ Σ. If Σ∪{ϕ} is Λ-inconsistent then Σ∪{¬ϕ}
is Λ-consistent (see proof of Lemma 2.3.10) and similarly ¬ϕ ∈ Σ.
(ii) Let ϕ,ψ ∈ Form(Φ) and let ϕ,ϕ → ψ ∈ Σ. If ψ ∈ Σ then we are done. Suppose towards a
contradiction that ψ 6∈ Σ. Thus by (i) we have ¬ψ ∈ Σ. Now, as Λ is a logic (and consequently
contains all propositional tautologies) we know that `Λ (p ∧ ¬p) → ⊥ which leads to the fact
that `Λ ((ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)) → ⊥ under uniform substitution. It is also straightforward
to show that `Λ ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ↔ (ϕ → ψ). Thus we have both that ϕ,¬ψ,ϕ → ψ ∈ Σ and
`Λ ((ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ (ϕ→ ψ))→ ⊥ which is a contradiction to Σ being Λ-consistent.
(iii) Let `Λ ϕ. If ϕ ∈ Σ then we are done. Suppose towards a contradiction that ϕ 6∈ Σ. By
statement (i) we then have ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. As Λ is a logic we know that `Λ p↔ (p∨ (p∧¬p)) which leads
to `Λ ϕ↔ (ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)) under uniform substitution. Since `Λ ϕ it follows that `Λ ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ).
It is straightforward to demonstrate that `Λ (ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)) ↔ (¬ϕ → (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)). Therefore we
have both that ¬ϕ ∈ Σ and `Λ ¬ϕ → (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) which, by Theorem 2.2.14, implies that Σ is
Λ-inconsistent, a contradiction.
(iv) Let ϕ,ψ ∈ Form(Φ). Suppose ψ∨ϕ 6∈ Σ. We will show ¬ϕ ∈ Σ and ¬ψ ∈ Σ. By statement (i)
we have ¬(ψ ∨ ϕ) ∈ Σ. But `Λ ¬(ψ ∨ ϕ)↔ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ); due to the fact that Λ ⊆ Σ and Σ is closed
under modus ponens (statements (ii), (iii)) we have that (¬ϕ∧¬ψ) ∈ Σ. Since `Λ (¬ϕ∧¬ψ)→ ¬ϕ
and `Λ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) → ¬ψ we have ¬ϕ ∈ Σ and ¬ψ ∈ Σ again by statements (ii) and (iii). The
reverse implication follows by similar reasoning.
2.3.12 Definition. Let Λ be a logic. The canonical model for Λ is MΛ=(WΛ, RΛ, V Λ) where
WΛ = {Σ ⊆ Form(Φ) | Σ is a Λ-MCS}, V Λ(p) = {Σ ∈ WΛ | p ∈ Σ} and RΛΓ1Γ2 iff ϕ ∈ Γ2
implies 3ϕ ∈ Γ1 for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ). The canonical frame for Λ is FΛ = (WΛ, RΛ).
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2.3.13 Remark. V Λ and RΛ are referred to as the canonical valuation and canonical relation
respectively.
We will not state the full proofs of the following two lemmas. Their complete proofs can be found
in [1].
2.3.14 Lemma. Let Λ be a logic; RΛΓ1Γ2 iff ϕ ∈ Γ1 implies ϕ ∈ Γ2 for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ).
Proof. The proof uses the definition of RΛ (Definition 2.3.12) and the properties of Λ-MCS from
Theorem 2.3.11.
2.3.15 Lemma. Let Λ be a logic, let Γ ∈ WΛ and let ϕ ∈ Form(Φ). If 3ϕ ∈ Γ then there exists
Σ+ ∈WΛ such that RΛΓΣ+ and ϕ ∈ Σ+.
Proof. Let 3ϕ ∈ Γ. Consider the set Σ = {ϕ} ∪ {ψ | ψ ∈ Γ}. The fact that 3ϕ ∈ Γ can be
used to check that Σ is Λ-consistent. From Lindenbaum’s Lemma (Lemma 2.3.10) there exists
Σ+ ∈WΛ such that Σ ⊆ Σ+. We have by the construction of Σ that ϕ ∈ Σ+ and RΛΓΣ+ (Lemma
2.3.14).
The preceding results seem to suggest that in a canonical model a formula is satisfied at a Λ-MCS
if and only if it is an element of the Λ-MCS. We will now give a formal proof of this. As with
many results that we explore, the theorem is proved by induction on the length of formulae.
2.3.16 Theorem. Let Λ be a logic and let Γ be a Λ-MCS. For all ψ ∈ Form(Φ): MΛ,Γ  ψ iff
ψ ∈ Γ.
Proof. We want to show for all ψ ∈ Form(Φ) that:
MΛ,Γ  ψ iff ψ ∈ Γ. (2.3.1)
Base case: Suppose k(ψ) = 01; then ψ = p ∈ Φ or ψ = ⊥. In the former case MΛ,Γ  p iff
Γ ∈ V Λ(p) iff p ∈ Γ by definition of the canonical valuation (Definition 2.3.12). In the latter case:
since MΛ,Γ 6 ⊥ and ⊥ 6∈ Γ (as Γ is Λ-consistent) we have MΛ,Γ  ⊥ iff ⊥ ∈ Γ.
Inductive hypothesis: Assume statement 2.3.1 is true for all ψ ∈ Form(Φ) such that k(ψ) < n.
1k(ψ) returns the number of connectives in ψ.
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Inductive step: Let k(ψ) = n. Thus for ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Form(Φ) we have either:
ψ =

ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 (i)
¬ϕ (ii)
3ϕ (iii).
(i) MΛ,Γ  ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff MΛ,Γ  ϕ1 or MΛ,Γ  ϕ2. From the inductive hypothesis Γ  ϕ1 or Γ 
ϕ2 iff ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ. From part (iv) of Theorem 2.3.11 ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ iff ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ Γ.
(ii) MΛ,Γ  ¬ϕ iff MΛ,Γ 6 ϕ. From the inductive hypothesis Γ 6 ϕ iff ϕ 6∈ Γ. Part (i) of
Theorem 2.3.11 gives ϕ 6∈ Γ iff ¬ϕ ∈ Γ (¬ϕ ∈ Γ implies ϕ 6∈ Γ since otherwise Γ would be Λ-
inconsistent).
(iii) =⇒ Let MΛ,Γ  3ϕ. Then there exists Γ′ ∈WΛ such that RΛΓΓ′ and MΛ,Γ′  ϕ. By the
inductive hypothesis ϕ ∈ Γ′. But since RΛΓΓ′ this gives 3ϕ ∈ Γ.
⇐= Let 3ϕ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 2.3.15 there exists Γ′ ∈ WΛ such that RΛΓΓ′ and ϕ ∈ Γ′. By the
inductive hypothesis we have Γ′  ϕ. Therefore Γ  3ϕ.
2.3.17 Remark. The case when ψ is > or ϕ falls under case (ii) since by definition > = ¬⊥ and
ϕ = ¬3¬ϕ. When ψ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, this falls under cases (i) and (ii) since ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 = ¬(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2).
2.3.18 Theorem. (Canonical Model Theorem) Let Λ be a logic; then Λ is strongly complete with
respect to {FΛ}.
Proof. By Theorem 2.3.7 Λ is strongly complete with respect to {FΛ} if and only if every Λ-
consistent set is satisfiable in a model based on FΛ. Let Γ be a Λ-consistent set. Then by Linden-
baum’s lemma (Lemma 2.3.10) there exists a Λ-MCS, Γ+, extending Γ. Therefore by Theorem
2.3.16 MΛ,Γ+  Γ.
The canonical model theorem shows that for a logic Λ and frame class F , if the canonical frame FΛ
is in F then Λ is strongly complete with respect F . With this we can see K is strongly complete
with respect to the class of all basic frames F since FK is a basic frame. This offers a pain-free
alternative proof to Example 2.2.11. Here are another two worked examples that are amenable to
the canonical method.
2.3.19 Example. Recall Example 2.3.3: D = p→ 3p and ruFrm = {(W,R) | (∀w ∈W )(∃w′ ∈
W )(Rww′)}. We shall show K ⊕ {D} is strongly complete with respect to ruFrm. From the
above results, all we need to check is FK⊕{D} ∈ ruFrm. Let Γ ∈ WK⊕{D} and consider the set
S = {Γ1 ∈ WK⊕{D} | RK⊕{D}ΓΓ1}. If S 6= ∅ then we are done. Suppose S = ∅ then vacuously
Γ  p. But Γ  D (since K ⊕ {D} ⊆ Γ (Theorem 2.3.11) and D ∈ Γ implies Γ  D (Theorem
2.3.16)). Thus Γ  3p, which gives a contradiction to S being empty. Therefore together with the
soundness result of Example 2.3.3 we now have K ⊕ {D} = ΛruFrm.
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2.3.20 Example. Let 1.1 = 3p→ p and define the class of partial function frames as pfFrm =
{(W,R) | (∀a, b, c ∈ W )(Rab & Rac =⇒ b = c)}. We will show that K ⊕ {1.1} is strongly
complete with respect to pfFrm. Let RK⊕{1.1}Γ1Γ2, RK⊕{1.1}Γ1Γ3 and ϕ ∈ Γ2. We shall show
ϕ ∈ Γ3. We have by definition of RK⊕{1.1} (see Definition 2.3.12) that 3ϕ ∈ Γ1 and thus Γ1  3ϕ
(Theorem 2.3.16). But 3ϕ → ϕ ∈ Γ1 (`K⊕{1.1} 3ϕ → ϕ under uniform substitution of 1.1
and K ⊕ {1.1} ⊆ Γ1 by Theorem 2.3.11). Therefore Γ1  3ϕ → ϕ (Theorem 2.3.16) and thus
Γ1  ϕ. This shows that Γ3  ϕ and thus ϕ ∈ Γ3 (Theorem 2.3.16). Therefore Γ2 ⊆ Γ3 and it can
be similarly demonstrated that Γ3 ⊆ Γ2. Thus Γ2 = Γ3 and FK⊕{1.1} ∈ pfFrm giving K ⊕ {1.1}
is strongly complete with respect to pfFrm. It can easily be checked that 1.1 ∈ ΛpfFrm and thus
K ⊕ {1.1} is sound with respect to pfFrm (see Remark 2.3.2 for why this suffices for a soundness
proof). We thus have K ⊕ {1.1} = ΛpfFrm.
The previous two examples have offered two logics that are sound and strongly complete with respect
to a frame class. However there exist many logics lacking this property, for example K⊕{L} where
L is the Lo¨b axiom: (p→ p)→ p. To see this suppose K⊕{L} is sound and strongly complete
with respect to a frame class F . Thus every K ⊕ {L}-consistent set of formulae is satisfiable in a
model based on a frame in F (Theorem 2.3.7). It can be shown that there is a K ⊕ {L}-consistent
set that can only be satisfied in a model with infinite paths. But L forces only finite paths on any
frame F for which F  L, a contradiction. Thus K ⊕{L} is not sound and strongly complete with
respect to any frame class.
2.4 The finite model property
As noted in Section 1.2 a finitely axiomatisable logic (Definition 2.2.9) which has the finite model
property is decidable [16].
2.4.1 Definition. Let Λ be a logic and let F be a frame class. The logic Λ is said to have the
finite model property (fmp) with respect to F if the following property holds: `Λ ϕ if and only if
Ffin  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ).
2.4.2 Remark. If Λ is sound and complete with respect to a frame class F such that F  ϕ if
and only if Ffin  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ), then by definition Λ has the finite model property with
respect to F .
Since, in the previous section, we already looked at methods of proving soundness and completeness,
for the proof of the finite model property we will focus on how to show that that the validities of F
and Ffin are the same i.e. Ffin  ϕ implies F  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ)2. In particular we will look
2By definition we already have F  ϕ implies Ffin  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Form(Φ).
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at the contrapositive of Ffin  ϕ implies F  ϕ, which states that if there is a model M based on
a frame (W,R) in F with w ∈ W such that M, w  ¬ϕ then there exists a model M′ based on a
frame (W ′, R′) in Ffin with w′ ∈ W ′ such that M′, w′  ¬ϕ. We will now discuss a technique for
proving this which involves constructing a finite model by identifying points. In particular we will
look at a filtration of a model [26].
2.4.3 Definition. LetM = (W,R, V ) and let Σ ⊆ Form(Φ). Define the relation ∼Σ onM as ∼Σ
= {(w,w1) ∈W 2 | (∀ϕ ∈ Σ)(w  ϕ ⇐⇒ w1  ϕ)}.
2.4.4 Remark. It is routine to check that ∼Σ is an equivalence relation on W .
2.4.5 Remark. The equivalence class of w under ∼Σ (the set {w′ ∈W | w ∼Σ w′}) is denoted by
|w|Σ or simply |w| when Σ is inferred from the context.
2.4.6 Definition. Let Σ ⊆ Form(Φ) be a subformula closed set (Σ contains all of its subformulae)
and let M = (W,R, V ). A filtration of M through Σ is a model MΣ = (WΣ, RΣ, V Σ) where
WΣ = W
/∼Σ, V Σ(p) = {|w| ∈WΣ | w ∈ V (p)} for p ∈ Σ, and RΣ is defined to have the following
properties:
(i) Rw1w2 implies R
Σ|w1||w2|;
(ii) RΣ|w1||w2| and w2  ϕ imply w1  3ϕ for all 3ϕ ∈ Σ.
The filtration MΣ is a model based on the frame FΣ = (WΣ, RΣ).
2.4.7 Example. Given a subformula closed set Σ and model M = (W,R, V ), it can easily be
checked that the relation RΣ,s on WΣ given by RΣ,s|w1||w2| iff there exists u1 ∈ |w1| and u2 ∈ |w2|
such that Ru1u2, fulfils conditions (i) and (ii) of a filtration relation. Given any filtration relation
RΣ on WΣ, it is immediate that RΣ,s ⊆ RΣ by the definition of RΣ,s and property (i) of RΣ.
The largest filtration relation (relative to set inclusion) on WΣ is RΣ,l|w1||w2| iff w2  ϕ implies
w1  3ϕ for all 3ϕ ∈ Σ.
2.4.8 Example. Consider the model M as shown:
3p p
w1 w2 w3
If we filtrate M through the subformula closed set Σ = {p,3p} using the largest filtration RΣ,l
then we get MΣ as:
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3p p
|w1| |w2| |w3|
Most of the arrows are added vacuously, for instance: RΣ,l|w2||w1| since w1 6 p and 3p is the only
diamond formula in Σ, thus for all 3ϕ ∈ Σ we have w1  ϕ implies w2  3ϕ. Notice how the
filtration does not preserve the transitivity ofM; the filtration relation RΣ,t|w1||w2| iff w2  ϕ∨3ϕ
implies w1  3ϕ for all 3ϕ ∈ Σ, will preserve the transitivity of M.
Towards demonstrating that the filtration construction will prove the finite model property, we
must first show that a filtration through a finite subformula closed set is finite.
2.4.9 Lemma. Given a model M = (W,R, V ) and a subformula closed set Σ with |Σ| = n, we
have |WΣ| ≤ 2n.
Proof. Consider the map m : WΣ → P(Σ) by m(|w|) = {ϕ ∈ Σ | M, w  ϕ}. It remains to check
that m is a well-defined injective map and thus |WΣ| ≤ |P(Σ)| = 2n. The map m is a well-defined
injective map since: |w1| = |w2| iff w1 ∼Σ w2 iff {ϕ ∈ Σ | M, w1  ϕ} = {ϕ ∈ Σ | M, w2  ϕ} iff
m(|w1|) = m(|w2|).
We still have not checked whether the formulae in Σ that are satisfiable onM are also satisfiable on
MΣ. The Definition 2.4.6 of RΣ will suffice to prove this in an induction on the length of formulae;
this is also where the subformula condition for Σ is necessary. We will state the result without
proof (see Theorem 2.39 of [1]).
2.4.10 Theorem. Let Σ be a subformula closed set and let M = (W,R, V ) be a model. For all
w ∈W and all ϕ ∈ Σ: M, w  ϕ iff MΣ, |w|  ϕ.
Therefore suppose we have M based on a frame in a given frame class F with M, w  ϕ. If we
filtrateM through sub(ϕ) = {ψ | ψ subformula of ϕ} we will have a finite modelMΣ (since sub(ϕ)
is finite; Theorem 2.4.9) with MΣ, |w|  ϕ (since ϕ ∈ sub(ϕ); Theorem 2.4.10). All that remains
to show the validities of F and Ffin are the same is to check thatMΣ is based on a frame in F , in
particular, FΣ ∈ F .
2.4.11 Example. Define the class of Euclidean frames E={(W,R) | (∀w1, w2, w3 ∈ W )(Rw1w2
& Rw1w3 =⇒ Rw2w3)}. The following diagram shows a member of E.
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w2
w1
w3
We shall show that the validities of E and Efin are the same. Let M be a model based on a
F = (W,R) in E withM, w  ϕ. Consider the filtration ofM through Σ = sub(ϕ) by the relation
RΣ|w1||w2| iff w2  ψ implies w1  3ψ for all 3ψ ∈ Σ;
w1  3ψ implies w2  3ψ for all 3ψ ∈ Σ;
w2  33ψ implies w2  3ψ for all 33ψ ∈ Σ.
The relation RΣ satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 2.4.6. In particular to see that the
relation satisfies condition (i), consider w1 ∈W and w2 ∈W such that Rw1w2. We will show that
the three implications above are satisfied and hence that RΣ|w1||w2|. By definition, if w2  ψ then
w1  3ψ for all 3ψ ∈ Σ. For the second implication suppose w1  3ψ for some 3ψ ∈ Σ. Therefore
there exists w ∈ W such that Rw1w and w  ψ. Since Rw1w2, Rw1w and F ∈ E we have Rw2w
and hence w2  3ψ. For the third implication suppose w2  33ψ for some 33ψ ∈ Σ. Therefore
there exists w ∈W and w′ ∈W such that Rw2w, Rww′ and w′  ψ. Since Rw1w2 and F ∈ E, we
know that Rw2w2; together with the fact that Rw2w and F ∈ E, this implies that Rww2. Thus
we have Rww2, Rww
′ and F ∈ E which together imply that Rw2w′ and hence w2  3ψ. The
following diagram depicts the situation (where the extra relations follow as F is Euclidean).
w1 w2 w w
′
Note that the definition of RΣ also ensures that FΣ ∈ E.
2.5 Algebraic semantics of modal logic
In this section we take for granted the notions of subalgebra, homomorphism and Boolean algebra.
See [5] for the relevant material.
Up to now we have been concerned with the relational semantics of modal logic. However another
interpretation of modal logic is through algebra. This is not foreign as the truth table semantics of
propositional calculus are nothing more than algebraic semantics under the 2 = {0, 1} algebra.
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We begin with the general definition of an algebra: algebras of type t (recall Definition 2.1.1).
2.5.1 Definition. Let t = (O, ζ) be a type. An algebra of type t is a structure A = (A, gA)g∈t
where A is a non-empty set, called the carrier set, and (gA)g∈t is a family of functions on A, the
fundamental operations of A, with arity(gA) = ζ(g) for all g ∈ t.
2.5.2 Example. Let Bool be the Boolean type and let τ be the basic modal type. The term algebra
of type Bool ∪ τ3 over Φ, denoted Tτ (Φ), is defined with carrier set Form(τ,Φ) and operations
∨Tτ (Φ)(ϕ,ψ) = ϕ ∨ ψ, ∧Tτ (Φ)(ϕ,ψ) = ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬Tτ (Φ)(ϕ) = ¬ϕ, 3Tτ (Φ)(ϕ) = 3ϕ; the nullary
operations 0Tτ (Φ) and 1Tτ (Φ) are identified with the formulae ⊥ and > respectively. For a term
ϕ ∈ Tτ (Φ) the set st(ϕ) denotes the set of subterms of ϕ. The carrier of the term algebra will be
denoted by Tτ (Φ) or Form(τ,Φ).
2.5.3 Remark. For a modal type τ and algebra A of type Bool ∪ τ , we will often write g for the
fundamental operation gA for all g ∈ Bool. For all 4 ∈ τ the fundamental operation 4A will be
denoted by f4 or just f when τ is the basic modal type.
For the sake of readability the results for the remainder of this section (as well as those of Sections
2.6 and 2.7) will be presented with τ as the basic modal type (in this circumstance the term algebra
will be denoted by T(Φ)). Motivated by the characteristics of the diamond (Theorem 2.2.3) we
look at the notion of an operator on an algebra.
2.5.4 Definition. Let τ be the basic modal type and let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f) be an algebra of
type Bool ∪ τ . The function f is said to be a normal operator on A (or simply operator on A) if
it preserves joins and the bottom i.e. for all x, y ∈ A :
(i) f(x ∨ y) = f(x) ∨ f(y);
(ii) f(0) = 0.
2.5.5 Definition. Let τ be the basic modal type. A modal algebra (or Boolean algebra with
operators) is an algebra A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f) of type Bool ∪ τ such that (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) is a
Boolean algebra and f is an operator on A.
2.5.6 Example. Let F = (W,R) be a frame and recall the mapping mR : P(W )→ P(W ) defined
by mR(S) = {w ∈W | (∃w′ ∈ S)(Rww′)}. It can easily be checked mR is an operator on the power
set Boolean algebra (P(W ),⋃,⋂,−,∅,W ) where − refers to set complementation.
2.5.7 Definition. Let F = (W,R) be a frame. The full complex algebra of F is the modal
algebra F+ = (P(W ),⋃,⋂,−,∅,W,mR). A proper sub-algebra of a full complex algebra is called
a complex algebra.
3Bool ∪ τ is defined as ({∨,∧,¬,3, 0, 1}, {(∨, 2), (∧, 2), (¬, 1), (3, 1), (0, 0), (1, 0)}).
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Modal algebras are good candidates for modal logic semantics since they have a Boolean algebra
structure and an operator for the Boolean and modal formula semantics respectively. It is natural
for algebraic semantics to be defined with respect to equations. For σ, ψ ∈ T (Φ) we write σ ≈ ψ for
an equation since equality depends on the particular evaluation of variables in σ, ψ in a particular
algebra. The following theorem will be used to define what it means for an equation to be a validity
on a modal algebra.
2.5.8 Theorem. Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f) be a modal algebra and h : Φ → A. The mapping h
has a unique homomorphic extension h∗ to T(Φ). The following commutative diagram describes
the situation (where eΦ : Φ→ T (Φ) is defined by eΦ(p) = p).
Φ A
T (Φ)
h
eΦ
!h∗
Proof. Define h∗ as:
h∗(ϕ) =

0 ϕ = ⊥
h(p) ϕ = p ∈ Φ
¬h∗(ϕ1) ϕ = ¬ϕ1
h∗(ϕ1) ∨ h∗(ϕ2) ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
f(h∗(ϕ1)) ϕ = 3ϕ1.
From the definition it is immediate that h∗ is a homomorphism that extends h. Towards uniqueness
suppose j : T (Φ)→ A is an arbitrary homomorphism extending h i.e. j ◦ eΦ = h. Since h∗ ◦ eΦ = h
we have that j and h∗ agree on Φ. But homomorphisms are only defined up to generating subsets
and by the definition of T(Φ) (see Example 2.5.2) we have that Φ generates T(Φ), thus j = h∗.
2.5.9 Remark. In light of this theorem the statement that a logic is closed under uniform substi-
tution (from Definition 2.2.1) can be stated rigorously as: for all g : Φ → T (Φ) and all ϕ ∈ T (Φ),
`Λ ϕ implies `Λ g∗(ϕ).
2.5.10 Definition. Let σ, ψ ∈ T (Φ) and let A be a modal algebra. The equation σ ≈ ψ is valid
on A if g∗(σ) = g∗(ψ) for every A-assignment g : Φ → A. This is denoted by A |= σ ≈ ψ. The
formula σ is a validity on A if A |= σ≈ where σ≈ = σ ≈ >.
2.5.11 Definition. Let A be a class of modal algebras and let σ, ψ ∈ T (Φ). The equation σ ≈ ψ is
valid on A if A |= σ ≈ ψ for every A ∈ A. This is denoted A |= σ ≈ ψ. The formula σ is a validity
on A if σ≈ is valid on A.
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2.5.12 Example. Recall Example 2.3.3: D = p→ 3p and ruFrm = {(W,R) | (∀w ∈W )(∃w′ ∈
W )(Rww′)}. Let A be the class of full complex algebras F+ where F ∈ ruFrm. We will show
A |= D≈. Let F+ = (W,R)+ ∈ A and g : Φ → P(W ). We need to show g∗(D) = W as
g∗(>) = W . Now g∗(D) = g∗(p → 3p) = g∗(¬¬3¬p ∨ 3p) by definition of → and . Since
g∗ is a homomorphism we have g∗(¬¬3¬p ∨ 3p) = − −mR(−g∗(p)) ∪mR(g∗(p)) where − is set
complementation. Then − −mR(−g∗(p)) ∪mR(g∗(p)) = mR(−g∗(p)) ∪mR(g∗(p)) since ¬¬x = x
on a Boolean algebra. Then mR(−g∗(p)) ∪mR(g∗(p)) = mR(−g∗(p) ∪ g∗(p)) = mR(W ) since mR
is an operator on P(W ). But mR(W ) = W since F ∈ ruFrm. Thus g∗(D) = W and therefore
A |= D≈.
In general we have F  σ ↔ ψ iff F+ |= σ ≈ ψ. This comes down to the fact that the notions
of P(W )-assignment and valuation are the same and thus have equal homomorphic extensions to
T(Φ) (see Remark 2.1.15). In this way complex algebras precisely capture frame validity.
2.5.13 Definition. Let A be a class of modal algebras. The equational theory of A is the set of
formulae {σ ∈ T (Φ) | A |= σ≈} and is denoted by ΛA.
2.5.14 Remark. It can be demonstrated that for any class of modal algebras A the set ΛA is a
logic.
2.6 Completeness with respect to modal algebras
In this section we take for granted the notion of congruence. See [5] for the relevant material.
2.6.1 Definition. Let Λ be a logic and let A be a class of modal algebras. The logic Λ is said to
be sound with respect to A if `Λ σ ↔ ψ implies A |= σ ≈ ψ for all σ, ψ ∈ T (Φ). Λ is said to be
complete with respect to A if A |= σ ≈ ψ implies `Λ σ ↔ ψ for all σ, ψ ∈ T (Φ).
2.6.2 Remark. The proof that a logic is sound with respect to a class of modal algebras is
straightforward. It involves checking that the axioms of the logic are validities on the class of
algebras as well as checking that the validities of the class of algebras are closed under modus
ponens, uniform substitution and generalisation.
We shall now look at completeness of a logic with respect to a class of algebras. As we shall see, the
advantage of algebraic semantics is that, unlike with frames, every logic is complete with respect
to some class of algebras (Theorem 2.6.9). In particular we will show completeness with respect to
Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras: modal algebras formed by factoring equivalent formulae (modulo a
given logic) out of the term algebra. In Section 2.7 we will see that Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras
are the algebraic analogues of canonical models.
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2.6.3 Definition. Let Λ be a logic. The binary relation ≡Λ on T (Φ) is defined as {(σ, ψ) ∈
T (Φ)2 | `Λ σ ↔ ψ}.
2.6.4 Lemma. Let Λ be a logic. The relation ≡Λ is a congruence on T(Φ).
Proof. ≡Λ is an equivalence relation: Uniform substitution and modus ponens with the follow-
ing propositional tautologies serves to demonstrate that ≡Λ satisfies the desired properties of an
equivalence relation.
`Λ p↔ p reflexivity
`Λ (p↔ q)→ (q ↔ p) symmetry
`Λ ((p↔ q) ∧ (q ↔ r))→ (p↔ r) transitivity
≡Λ is a congruence: Uniform substitution and modus ponens with the following tautologies
will show that ≡Λ preserves the relevant operation on T(Φ).
`Λ (p↔ q)→ ((p ∨ r)↔ (q ∨ r)) ≡Λ preserves ∨
`Λ (p↔ q)→ ((p ∧ r)↔ (q ∧ r)) ≡Λ preserves ∧
`Λ (p↔ q)↔ (¬p↔ ¬q) ≡Λ preserves ¬
It can also be seen that ϕ ≡Λ ϕ1 implies 3ϕ ≡Λ 3ϕ1 by uniform substitution and modus po-
nens with the Λ formula (p→ q)→ (3p→ 3q) (Theorem 2.2.3).
2.6.5 Remark. Given a logic Λ, the equivalence class of ϕ under ≡Λ (the set {ψ ∈ T (Φ) | ψ ≡Λ ϕ})
is denoted by [ϕ]Λ or simply [ϕ].
2.6.6 Definition. Let Λ be a logic. The Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra over Λ is defined as LΛ(Φ) =
(T (Φ)
/≡Λ,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f) with the operations (∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f) defined as the canonical quotient
operations:
0 = [⊥]
1 = [>]
¬[ϕ] = [¬ϕ]
[ϕ] ∨ [ψ] = [ϕ ∨ ψ]
[ϕ] ∧ [ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ψ]
f [ϕ] = [3ϕ].
2.6.7 Remark. The fact that the operations on LΛ(Φ) are well defined is due precisely to the fact
that ≡Λ respects the algebraic operations on T(Φ) (Lemma 2.6.4).
2.6.8 Lemma. Let Λ be a logic. The algebra LΛ(Φ) is a modal algebra.
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Proof. The fact that the Lindenbaum–Tarski operations (∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) obey the Boolean algebra
axioms can be shown using the appropriate propositional tautologies in Λ. The function f on
LΛ(Φ) is an operator on LΛ(Φ) since `Λ 3(p ∨ q) ↔ (3p ∨ 3q) and `Λ 3⊥ ↔ ⊥ (Theorem
2.2.3).
2.6.9 Theorem. Let Λ be a logic. Then Λ is complete with respect to {LΛ(Φ)}.
Proof. Let σ, ψ ∈ T (Φ) and suppose 6`Λ σ ↔ ψ. We want to show {LΛ(Φ)} 6|= σ ≈ ψ. In particular
we will show there exists a g : Φ → LΛ(Φ) such that g∗(σ) 6= g∗(ψ). Consider the g : Φ → LΛ(Φ)
defined by g(p) = [p]. The fundamental operations on LΛ(Φ) facilitate a straightforward induction
on the length of formulae to show that g∗(ϕ) = [ϕ] for all ϕ ∈ T (Φ). Therefore g∗(σ) = [σ] and
g∗(ψ) = [ψ]. Since 6`Λ σ ↔ ψ it follows that g∗(σ) 6= g∗(ψ). Therefore Λ is complete with respect
to {LΛ(Φ)}.
2.6.10 Remark. To prove that a logic Λ is complete with respect to a class of modal algebras A,
this theorem shows it suffices to demonstrate LΛ(Φ) ∈ A.
2.7 The duality between frames and algebras
Up to now we have looked at aspects of modal validities through lenses that are apparently different:
frames and modal algebras. It is natural to ask whether there is some relationship between the
two approaches. In this section we will discuss how a representation theorem due to Jo´nsson and
Tarski holds for modal algebras and complex algebras, analogous to the Stone representation of
every Boolean algebra as a set algebra [21]. This is a useful result because in the same way that set
algebras model propositional logic, complex algebras model modal logic (see Example 2.5.12 and
paragraph following it).
In the same way that taking the full complex algebra of a frame (see Definition 2.5.7) takes us from
frames to modal algebras, we will now discuss a method of moving from modal algebras to frames.
2.7.1 Definition. Let B = (B,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) be a Boolean algebra and let C ⊆ B. The set C is a
filter of B if for all x, y ∈ B:
(i) x, y ∈ C implies x ∧ y ∈ C;
(ii) x ∈ C and x ≤ y implies y ∈ C;
(iii) 1 ∈ C.
A filter C of B is called a proper filter if 0 6∈ C. A maximal proper filter (relative to set in-
clusion) of B is called an ultrafilter of B. The set of ultrafilters of B is denoted UfB.
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We state the following theorem about ultrafilters without proof.
2.7.2 Theorem. Let B = (B,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) be a Boolean algebra and let C ⊆ B be a proper filter
of B. C is an ultrafilter of B iff y ∈ C or ¬y ∈ C for every y ∈ B.
2.7.3 Remark. An ultrafilter over a set W is an ultrafilter of the power set algebra P(W ). Every
ultrafilter over an infinite set W is uncountable. To see this consider an ultrafilter C over an infinite
set W . For S ∈ C, it is guaranteed that W \ S ∈ P(W ) \ C else otherwise we would have ∅ ∈ C
which is a contradiction to C being a proper filter. Thus consider the mapping t : C → P(W ) \ C
by t(S) = W \ S. It is easy to check that t is injective; the fact that t is surjective can be seen
from Theorem 2.7.2. Thus t is a bijection. Since W is infinite, P(W ) is uncountable by Cantor’s
theorem. The ultrafilter C cannot be countable as this would imply (by the bijectivity of t) that
P(W ) \ C is countable which would lead to C ∪ (P(W ) \ C) = P(W ) being countable.
We state the following theorem without proof.
2.7.4 Theorem. Let B = (B,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) be a Boolean algebra and let C ⊆ B be an ultrafilter of
B. For all x, y ∈ B, x ∨ y ∈ C iff x ∈ C or y ∈ C.
2.7.5 Definition. Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f) be a modal algebra. The ultrafilter frame of A is
the frame A+ = (UfA, Qf ) where Qf = {(C1, C2) ∈ UfA2 | (∀x ∈ C2)(f(x) ∈ C1)}.
Taking the ultrafilter frame of a modal algebra offers a construction that leads from modal algebras
to frames. The following diagram depicts the situation between the two settings of frames and
modal algebras.
Frames Modal algebras
F+
A+
One would know that ( )+ and ( )
+ are the ‘right’ constructions to move between the two settings
if one could recover A from A+
+ and F from F++ where A is a modal algebra and F is a frame.
The Jo´nsson–Tarski theorem shows this is indeed the case for algebras by stating that a modal
algebra A is embedded in its canonical algebra: A+
+. Furthermore it shows that every modal
algebra is isomorphic to a complex algebra, algebras that capture frame validity. This embedding
of a modal algebra into its canonical algebra has links to topology, in particular, Stone spaces (see
[8]). We will state the Jo´nsson–Tarski theorem [21] without proof (see Theorem 5.43 of [1]).
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2.7.6 Theorem. (Jo´nsson–Tarski Theorem) Let A be a modal algebra and consider A+
+, the
carrier set of the algebra A+
+. The map r : A→ A++ defined by r(x) = {C ∈ UfA | x ∈ C} is an
injective homomorphism.
It can also be shown that F = (W,R) is embedded in F++ = (Uf P(W ), QmR) by the map
w 7→ l(w) = {C ∈ Uf P(W ) | {w} ∈ C}. Notice the strong similarity of the Λ-MCS properties
(Theorem 2.3.11) and those of ultrafilters. The following theorem firmly establishes the connection
between the two.
2.7.7 Theorem. Let Λ be a logic. Then LΛ(Φ)+ ∼= FΛ.
3. PDL and the Modal µ-Calculus
3.1 Propositional dynamic logic (PDL)
The results in this section are taken from the sources [1] and [11]. For each result, the proof is
provided when we feel it offers some insight. When a proof is provided, we fill out more details
than those found in the source material.
PDL is a branch of modal logic where modalities represent the actions of programs. In this section
we will first look at the PDL type which contains more than one (possibility infinitely many) unary
modalities (Definition 3.1.1). Next we discuss regular frames which offer a relational interpretation
for PDL formulae (Definition 3.1.3). We then give the Segerberg axiomatisation of PDL (Definition
3.1.8) and finally we present a brief outline of the result of Fischer and Ladner which states that
PDL is decidable (Corollary 3.1.13).
Most of the results and definitions up to this point have been with respect to the basic modal type
and will be assumed to be suitably adjusted when used in the context of a multi-modal unary type
(see [1]).
3.1.1 Definition. The set of program symbols Π is defined recursively over a set of atomic program
symbols Π0 as pi = a | pi1;pi2 | pi1 ∪ pi2 | pi∗ where a ∈ Π0. The PDL type (denoted τ∗) is a modal
type consisting of unary modal symbols indexed by program symbols in Π (modal symbols are
written as 〈pi〉 for pi ∈ Π). The basic program type (denoted τ0) is a modal type consisting of unary
modal symbols indexed by atomic program symbols in Π0.
3.1.2 Remark. The formulae of PDL are the elements in the set Form(τ∗,Φ).
Intuitively pi1;pi2 represents the program which executes program pi1 then program pi2, the symbol
pi1 ∪ pi2 represents the program which executes program pi1 or program pi2. Finally, pi∗ represents
the program that executes program pi a finite (possibly zero) number of times. According to these
intended meanings, PDL formulae are interpreted on regular frames.
3.1.3 Definition. A τ∗-frame F = (W,R〈pi〉)pi∈Π is regular if for all pi, pi1, pi2 ∈ Π :
(i) R〈pi1;pi2〉 = R〈pi1〉 ◦R〈pi2〉;
(ii) R〈pi1∪pi2〉 = R〈pi1〉 ∪R〈pi2〉;
(iii) R〈pi∗〉 = R∗〈pi〉
where R〈pi1〉 ◦R〈pi2〉 is relation composition of R〈pi1〉 and R〈pi2〉, R∗〈pi〉 is the transitive reflexive closure
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of R〈pi〉. The class of regular frames is denoted RFrm. A τ∗-model is regular if it is based on a
regular τ∗-frame.
3.1.4 Example. Let Π0 = {a}; then τ∗ = {〈a〉 , 〈a∗〉 , 〈a; a∗〉 , ...}. The diagram below shows a
regular τ∗-model but only displaying the relations R〈a〉 (dashed) and R〈a∗〉.
p
w1 w2 w3
It can be seen w1  〈a∗〉 p, w2  〈a ∪ a∗〉 p and, although the relation is not shown, w1  〈a; a〉 p.
3.1.5 Remark. In Chapter 5 we will introduce the class of dynamic algebras D which provide an
algebraic semantics of PDL.
Intuitively, the set of worlds W of a regular frame can be viewed as the possible execution states of
a computer; a relation R〈pi〉 relates state w1 to state w2 if before program pi executes the computer is
in state w1 and afterwards, it is in state w2. In this way the formula 〈pi〉ϕ represents the statement
that ϕ holds after a possible execution of pi and [pi]ϕ = ¬ 〈pi〉 ¬ϕ expresses that ϕ holds after every
execution of pi.
We now look at the following result for the valuation of PDL formulae. This theorem will be used
to show that PDL is a fragment of the modal µ-calculus (Theorem 3.2.20).
3.1.6 Theorem. Let 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ, 〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ, 〈pi∗〉ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) and let M = (W,R〈pi〉, V )pi∈Π be a
regular τ∗-model. Then
V ∗(〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ) = mR〈pi1〉(mR〈pi2〉(V ∗(ϕ)))
V ∗(〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ) = mR〈pi1〉(V ∗(ϕ)) ∪mR〈pi2〉(V ∗(ϕ))
V ∗(〈pi∗〉ϕ) =
∞⋃
n=0
mnR〈pi〉(V
∗(ϕ))
where m0R〈pi〉(V
∗(ϕ)) = V ∗(ϕ) and mnR〈pi〉(V
∗(ϕ)) = (mR〈pi〉 ◦ ... ◦mR〈pi〉)(V ∗(ϕ)) nested n times.
Proof. Since M is a regular model we have
V ∗(〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ) = mR〈pi1;pi2〉(V ∗(ϕ))
= mR〈pi1〉◦R〈pi2〉(V
∗(ϕ)).
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Furthermore,
w ∈ mR〈pi1〉◦R〈pi2〉(V ∗(ϕ)) ⇐⇒ there exists a w′ ∈ V ∗(ϕ) such that R〈pi1〉 ◦R〈pi2〉ww′
⇐⇒ there exists a w′ ∈ V ∗(ϕ) and z ∈W such that R〈pi1〉wz and
R〈pi2〉zw
′
⇐⇒ w ∈ mR〈pi1〉(mR〈pi2〉(V ∗(ϕ))).
Similarly for the second result, since M is a regular model, we have
V ∗(〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ) = mR〈pi1∪pi2〉(V ∗(ϕ))
= mR〈pi1〉∪R〈pi2〉(V
∗(ϕ)).
The fact that mR〈pi1〉∪R〈pi2〉(V
∗(ϕ)) = mR〈pi1〉(V
∗(ϕ)) ∪ mR〈pi2〉(V ∗(ϕ)) follows directly from the
definition of R〈pi1〉 ∪R〈pi2〉. For the final result we have, again by the regularity assumption on M,
that
V ∗(〈pi∗〉ϕ) = mR〈pi∗〉(V ∗(ϕ))
= mR∗〈pi〉(V
∗(ϕ)).
Furthermore, since R∗〈pi〉 is the transitive closure of R〈pi〉, we have
w ∈ mR∗〈pi〉(V ∗(ϕ)) ⇐⇒ there exists a w′ ∈ V ∗(ϕ) such that R∗〈pi〉ww′
⇐⇒ there exists a w′ ∈ V ∗(ϕ) and a subset {w0, ..., wn} of W such that
w0 = w,wn = w
′ and R〈pi〉wiwi+1 for all 0 ≤ i < n
⇐⇒ w ∈
∞⋃
n=0
mnR〈pi〉(V
∗(ϕ)).
3.1.7 Remark. This lemma shows us that regular frames offer the intended semantics for PDL.
For instance we now know w  〈pi∗〉 p iff w ∈ mnR〈pi〉(V (p)) for some n i.e. p is satisfied on some
finite R〈pi〉-path from w (see Definition 2.1.7). Also the fact that the valuation of the formula 〈pi∗〉 p
involves an infinite disjunction demonstrates that PDL is strictly more expressive than a modal
language equipped only with atomic unary modalities (such as Hennessy Milner logic discussed in
Chapter 1).
The following is the Segerberg axiomatisation of PDL [37].
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3.1.8 Definition. The logic PDL is the smallest logic containing the Tτ∗(Φ) formulae:
(i) [pi](p→ q)→ ([pi]p→ [pi]q)
(ii) 〈pi〉 p↔ ¬[pi]¬p
(iii) 〈pi1;pi2〉 p↔ 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉 p
(iv) 〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉 p↔ (〈pi1〉 p ∨ 〈pi2〉 p)
(v) 〈pi∗〉 p↔ (p ∨ 〈pi〉 〈pi∗〉 p)
(vi) [pi∗](p→ [pi]p)→ (p→ [pi∗]p).
PDL can be shown to be decidable via a relational argument. In particular the result follows if
PDL has the finite model property with respect to RFrm. The fact that PDL has the finite model
property can be proven (in part) by using filtrations. However this process is complicated by the
inductive structure of the modalities and one cannot always expect the filtration of a regular model
through any subformula closed set to be regular. The Fischer–Ladner closure of a set of formulae
solves this problem [11].
3.1.9 Definition. A set of formulae Σ ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ) is Fischer–Ladner closed if
(i) 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ Σ implies 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ Σ;
(ii) 〈pi1 ∨ pi2〉ϕ ∈ Σ implies 〈pi1〉ϕ ∨ 〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ Σ;
(iii) 〈pi∗〉ϕ ∈ Σ implies 〈pi〉 〈pi∗〉ϕ ∈ Σ;
(iv) Σ is subformula closed.
3.1.10 Lemma. Let Σ ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ). There exists a smallest Fischer–Ladner closed set containing Σ,
denoted FL(Σ). Furthermore if Σ is finite then FL(Σ) is finite.
Proof. See Theorem 3.2 of [11].
3.1.11 Theorem. RFrm  ϕ iff RFrmfin  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ).
Proof. The proof involves taking a filtration of a model through a finite Fischer–Ladner closed set
(see Theorem 3.2 of [11]).
3.1.12 Theorem. PDL is sound and complete with respect to RFrm.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. By Theorem 2.3.18 the completeness result follows by showing
FPDL ∈ RFrm.
3.1.13 Corollary. PDL is decidable.
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Proof. By Theorem 3.1.11 and Theorem 3.1.12 PDL has the finite model property with respect to
RFrm. Therefore, together with the fact that PDL is finitely axiomatisable, we have that PDL
is decidable by Harrop [16].
In Chapter 5 (Section 5.1) we give an algebraic proof that PDL is decidable.
3.2 The modal µ-calculus
The results in this section are taken from the sources [8], [4] and [38]. For each result, the proof
is provided when we feel it offers some insight. When a proof is provided, we fill out more details
than those found in the source material.
We shall now look at the modal µ-calculus. The modal µ-calculus (the language of which we denote
by Lµ) adds a least fixed point binder, µ, to the modal language of basic programs. We will first
consider the syntax and semantics of Lµ and then we will look at how Lµ can be used to express
assertions regarding program correctness (Examples 3.2.13 and 3.2.15). We will then look at L∗µ:
a fragment of Lµ which expresses all PDL formulae (Theorem 3.2.19). We then finally review
the result of Streett [38] which demonstrates both that Lµ is more expressive than PDL and why
filtration techniques do not suffice for Lµ (Theorem 3.2.21).
3.2.1 Definition. The set V ar denotes a set of variables disjoint from Φ. The formulae of Lµ are
defined recursively as ϕ = ⊥ | p | X | ¬ϕ1 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | 〈a〉ϕ1 | µX.ϕ(X) where p ∈ Φ, X ∈ V ar,
a ∈ Π0 and ϕ(X) refers to an Lµ formula possibly containing occurrences of the variable X;
furthermore ϕ(X) is syntactically order-preserving in X i.e. every X in ϕ(X) occurs under an even
number of negations. The dual of µX.ϕ(X) is defined as νX.ϕ(X) = ¬µX.¬ϕ(¬X). The collection
of Lµ formulae will be denoted by Lµ(Φ, V ar).
3.2.2 Example. The string of symbols µX1.(〈a〉X1 ∨ µX2.(X2 ∧ 〈b〉X1)) is an Lµ formula whilst
the string of symbols µX.(p ∨ 〈a〉 ¬X) is not an Lµ formula as p ∨ 〈a〉 ¬X is not syntactically
order-preserving in X.
Towards interpreting Lµ formulae we now discuss the least fixed point theorem of Knaster and
Tarski [8].
3.2.3 Definition. Let L = (L,∨,∧) be a lattice. A mapping t : L→ L is order-preserving if x ≤ y
implies t(x) ≤ t(y) for all x, y ∈ L. A fixed point of t is an element x ∈ L such that t(x) = x; a
pre-fixed point of t (post-fixed point of t) is an element x ∈ L such that t(x) ≤ x (x ≤ t(x)).
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3.2.4 Theorem. (Knaster Tarski Fixed Point Theorem) Let L = (L,∨,∧) be a complete lattice
and let t : L → L be an order-preserving function. Then the least fixed point of t exists and is∧{x ∈ L | t(x) ≤ x}.
Proof. The set C = {x ∈ L | t(x) ≤ x} is non-empty since t(∨L) ≤ ∨L (as ∨L is of course the
top of L). It needs to be shown that z =
∧
C is a fixed point of t i.e. t(z) = z. We will firstly
show t(z) ≤ z. Since z = ∧C it suffices to show t(z) is a lower bound of C: let x ∈ C; then
z ≤ x by definition of z; but t is order-preserving thus t(z) ≤ t(x); but t(x) ≤ x since x ∈ C; thus
t(z) ≤ x which shows t(z) is a lower bound of C and thus t(z) ≤ z. The other inequality z ≤ t(z)
follows from the first: we have t(z) ≤ z and thus t(t(z)) ≤ t(z) i.e. t(z) ∈ C; therefore z ≤ t(z) by
definition of z. Thus t(z) = z i.e. z is a fixed point of t. We need to show z is the least fixed point
of t. Suppose z1 is a fixed point of t i.e. t(z1) = z1; thus z1 ∈ C which gives z ≤ z1 by definition of
z.
3.2.5 Remark. Using this result we can deduce, in a complete Boolean algebra L, that the greatest
fixed point of t exists and is
∨{x ∈ L | x ≤ t(x)}. To see this let y = ∨{x ∈ L | x ≤ t(x)} and let
t′ : L→ L be defined as t′(x) = ¬t(¬x) (note that it is order-preserving).
¬y = ∧{¬x ∈ L | x ≤ t(x)}
=
∧{x ∈ L | ¬x ≤ t(¬x)}
=
∧{x ∈ L | ¬t(¬x) ≤ x}
=
∧{x ∈ L | t′(x) ≤ x}.
Thus, from Theorem 3.2.4, we know that ¬y is the least fixed point of t′. From this we know that y
is a fixed point of t: t′(¬y) = ¬y iff ¬t(¬¬y) = ¬y iff ¬t(y) = ¬y iff t(y) = y. Furthermore y is the
greatest fixed point of t: let z1 ∈ L such that t(z1) = z1; we have ¬t(¬¬z1) = ¬z1 i.e. t′(¬z1) = ¬z1
and therefore ¬y ≤ ¬z1 (since ¬y is the least fixed point of t′). Thus y ≥ z1.
3.2.6 Remark. From these results we also have that
∧{x ∈ L | t(x) ≤ x} is the least pre-fixed
point of t and
∨{x ∈ L | x ≤ t(x)} is the greatest post-fixed point of t.
When it comes to the semantics of Lµ formulae it is immediate that formulae involving the fixed
point binder µ are difficult to formally interpret. The Knaster–Tarski theorem (Theorem 3.2.4)
will be used to interpret such formulae. Specifically for a τ0-frame (W,R〈a〉)a∈Π0 and Lµ formula
µX.ϕ(X), the interpretation of ϕ(X) varies as the interpretation of X varies. In this way ϕ(X)
induces an order-preserving function on P(W ) (order-preserving by the syntactic condition on
ϕ(X)). The interpretation of µX.ϕ(X) will be the least fixed point of this function on the complete
lattice P(W ) (guaranteed to exist by Theorem 3.2.4).
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3.2.7 Definition. Let A be a τ0 modal algebra, let X ∈ V ar, let X = (X1, ..., Xn) ∈ V arn, let
z ∈ A, let z = (z1, ..., zn) ∈ An and let V : Φ ∪ V ar → A. Then an X-variant of V is defined as
VX→z : Φ ∪ V ar → A where:
VX→z(p) =
z if p = XV (p) otherwise.
A X-variant of V is defined as VX→z : Φ ∪ V ar → A where VX→z = VX1→z1,...,Xn→zn .
VX→z will also be referred to as a vector variant of V . The maps V and VX→ will form the base
case in the following recursive definition for the semantics of Lµ formulae.
3.2.8 Definition. Let ψ ∈ Lµ(Φ, V ar), let (W,R〈a〉)a∈Π0 be a τ0-frame and let V : Φ ∪ V ar →
P(W ). The set of states of W satisfying ψ is given by V ∗(ψ) where V ∗ : Lµ(Φ, V ar) → P(W ) is
the extension of V to Lµ(Φ, V ar) and is defined as:
V ∗(ψ) =

∅ ψ = ⊥
V (p) ψ = p ∈ Φ ∪ V ar
W \ V ∗(ψ1) ψ = ¬ψ1
V ∗(ψ1) ∪ V ∗(ψ2) ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2
mR〈a〉(V
∗(ψ1)) ψ = 〈a〉ψ1⋂{S ∈ P(W ) | V ∗X→S(ϕ(X)) ⊆ S} ψ = µX.ϕ(X)
where V ∗X→S is the extension of VX→S to Lµ(Φ, V ar).
3.2.9 Remark. V ∗X→(ϕ(X)) : P(W ) → P(W ) is defined by V ∗X→(ϕ(X))(S) = V ∗X→S(ϕ(X)).
The function V ∗X→(ϕ(X)) will be denoted by ϕ
∗ when there is no danger of ambiguity. Since the
function V ∗X→(ϕ(X)) is order-preserving (by the syntactic condition on ϕ(X)) and (P(W ),
⋃
,
⋂
) is
a complete lattice we have by Theorem 3.2.4 that the interpretation of µX.ϕ(X) is the least fixed
point of the function V ∗X→(ϕ(X)). The Lµ formula νX.ϕ(X) = ¬µX.¬ϕ(¬X) is interpreted as
V ∗(¬µX.¬ϕ(¬X)) = W \⋂{S ∈ P(W ) | V ∗X→S(¬ϕ(¬X)) ⊆ S}
=
⋃{W \ S ∈ P(W ) | W \ V ∗X→S(ϕ(¬X)) ⊆ S}
=
⋃{W \ S ∈ P(W ) | W \ V ∗X→W\S(ϕ(X)) ⊆ S}
=
⋃{W \ S ∈ P(W ) | W \ S ⊆ V ∗X→W\S(ϕ(X))}
=
⋃{S ∈ P(W ) | S ⊆ V ∗X→S(ϕ(X))}
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i.e. νX.ϕ(X) is interpreted as the greatest fixed point of V ∗X→(ϕ(X)) (see Remark 3.2.5).
3.2.10 Example. LetM = (W,R〈a〉)a∈Π0 be a τ0-frame, let V : Φ∪V ar → P(W ) and let ϕ(X) =
X ∨¬p. Recall from the previous remark that we usually denote the map V ∗X→(ϕ(X)) by ϕ∗ when
there is no danger of ambiguity. Therefore we have ϕ∗(S) = S∪(W \V (p)) for S ∈ P(W ). We have
V ∗(µX.ϕ(X)) =
⋂{S ∈ P(W ) | S∪(W \V (p)) ⊆ S} = ⋂{S ∈ P(W ) | W \V (p) ⊆ S} = W \V (p).
It can be seen that the greatest fixed point of ϕ∗ is W .
We have a way of relationally interpreting Lµ formulae with binders. However it is not always
as straightforward as Example 3.2.10 to find the least fixed point of a formula on a model (for
instance consider the formula ϕ(X) = p ∧ [a]X). Towards having a way to easily approximate the
fixed point, there is a technique called ordinal unfolding : on a complete lattice L with an order-
preserving function t : L→ L we have 0 ≤ t(0) which gives t(0) ≤ t2(0) since t is order-preserving,
which gives t2(0) ≤ t3(0) and so on. In this way L has the increasing chain 0 ≤ t(0) ≤ t2(0) ≤
... ≤ tλ(0) ≤ tλ+1(0)... where λ is a limit ordinal and tλ(0) is recursively defined as ∨γ<λ tγ(0) and
tλ+1(0) is defined as t(tλ(0)). We state the following result regarding the join of this chain and the
least fixed point of t (guaranteed to exist by Knaster–Tarski).
3.2.11 Lemma. Let L be a complete lattice and t : L→ L be an order-preserving function. The
element
∨
γ<κ t
γ(0) (where κ = |L|) is equal to the least fixed point of t.
3.2.12 Remark. Similarly the meet of the descending chain 1 ≥ t(1) ≥ t2(1) ≥ ... ≥ tλ(1) ≥ ... is
the greatest fixed point of t.
We shall now look at two examples of how Lµ can be used to express assertions of safety and
liveness in program correctness.
3.2.13 Example. Let Π0 = {a}. Suppose we are interested in the safety condition: “〈a〉 p is
always satisfied along every R〈a〉-path” (p could represent the statement “memory is not full”).
The safety assertion can be encoded by the Lµ formula νX.(〈a〉 p∧ [a]X). Let ϕ(X) = 〈a〉 p∧ [a]X
and consider the τ0-model F = (W,R〈a〉) with V : Φ ∪ V ar → P(W ) given as:
p p
w1 w2
w4 w3
We want to see whether every state in W satisfies the safety assertion, in particular is V ∗(νX.ϕ(X))
= W? We find V ∗(νX.ϕ(X)) by using ordinal unfolding on ϕ∗ in P(W ): ϕ∗(S) = mR〈a〉(V (p)) ∩
lR〈a〉(S)
1 thus giving rise to the following decreasing chain in P(W ):
1Recall from Remark 2.1.15 that lR〈a〉(S) = {w ∈W | (∀w′ ∈W )(R〈a〉ww′ =⇒ w′ ∈ S)}.
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ϕ∗(W ) = {w1, w2, w3} ∩W
= {w1, w2, w3}
ϕ∗2(W ) = {w1, w2, w3} ∩ lR〈a〉({w1, w2, w3})
= {w1, w2, w3} ∩ {w1, w2, w4}
= {w1, w2}
ϕ∗3(W ) = {w1, w2, w3} ∩ lR〈a〉({w1, w2})
= {w1, w2, w3} ∩ {w1, w2}
= {w1, w2}.
This shows that
⋂
n<|P(W )| ϕ
∗n(W ) = {w1, w2} and thus, by Remark 3.2.12, V ∗(νX.ϕ(X)) =
{w1, w2}. The points w3 and w4 fail the safety condition.
3.2.14 Remark. This safety property can be expressed by the PDL formula [a∗] 〈a〉 p.
3.2.15 Example. Let Π0 = {a, b}. Consider the liveness property: “there is a path to a state
where b can be executed”. This can be encoded by the formula µX.(〈b〉> ∨ 〈a〉X ∨ 〈b〉X). Let
ϕ(X) = 〈b〉> ∨ 〈a〉X ∨ 〈b〉X and consider the τ0-frame (W,R〈a〉, R〈b〉) and V : Φ ∪ V ar → P(W )
given by (where R〈b〉 elements are dashed):
w5 w1 w2
w4 w3
Towards finding V ∗(µX.ϕ(X)):
ϕ∗(∅) = mR〈b〉(W ) ∪mR〈a〉(∅) ∪mR〈b〉(∅)
= {w3}
ϕ∗2(∅) = {w3} ∪mR〈a〉({w3}) ∪mR〈b〉({w3})
= {w3, w5}
ϕ∗3(∅) = {w3} ∪mR〈a〉({w3, w5}) ∪mR〈b〉({w3, w5})
= {w1, w3, w4, w5}
ϕ∗4(∅) = {w3} ∪mR〈a〉({w1, w3, w4, w5}) ∪mR〈b〉({w1, w3, w4, w5})
= {w3} ∪ {w1, w3, w4, w5} ∪ {w3}
= {w1, w3, w4, w5}.
Therefore
⋃
n<|P(W )| ϕ
∗n(∅) = {w1, w3, w4, w5} and thus by Lemma 3.2.11 V ∗(µX.ϕ(X)) = {w1, w3,
w4, w5}. The state w2 is the only state to fail the liveness condition.
3.2.16 Remark. This liveness property of “there is a path to a state where b can be executed”
can also be expressed by the PDL formula 〈(a ∨ b)∗〉 〈b〉>.
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We have seen how Lµ can express formulae of PDL; we will now exactly isolate the fragment of
Lµ corresponding to PDL, denoted L
∗
µ.
3.2.17 Definition. The formulae of L∗µ are defined recursively as ϕ = ⊥ | p | X | ¬ϕ1 | ϕ1 ∨
ϕ2 | 〈a〉ϕ1 | µX.(ϕ ∨ 〈a〉X) where p ∈ Φ, X ∈ V ar and a ∈ Π0. The collection of formulae of L∗µ
is denoted L∗µ(Φ, V ar).
Towards showing that PDL formulae are equivalent to L∗µ formulae we define the notion of two
such formulae being M-equivalent for a model M.
3.2.18 Definition. Let ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ), let ψ ∈ L∗µ(Φ, V ar) and let M = (F , V ) be a τ∗-model. The
formulae ϕ,ψ are M-equivalent if V ∗(ϕ) = V ∗(ψ). We denote this situation by ϕ ∼M ψ.
We now see the full translation from PDL formulae to L∗µ formulae.
3.2.19 Theorem. Let M be a regular τ∗-model and consider l : Tτ∗(Φ) ∪ V ar → Lµ(Φ, V ar) by
l(ϕ) =

X ϕ = X
p ϕ = p ∈ Φ
¬l(ϕ1) ϕ = ¬ϕ1
l(ϕ1) ∨ l(ϕ2) ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
〈a〉 l(ϕ1) ϕ = 〈a〉ϕ1
l(〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ1) ϕ = 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ1
l(〈pi1〉ϕ1) ∨ l(〈pi2〉ϕ1) ϕ = 〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ1
µX.(l(ϕ1) ∨ l(〈pi〉X)) ϕ = 〈pi∗〉ϕ1.
Then ϕ ∼M l(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ).
Proving this full correspondence of PDL with L∗µ involves a tedious double induction on the length
of formulae and programs. We thus prove a simpler version of the theorem below.
3.2.20 Theorem. Let M = (W,R〈pi〉, V )pi∈Π be a regular τ∗-model, let a, b ∈ Π0 and let p ∈ Φ.
Then it follows
〈a; b〉 p ∼M l(〈a; b〉 p) = 〈a〉 〈b〉 p
〈a ∪ b〉 p ∼M l(〈a ∪ b〉 p) = 〈a〉 p ∨ 〈b〉 p
〈a∗〉 p ∼M l(〈a∗〉 p) = µX.(p ∨ 〈a〉X).
Proof. From Theorem 3.1.6 we have
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V ∗(〈a; b〉 p) = mR〈a〉(mR〈b〉(V (p)))
= V ∗(〈a〉 〈b〉 p)
V ∗(〈a ∪ b〉 p) = mR〈a〉(V (p)) ∪mR〈b〉(V (p))
= V ∗(〈a〉 p ∨ 〈b〉 p).
Let ϕ(X) = p ∨ 〈a〉X. We now need to show that 〈a∗〉 p and µX.ϕ(X) are M-equivalent. By
Theorem 3.1.6 we know that V ∗(〈a∗〉 p)=⋃∞n=0mnR〈a〉(V (p)). Thus it remains to prove V ∗(µX.(p ∨
〈a〉X))=⋃∞n=0mnR〈a〉(V (p)). We proceed by ordinal unfolding (and use the fact that mR〈a〉 is an
operator on P(W )):
ϕ∗(∅) = V (p) ∪mR〈a〉(∅)
= V (p) ∪∅
= V (p)
ϕ∗2(∅) = V (p) ∪mR〈a〉(V (p))
ϕ∗3(∅) = V (p) ∪mR〈a〉(V (p) ∪mR〈a〉(V (p)))
= V (p) ∪mR〈a〉(V (p)) ∪mR〈a〉(mR〈a〉(V (p)))
...
ϕ∗i(∅) =
i−1⋃
n=0
mnR〈a〉(V (p)).
Inductively it follows that ϕ∗ω(∅) =
∞⋃
n=0
mnR〈a〉(V (p)) which gives
ϕ∗ω+1(∅) = V (p) ∪mR〈a〉(
∞⋃
n=0
mnR〈a〉(V (p)))
=
∞⋃
n=0
mnR〈a〉(V (p)).
Therefore
⋃
γ<|P(W )| ϕ
∗γ(∅) =
⋃∞
n=0m
n
R〈a〉(V (p)) and thus by Lemma 3.2.11 we have V
∗(µX.(p ∨
〈a〉X)) = ⋃∞n=0mnR〈a〉(V (p)).
We will now look at a result of Streett [38] which demonstrates how Lµ is strictly larger than
PDL; larger in the sense that there is no PDL formula which is M-equivalent to µX.[a]X for all
τ∗-models M. In the proof we will also see why filtration techniques do not work for Lµ.
3.2.21 Theorem. Let a ∈ Π0. The Lµ formula µX.[a]X is not M-equivalent to a PDL formula
for all τ∗-models M.
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Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is a ψ in Tτ∗(Φ) such that µX.[a]X is M-
equivalent to ψ for all τ∗-modelsM. Consider the following τ∗-model N = (W,R〈pi〉, V )pi∈Π (where
only the R〈a〉 elements are shown).
w
w0,0 w1,0 w2,0 w3,0 · · ·
w0,1 w1,1 w2,1
w0,2 w1,2
w0,3
. . .
We shall show N satisfies µX.[a]X everywhere: denote [a]X by ϕ(X) (thus we have ϕ∗(S) =
lR〈a〉(S)) and denote
⋃∞
i=0{wn,i} by Sn2. We have:
lR〈a〉(∅) = S0
l2R〈a〉(∅) = S0 ∪ S1
...
lnR〈a〉(∅) =
n−1⋃
i=0
Si .
Inductively lωR〈a〉(∅) =
⋃∞
i=0 Si which gives that l
ω+1
R〈a〉(∅) = {w} ∪ (
⋃∞
i=0 Si) = W and we thus have
V ∗(µX.[a]X) = W by Lemma 3.2.11. In particular, w satisfies µX.[a]X which leads to w  ψ
by supposition. Consider the filtration NΣ of N through Σ = FL({ψ}); since w  ψ we have
NΣ, |w|  ψ and thus by supposition NΣ, |w|  µX.[a]X.
Now, the set FL({ψ}) is finite so we have |P(FL({ψ}))| = m ∈ N and thus by Lemma 3.2.11
V Σ
∗
(µX.[a]X) =
⋃m
n=0 l
n
RΣ〈a〉
(∅) i.e. NΣ, |w|  µX.[a]X iff |w| is deadlocked or every RΣ〈a〉-path
from |w| ends in a deadlocked state (see Definition 2.1.7). We will show there is an infinite RΣ〈a〉-
path from |w| and hence that |w| 6∈ ⋃mn=0 lnRΣ〈a〉(∅) i.e. NΣ, |w| 6 µX.[a]X, a contradiction. Consider
the R〈a〉-path wwm,0wm−1,0...w0,m from w of length m + 2. For ease of reference we shall denote
this path by (ui)
m+1
i=0 . The sequence (|ui|)m+1i=0 is a RΣ〈a〉-path from |w| since NΣ is a filtration.
The filtration NΣ must identify at least three states in (|ui|)m+1i=0 by the pigeonhole principle, since
|NΣ| ≤ m (see Remark 3.2.22). This will create a loop in NΣ: there are j, k ∈ {0, ...,m+1} such
that j < k-1, |uj | = |uk| and RΣ〈a〉|ui||ui+1| for all i ∈ {j, ..., k-1} i.e.
2States which have no neighbours, such as those in S0, are referred to as deadlocked states.
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|uj | |uj+1| . . . |uk−1|
Since NΣ has such a loop, and hence an infinite RΣ〈a〉-path from |w|, we have a contradiction.
3.2.22 Remark. Note that if we instead consider the R〈a〉-path from w of length m + 1 (call it
(si)
m
i=0) and hence identify at least two states amongst (|si|)mi=0 in NΣ, we will not necessarily get a
loop in the filtration. This is due to the fact that two adjacent states in (|si|)mi=0 may be identified
(for example |s0| = |s1|) which will not generate a loop. The fact that in the proof three states
amongst (|ui|)m+1i=0 are identified in NΣ guarantees that it is possible to identify two non-adjacent
states (in the proof the stipulation that j < k-1 emphasizes that the two states identified are not
adjacent).
4. Algebraic Filtrations
The results in this chapter are taken from the sources [8] and [7]. For each result, the proof is
provided when we feel it offers some insight. When a proof is provided, we fill out more details
than those found in the source material.
We have seen that a possible way to demonstrate the decidability of a finitely axiomatisable logic
Λ is to show that Λ has the finite model property with respect to a class of frames. Analogously in
the algebraic setting, if a finitely axiomatisable logic Λ has the finite model property with respect
to a class of modal algebras (Definition 4.1.1) then Λ is decidable i.e. Λ is shown to be decidable
algebraically.
A natural way to attempt a proof of the finite model property for a logic which is characterised by
a class of frames is by using a filtration of a model (see Section 2.4). Similarly, algebraic filtrations
can be used to demonstrate the finite model property for a logic which is characterised by a class
of algebras i.e. for a given class of modal algebras A, algebraic filtrations can be used to show that
Afin |= ϕ≈ implies A |= ϕ≈. In this chapter we shall look at the paper of Conradie et al. [7] which
defines algebraic filtrations; in particular we will look at algebraic filtrations of τ0 modal algebras
(recall from Definition 3.1.1 that τ0 = {〈a〉}a∈Π0); this will be useful in the next chapter when
algebraically showing that PDL is decidable (Section 5.1) and that ΛR, the equational theory of
R, has the finite model property with respect to R (Section 5.2). We begin with some background
needed to discuss algebraic filtrations.
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Definition. Let Λ be a logic and let A be a class of modal algebras. Λ has the finite model
property (fmp) with respect to A if the following property holds: `Λ ϕ if and only if Afin |= ϕ≈ for
all ϕ ∈ T (Φ).
4.1.2 Remark. If Λ is sound and complete with respect to A and A has the property that A |= ϕ≈
iff Afin |= ϕ≈ then Λ has the finite model property with respect to A. To see this note that `Λ ϕ iff
`Λ ϕ↔ >. Since Λ is sound and complete with respect to A we have `Λ ϕ↔ > iff A |= ϕ≈. But
A |= ϕ≈ iff Afin |= ϕ≈ and we thus have `Λ ϕ iff Afin |= ϕ≈ i.e. Λ has the finite model property
with respect to A.
4.1.3 Definition. Let L = (L,∨,∧) be a bounded lattice. An element x ∈ L is called an atom of
L if 0 < x and there does not exist any element z ∈ L such that 0 < z < x. The set of atoms of L
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is denoted AtL. The lattice L is atomic if for every non-zero z ∈ L there exists x ∈ AtL such that
x ≤ z.
4.1.4 Example. Every finite lattice is atomic. Also, for a set W , the power set algebra P(W ) is
atomic with AtP(W ) = {{w} | w ∈W}.
4.1.5 Lemma. Let L be a bounded distributive lattice. If x ∈ AtL and x ≤ ∨ni=1 zi then x ≤ zj
for some j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Proof. Since x ≤ ∨ni=1 zi we have x = x∧∨ni=1 zi = ∨ni=1(x∧zi). Also x ≥ x∧zi for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Suppose towards a contradiction that x > x ∧ zi for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Then since x ∈ AtL we have
x ∧ zi = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} which leads to x =
∨n
i=1(x ∧ zi) = 0, a contradiction. Thus there
must exist a zj for some j ∈ {1, ..., n} such that x = x ∧ zj i.e. x ≤ zj .
4.1.6 Lemma. Let L = (L,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) be a finite Boolean algebra. Then for every z ∈ L we have
z =
∨{x ∈ AtL | x ≤ z}.
Proof. The element z is obviously an upper bound of {x ∈ AtL | x ≤ z}. Suppose towards a
contradiction that z is not the supremum of {x ∈ AtL | x ≤ z} i.e. there exists a z′ ∈ L such that
z′ is an upper bound of {x ∈ AtL | x ≤ z} and z 6≤ z′. It can be easily shown that z 6≤ z′ implies
z ∧ ¬z′ 6= 0 in L. Since L is atomic there exists x ∈ AtL such that x ≤ z ∧ ¬z′. Since x ≤ z ∧ ¬z′
we have x ∈ {x ∈ AtL | x ≤ z}; therefore x ≤ z′ (since z′ is an upper bound of {x ∈ AtL | x ≤ z})
and we have x ≤ z′ ∧ ¬z′ = 0, a contradiction. Thus z = ∨{x ∈ AtL | x ≤ z}.
4.2 Constructing a finite falsifying algebra
Recall from Section 2.5 that a τ0 modal algebra is an algebra A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈a〉)a∈Π0 where
(A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1) is a Boolean algebra and f〈a〉 is an operator on A for each a ∈ Π0. Let A be a class
of τ0 modal algebras for which we want to prove that the validities of A and Afin are the same. In
particular if A ∈ A with A 6|= σ≈, it needs to be shown that there exists a finite falsifying algebra
in A i.e. A′ ∈ Afin such that A′ 6|= σ≈.
If it can be shown that for an A-assignment h falsifying σ≈, the finite set {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)} is
embedded in an algebra from Afin such that the existing fundamental operations on {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈
st(σ)} are preserved, then we are done. Motivated by this, we consider the general problem:
For A ∈ A with C ⊆fin A show that there exists A′ ∈ Afin and an embedding from C
to A′ such that the existing fundamental operations on C are preserved.
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It is tempting to simply take the modal algebra generated by C as our A′, but there is no guarantee
it will be finite due to the presence of the operators (f〈a〉)a∈Π0 . Instead, towards constructing
such an A′, Conradie et al. [7] consider the Boolean algebra generated by C, denoted AC =
(AC ,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1). The algebra AC is finite since C is finite (see [8]). Also C is embedded in
AC under the trivial embedding and AC certainly preserves all existing Boolean operations on
C. It now remains to construct operators (f ′〈a〉)a∈Π0 on AC which preserve the existing operators
(f〈a〉)a∈Π0 on C i.e. for a ∈ Π0 and z ∈ Ca = {x ∈ C | f〈a〉(x) ∈ C} we have f ′〈a〉(z) = f〈a〉(z). In
this case the operators (f ′〈a〉)a∈Π0 are said to extend (f〈a〉 Ca)a∈Π0 . Also it must be checked that
(AC , f
′
〈a〉)a∈Π0 is in A.
The algebra AC is atomic and thus by Lemma 4.1.6, operators on AC are completely determined
by their actions on AtAC : for an operator f〈a〉 on AC and z ∈ AC we have f〈a〉(z) = f〈a〉(
∨{x ∈
AtAC | x ≤ z}) =
∨{f〈a〉(x) | x ∈ AtAC & x ≤ z}. Furthermore, there is a relationship between
functions t : AtAC → AC and relations R ⊆ AtA2C .
4.2.1 Definition. Let A′ ⊆ AC and let t : A′ → AC ; define Rt = {(x, y) ∈ A′2 | x ≤ t(y)}.
4.2.2 Definition. Let R ⊆ AtA2C . Define the mapping tR : AtAC → AC by tR(y) =
∨{x ∈
AtAC | Rxy}.
4.2.3 Theorem. Consider the set of mappings from AtAC to AC , denoted A
AtAC
C ; the mapping
e : AAtACC → P(AtA2C) defined by e(t) = Rt is a bijection.
Proof. If it can be shown that the mapping e′ : P(AtA2C) → AAtACC defined by e′(R) = tR, is the
inverse of e then we are done. Let R ∈ P(AtA2C) then e(e′(R)) = Rt
R
. We have Rt
R
xy iff x ≤ tR(y)
iff x ≤ ∨{z ∈ AtAC | Rzy}. By Lemma 4.1.5 x ≤ z for some z ∈ {z ∈ AtAC | Rzy} and thus
x = z (otherwise this would contradict z being an atom of AC). Thus x ≤
∨{z ∈ AtAC | Rzy} iff
Rxy and e(e′(R)) = R. For the other direction e′(e(t)) = tRt ; we want to check that tRt = t: let
x ∈ AtAC then tRt(x) =
∨{y ∈ AtAC | Rtyx} = ∨{y ∈ AtAC | y ≤ t(x)} = t(x) (where the last
equality follows from Lemma 4.1.6).
Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between relations R ⊆ AtA2C and functions t : AtAC →
AC . For R ⊆ AtA2C the function tR : AtAC → AC gives rise to an operator on AC .
4.2.4 Lemma. Let R ⊆ AtA2C . The mapping tR has a unique extension to an operator fR on AC
i.e. the following diagram commutes (where eAtAC : AtAC → AC is defined by eAtAC (x) = x).
AtAC AC
AC
eAtAC
tR
!fR
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Proof. For z ∈ AC define fR(z) =
∨{tR(y) | y ∈ AtAC & y ≤ z}; therefore
fR(z) =
∨{∨{x ∈ AtAC | Rxy} | y ∈ AtAC & y ≤ z}
=
∨{x ∈ AtAC | (∃y ∈ AtAC)(Rxy & y ≤ z)}.
When z ∈ AtAC we have fR(z) =
∨{tR(z)} = tR(z) and thus fR extends tR. The mapping fR is
an operator since fR(0) =
∨
∅ = 0 and for any y1, y2 ∈ AC we have fR(y1 ∨ y2) = fR(y1)∨ fR(y2)
from Lemma 4.1.5. Finally, fR uniquely extends tR since operators are uniquely determined by
their actions on AtAC .
Towards constructing operators (f ′〈a〉)a∈Π0 on AC such that (f
′
〈a〉)a∈Π0 extend (f〈a〉 Ca)a∈Π0 , we
have seen that we can instead look at relations R ⊆ AtA2C since they give rise to functions tR :
AtAC → AC which in turn give rise to operators fR : AC → AC . Thus given a collection (R〈a〉)a∈Π0
of binary relations on AtAC we can take (f
R〈a〉)a∈Π0 as our desired (f ′〈a〉)a∈Π0 . However in order
for (fR〈a〉)a∈Π0 to extend (f〈a〉 Ca)a∈Π0 , the relations (R〈a〉)a∈Π0 need to each satisfy a precise
requirement.
4.2.5 Definition. Let R ⊆ AtA2C and let a ∈ Π0. Condition (R)a is defined as
(R)a : (∀z ∈ Ca)(∀x ∈ AtAC)(x ≤ f〈a〉(z) iff (∃y ∈ AtAC)(Rxy & y ≤ z)).
4.2.6 Theorem. Let R ⊆ AtA2C and let a ∈ Π0. If R satisfies condition (R)a then fR extends
f〈a〉 Ca.
Proof. Let R ⊆ AtA2C such that R satisfies condition (R)a and let z ∈ Ca. We have fR(z) =
∨{x ∈
AtAC | (∃y ∈ AtAC)(Rxy & y ≤ z)} =
∨{x ∈ AtAC | x ≤ f〈a〉(z)} where the last equality follows
since R satisfies (R)a. But by Lemma 4.1.6 we have
∨{x ∈ AtAC | x ≤ f〈a〉(z)} = f〈a〉(z).
4.2.7 Theorem. Let a ∈ Π0. If f ′ is an operator on AC extending f〈a〉 Ca then Rf
′
satisfies
condition (Rf
′
)a.
Proof. Suppose f ′ is an operator on AC extending f〈a〉 Ca , let z ∈ Ca and let x ∈ AtAC . We
need to show that Rf
′
satisfies condition (Rf
′
)a. Suppose x ≤ f〈a〉(z); since f ′ extends f〈a〉 Ca we
have x ≤ f ′(z). By Lemma 4.1.6 we thus get x ≤ f ′(∨{y ∈ AtAC | y ≤ z}) = ∨{f ′(y) | y ∈
AtAC & y ≤ z} where the last equality follows since f ′ is an operator. Therefore by Lemma 4.1.5
we have x ≤ f ′(y′) for some y′ ∈ AtAC such that y′ ≤ z. But x ≤ f ′(y′) iff Rf ′xy′ and thus the
left to right conditional of (Rf
′
)a holds. For the reverse conditional suppose there exists y ∈ AtAC
such that Rf
′
xy and y ≤ z. Since Rf ′xy we have x ≤ f ′(y) and since y ≤ z and f ′ is an operator
we have f ′(y) ≤ f ′(z). Thus x ≤ f ′(z) = f〈a〉(z).
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We are now ready to define an algebraic filtration of the τ0 modal algebra A.
4.2.8 Definition. Let (R〈a〉)a∈Π0 be a collection of binary relations on AtAC . If R〈a〉 satisfies (R)a
for all a ∈ Π0 then the collection (R〈a〉)a∈Π0 is an algebraic filtrator of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 and
the τ0 modal algebra (AC , f
R〈a〉)a∈Π0 is called an algebraic filtration of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 with
(R〈a〉)a∈Π0 .
4.2.9 Example. Consider the collection (Rs〈a〉)a∈Π0 of binary relations on AtAC defined by R
s
〈a〉xy
iff x∧ f〈a〉(y) 6= 0 for all a ∈ Π0. The relation Rs〈a〉 satisfies condition (Rs〈a〉)a for all a ∈ Π0. To see
this let a ∈ Π0, let z ∈ Ca and let x ∈ AtAC . Suppose x ≤ f〈a〉(z); thus x ≤ f〈a〉(
∨{y ∈ AtAC | y ≤
z}) = ∨{f〈a〉(y) | y ∈ AtAC & y ≤ z}. By Lemma 4.1.5 x ≤ f〈a〉(y′) for some y′ ∈ AtAC such
that y′ ≤ z. Rs〈a〉xy′ since x ∧ f〈a〉(y′) = x and x 6= 0 since x ∈ AtAC . For the reverse direction
of (Rs〈a〉)a suppose there exists y ∈ AtAC such that Rs〈a〉xy and y ≤ z. Since f〈a〉 is an operator
f〈a〉(y) ≤ f〈a〉(z) and since Rs〈a〉xy we have x ∧ f〈a〉(y) 6= 0 which implies x ∧ f〈a〉(y) = x (i.e.
x ≤ f〈a〉(y)) since x ∈ AtAC . Therefore x ≤ f〈a〉(z).
4.2.10 Example. As mentioned in Chapter 1 the filtration method was first developed by McKin-
sey [31] in his proof that S2 and S4 are decidable logics. Towards constructing a finite falsifying basic
modal algebra, McKinsey defined the operator f ′(z) =
∧{x ∈ AC | (∃y ∈ C)(x = f(y) & z ≤ y)}
on AC . It can be shown (see [7]) that the modal algebra (AC , f
′) is the algebraic filtration of
A through (C,C) with Rl, where Rl is the largest algebraic filtrator of A through (C,C) and is
defined as Rlxy iff y ≤ z implies x ≤ f(z) for all z ∈ C.
4.2.11 Theorem. Let A be a τ0 modal algebra with A 6|= σ≈ for σ ∈ Tτ0(Φ) (i.e. there is an
h : Φ → A such that h∗(σ) 6= 1), let (AC , fR〈a〉)a∈Π0 be any algebraic filtration of A through
(C,Ca)a∈Π0 where {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)} ⊆ C ⊆fin A and define j : Φ → AC by j(p) = h(p). Then
j∗(ψ) = h∗(ψ) for all ψ ∈ st(σ) and thus (AC , fR〈a〉)a∈Π0 6|= σ≈.
Proof. Let (AC , f
R〈a〉)a∈Π0 be an algebraic filtration of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 where {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈
st(σ)} ⊆ C ⊆fin A. Towards showing (AC , fR〈a〉)a∈Π0 6|= σ≈, define j : Φ → AC by j(p) = h(p)1
and consider the homomorphic extension j∗ : Tτ0(Φ) → AC . To demonstrate j∗(σ) 6= 1, it suffices
to show for all ψ ∈ st(σ) that
j∗(ψ) = h∗(ψ) (4.2.1)
since this would imply j∗(σ) = h∗(σ) 6= 1. Thus we proceed by induction:
Base case: Let ψ ∈ st(σ) such that k(ψ) = 0; then ψ = p ∈ Φ or ψ = ⊥. If ψ = p then equation
4.2.1 is true since j∗(p) = j(p) = h(p) = h∗(p) by definition of j. If ψ = ⊥ then equation 4.2.1 is
true since j∗(⊥) = 0 = h∗(⊥).
1We only actually require j(p) = h(p) when p ∈ Φ ∩ st(σ).
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Inductive hypothesis: Assume that equation 4.2.1 is true for all ψ ∈ st(σ) such that k(ψ) < n ≤
k(σ).
Inductive step: Let ψ ∈ st(σ) such that k(ψ) = n ≤ k(σ). Then for some ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Tτ0(Φ) and
a ∈ Π0:
ψ =

ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 (i)
¬ϕ (ii)
〈a〉ϕ (iii).
(i) We have j∗(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = j∗(ϕ1) ∨AC j∗(ϕ2). We are permitted to form the element h∗(ϕ1) ∨AC
h∗(ϕ2) since h∗(ϕ1), h∗(ϕ2) ∈ AC as {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)} ⊆ C. But by inductive hypothesis
j∗(ϕ1) = h∗(ϕ1) and j∗(ϕ2) = h∗(ϕ2) and therefore j∗(ϕ1)∨AC j∗(ϕ2) = h∗(ϕ1)∨AC h∗(ϕ2). Since
h∗(ϕ1), h∗(ϕ2) ∈ AC and AC is the Boolean subalgebra generated by C and we have h∗(ϕ1) ∨AC
h∗(ϕ2) = h∗(ϕ1) ∨A h∗(ϕ2) = h∗(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
(ii) Similarly, we have j∗(¬ϕ) = ¬ACj∗(ϕ) = ¬ACh∗(ϕ) by the inductive hypothesis; since AC is
the Boolean algebra generated by C we have ¬ACh∗(ϕ) = ¬Ah∗(ϕ) = h∗(¬ϕ).
(iii) We have j∗(〈a〉ϕ) = fR〈a〉(j∗(ϕ)) = fR〈a〉(h∗(ϕ)) by the inductive hypothesis; also h∗(〈a〉ϕ) =
f〈a〉(h∗(ϕ)). Thus we need to show fR〈a〉(h∗(ϕ)) = f〈a〉(h∗(ϕ)). If h∗(ϕ) ∈ Ca we are done since
fR〈a〉 extends f〈a〉 Ca as (R〈a〉)a∈Π0 is an algebraic filtrator of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 . We certainly
have f〈a〉(h∗(ϕ)) ∈ C since f〈a〉(h∗(ϕ)) = h∗(〈a〉ϕ) ∈ {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)}.
4.2.12 Remark. This result demonstrates that in order to show a class of τ0 modal algebras A
has the same validities as Afin, the algebra (AC , f
R〈a〉)a∈Π0 will provide a finite falsifying algebra;
but it still needs to be checked if (AC , f
R〈a〉)a∈Π0 ∈ A.
The next lemma will be useful in Chapter 5 when algebraically proving PDL is decidable.
4.2.13 Lemma. Let a ∈ Π0, let Rs〈a〉 ⊆ AtA2C such that Rs〈a〉xy iff x ∧ f〈a〉(y) 6= 0 and define
f ′ : AC → AC by f ′(z) =
∧{x′ ∈ AC | f〈a〉(z) ≤ x′}. Then f ′ = fRs〈a〉 .
Proof. Let z ∈ AC . Denote the following sets A2 = {x′ ∈ AC | f〈a〉(z) ≤ x′} and A1 = {x ∈
AtAC | (∃y ∈ AtAC)(Rs〈a〉xy & y ≤ z)}. We want to prove
∧
A2 =
∨
A1. To show that
∧
A2 ≥∨
A1 it suffices to demonstrate that
∧
A2 is an upper bound of A1. In turn, to show
∧
A2 is an
upper bound of A1 it suffices to demonstrate that for any x ∈ A1, x is a lower bound of A2. Let
x′ ∈ A2; we have by definition of A2 that f〈a〉(z) ≤ x′ and so to prove x is a lower bound of A2,
we will show x ≤ f〈a〉(z). Since x ∈ A1 there exists y ∈ AtAC such that Rs〈a〉xy and y ≤ z. Rs〈a〉xy
implies x ≤ f〈a〉(y) (since x is an atom of AC) and y ≤ z implies f〈a〉(y) ≤ f〈a〉(z) (since f〈a〉 is an
operator) and thus x ≤ f〈a〉(z). To show the other inequality
∧
A2 ≤
∨
A1 we demonstrate that
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∨
A1 ∈ A2. Suppose towards a contradiction that
∨
A1 6∈ A2 i.e. f〈a〉(z) 6≤
∨
A1. This implies
f〈a〉(z) ∧ ¬(
∨
A1) 6= 0. Therefore there exists x ∈ AtAC such that x ≤ f〈a〉(z) ∧ ¬(
∨
A1). Thus
x ≤ f〈a〉(z) =
∨{f〈a〉(y) | y ∈ AtAC & y ≤ z} giving by Lemma 4.1.5 that x ≤ f〈a〉(y′) for some
y′ ∈ AtAC such that y′ ≤ z. We have Rs〈a〉xy′ since x∧ f〈a〉(y′) = x 6= 0 and thus x ∈ A1. But from
x ≤ f〈a〉(z) ∧ ¬(
∨
A1) we know that x ≤ ¬(
∨
A1) =
∧¬A12 which implies x ≤ ¬x since x ∈ A1.
This gives 0 = x ∧ ¬x = x, a contradiction since x ∈ AtAC .
It is natural to compare algebraic filtrations with filtrations on models and ask whether there
is a relationship between the two. Conradie et al. [7] demonstrate that there is a one to one
correspondence between algebraic filtrations satisfying an additional “rigidity” condition and model
filtrations. In general there are more algebraic filtrations than model filtrations [7].
2¬A1 is defined {¬x | x ∈ A1}.
5. Decidability of Two Least Binder Logics
In this chapter we will first demonstrate that the fragment L∗µ of the modal µ-calculus is decidable.
This will be demonstrated by proving that PDL has the finite model property with respect to the
class D of dynamic algebras (Section 5.1). Then in Section 5.2 we will prove that ΛR has the finite
model property with respect to R where R supplies an algebraic semantics for Pratt’s least root
language Lρ [34]. These finite model property results are achieved using an algebraic filtration
method based on that of Conradie et al. [7].
5.1 L∗µ is decidable
L∗µ is the fragment of Lµ where the fixed point binder µ may only be applied to formulae of the
form ψ(X) = ϕ ∨ 3X (see Definition 3.2.17). As shown in Theorem 3.2.19 PDL corresponds to
L∗µ and as such we will show L∗µ is decidable by proving that the logic PDL is decidable. We begin
with discussing the F -closure (Definition 5.1.1), we then show that PDL is complete with respect
to the class of dynamic algebras D (Theorem 5.1.11) and finally that the validities of D and Dfin
are the same (Theorem 5.1.15).
5.1.1 F -closure.
We now discuss theF -closure, a closure analogous to the Fischer–Ladner closure (Definition 3.1.9).
This will be useful when building a finite falsifying dynamic algebra in the proof that the validities
of D and Dfin are the same (see Theorem 5.1.15). Roughly speaking, the closure is needed to
“educate” the algebraic filtration about the dynamic nature of programs.
5.1.1 Definition. Let Γ ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ). Γ is F -closed if for all ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) and all pi1, pi2, pi∗ in Π:
(i) 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ Γ implies 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ, 〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ Γ;
(ii) 〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ ∈ Γ implies 〈pi1〉ϕ, 〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ Γ;
(iii) 〈pi∗〉ϕ ∈ Γ implies 〈pi〉 〈pi∗〉ϕ ∈ Γ.
The F -closure of Γ, denoted F (Γ), is the smallest F -closed set containing Γ (if it exists). For a
singleton {ψ} ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ) the set F ({ψ}) is denoted F (ψ).
5.1.2 Example. Let a, b, c ∈ Π0 and p ∈ Φ; then F (〈a; (b ∪ c∗)〉 p) = {〈a; (b ∪ c∗)〉 p, 〈a〉 〈b ∪ c∗〉 p,
〈b ∪ c∗〉 p, 〈b〉 p, 〈c∗〉 p, 〈c〉 〈c∗〉 p}.
5.1.3 Theorem. For every Γ ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ) the set F (Γ) exists. Furthermore if Γ ⊆fin Tτ∗(Φ) then
F (Γ) ⊆fin Tτ∗(Φ).
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Proof. To show the existence of F (Γ) consider the set C = {Σ ∈ P(Tτ∗(Φ)) | Γ ⊆ Σ & Σ is
F -closed} which is non-empty since Tτ∗(Φ) is F -closed. The set
⋂
C ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ) gives the desired
result.
Let Γ ⊆fin Tτ∗(Φ); we will demonstrate F (Γ) ⊆fin Tτ∗(Φ). If we can show that for all Γ1,Γ2 ⊆
Tτ∗(Φ)
F (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) = F (Γ1) ∪F (Γ2) (5.1.1)
then it will follow that F (Γ) =
⋃
ψ∈ΓF (ψ) and thus it will only remain to show F (ψ) ⊆fin Tτ∗(Φ)
for any ψ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ).
Let Γ1,Γ2 ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ). Towards demonstrating equation 5.1.1 we prove F (Γ1)∪F (Γ2) is F -closed.
Denote the set F (Γ1)∪F (Γ2) as Σ. Suppose we have 〈pi〉ϕ ∈ Σ where ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) and pi ∈ Π\Π0;
then for some pi1, pi2 ∈ Π we have either:
pi =

pi1;pi2 (i)
pi1 ∪ pi2 (ii)
pi1
∗ (iii).
(i) pi = pi1;pi2 and thus 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ Σ. Then 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ F (Γ1) or 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ F (Γ2). If
〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ F (Γ1) then since F (Γ1) is F -closed 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ, 〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ F (Γ1) and thus 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ,
〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ Σ. Similarly for 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ F (Γ2). Thus 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ∈ Σ implies that 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ, 〈pi2〉ϕ ∈
Σ. Similar reasoning follows for cases (ii) and (iii). Thus Σ is F -closed.
We now demonstrate equation 5.1.1. By Definition 5.1.1 of the F -closure Γ1 ⊆ F (Γ1) and Γ2 ⊆
F (Γ2) thus Γ1∪Γ2 ⊆ F (Γ1)∪F (Γ2). Since, under set inclusion,F is an order-preserving function1
we therefore have F (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊆ F (F (Γ1) ∪F (Γ2)). Since we have proven F (Γ1) ∪F (Γ2) is F -
closed, we have F (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) ⊆ F (Γ1) ∪ F (Γ2). For the other direction we have by definition
Γ1,Γ2 ⊆ Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and since F is an order-preserving function F (Γ1),F (Γ2) ⊆ F (Γ1 ∪ Γ2). Thus
F (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) is an upper bound of F (Γ1) and F (Γ2) and therefore F (Γ1) ∪F (Γ2) ⊆ F (Γ1 ∪ Γ2).
Thus F (Γ1) ∪F (Γ2) = F (Γ1 ∪ Γ2) and equation 5.1.1 is true.
We now finally need to show that for all ψ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) we have F (ψ) is finite. If ψ is not of the
form 〈pi〉ϕ, where pi ∈ Π and ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ), then F (ψ) = {ψ} since the set {ψ} is F -closed as the
three conditionals of the F -closure definition (Definition 5.1.1) are vacuously true. Therefore to
complete the proof it needs to be demonstrated that for all pi ∈ Π:
F (〈pi〉ϕ) is finite for all ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ). (5.1.2)
Base case: Let ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) and let pi = a ∈ Π0. Statement 5.1.2 is true since vacuouslyF (〈a〉ϕ) =
{〈a〉ϕ}.
1This can be seen by Definition 5.1.1 of F as returning the smallest F -closed set.
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Inductive hypothesis: Assume statement 5.1.2 is true for all pi ∈ Π with k(pi) < m.
Inductive step: Let ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) and let k(pi) = m. Then for some pi1, pi2 ∈ Π we have either:
pi =

pi1;pi2 (I)
pi1 ∪ pi2 (II)
pi1
∗ (III).
(I) If we can show that
F (〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ) = {〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ} ∪F (〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ) ∪F (〈pi2〉ϕ)
then statement 5.1.2 is true since by the inductive hypothesis F (〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ) and F (〈pi2〉ϕ) are
both finite. Similar to when proving equation 5.1.1 the proof of this equality comes down to
showing {〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ}∪F (〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ)∪F (〈pi2〉ϕ) (denoted Ψ) isF -closed. Thus suppose 〈α〉χ ∈ Ψ
for some α ∈ Π \ Π0 and χ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ). If 〈α〉χ ∈ F (〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ) or 〈α〉χ ∈ F (〈pi2〉ϕ) then
we are done. Otherwise 〈α〉χ = 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ; but we have 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ F (〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ) ⊆ Ψ and
〈pi2〉ϕ ∈ F (〈pi2〉ϕ) ⊆ Ψ. Thus Ψ is F -closed.
(II) Similarly to (I), the result follows by showing
F (〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ) = {〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ} ∪F (〈pi1〉ϕ) ∪F (〈pi2〉ϕ).
(III) Similarly to (I), the result follows by showing
F (〈pi∗〉ϕ) = {〈pi∗〉ϕ} ∪F (〈pi〉 〈pi∗〉ϕ).
Thus statement 5.1.2 is true for all pi ∈ Π and in all we have that Γ ⊆fin Tτ∗(Φ) implies F (Γ) ⊆fin
Tτ∗(Φ).
5.1.4 Remark. As opposed to the Fischer–Ladner closure, the definition of the F -closure omits
the requirement of being subterm closed and thus facilitates a straightforward proof that F (Γ)
if finite when Γ is finite. In the proof that the validities of D and Dfin are the same (Theorem
5.1.15), we take the F -closure of a subterm closed set towards building a finite falsifying dynamic
algebra.
5.1.2 PDL is complete with respect to D.
In this subsection we will introduce the class D of dynamic algebras; we shall then discuss how
dynamic algebras interface with regular frames (see Definition 3.1.3) and finally we will show that
the logic PDL (see Definition 3.1.8) is complete with respect to D.
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5.1.5 Definition. [33] A dynamic algebra is a τ∗ modal algebra (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π such that :
(i) f〈pi1;pi2〉(x) = f〈pi1〉(f〈pi2〉(x));
(ii) f〈pi1∪pi2〉(x) = f〈pi1〉(x) ∨ f〈pi2〉(x);
(iii) f〈pi∗〉(x) = x ∨ f〈pi〉(f〈pi∗〉(x));
(iv) f〈pi∗〉(x) ≤ x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))
for all pi, pi1, pi2 ∈ Π and all x ∈ A. The class of dynamic algebras is denoted by D.
Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π be a dynamic algebra, let pi ∈ Π and let x ∈ A; property (iii)
from the above definition demonstrates that f〈pi∗〉(x) is a fixed point of the function tpix,A : A → A
defined by tpix,A(y) = x∨ f〈pi〉(y). Furthermore the next result (from the paper [33] by Pratt) shows
that f〈pi∗〉(x) is the least fixed point (and least pre-fixed point) of tpix,A. This is analogous to how
PDL formulae involving 〈pi∗〉 are interpreted relationally i.e. for a τ∗-model (W,R〈pi〉, V )pi∈Π and a
Tτ∗(Φ) formula 〈pi∗〉ϕ, we have V ∗(〈pi∗〉ϕ) = V ′(µ(X)(ϕ∨〈pi〉X)) (see Theorem 3.2.19 and Remark
3.2.6). These results tell us that the class of dynamic algebras offers the intended semantics for
PDL.
5.1.6 Definition. Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π be a τ∗ modal algebra. For a pi ∈ Π and
x ∈ A, the function tpix,A : A→ A is defined as tpix,A(y) = x ∨ f〈pi〉(y).
5.1.7 Lemma. [33] Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π ∈ D, let pi ∈ Π and let x ∈ A. Then f〈pi∗〉(x)
is the least fixed point (and least pre-fixed point) of tpix,A.
Proof. (This proof utilises the same proof strategy as found in [33] but we fill out more details).
The fact that f〈pi∗〉(x) is a fixed point (and thus a pre-fixed) of tpix,A is immediate from property
(iii) of dynamic algebras (Definition 5.1.5). It suffices to show f〈pi∗〉(x) is the least pre-fixed point
of tpix,A (this will imply f〈pi∗〉(x) is the least fixed point of t
pi
x,A since any fixed point of t
pi
x,A is a
pre-fixed point of tpix,A). Thus consider an arbitrary pre-fixed point z of t
pi
x,A:
x ∨ f〈pi〉(z) ≤ z.
Therefore x ≤ z which gives f〈pi∗〉(x) ≤ f〈pi∗〉(z) since f〈pi∗〉 is an operator on A. Thus it remains to
show f〈pi∗〉(z) ≤ z. We have from property (iv) of dynamic algebras that
f〈pi∗〉(z) ≤ z ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬z ∧ f〈pi〉(z)).
If we can show ¬z ∧ f〈pi〉(z) = 0 then we are done since this implies z ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬z ∧ f〈pi〉(z)) =
z∨f〈pi∗〉(0) = z∨0 = z and hence f〈pi∗〉(z) ≤ z (where f〈pi∗〉(0) = 0 follows since f〈pi∗〉 is an operator
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on A). Since z is pre-fixed point of tpix,A we have x ∨ f〈pi〉(z) ≤ z and from the fact that meets
preserve order we get
¬z ∧ (x ∨ fpi(z)) ≤ ¬z ∧ z = 0.
Since A is a distributive lattice we have
(¬z ∧ x) ∨ (¬z ∧ fpi(z)) ≤ 0
and thus ¬z ∧ f〈pi〉(z) = 0 since ¬z ∧ f〈pi〉(z) ≤ (¬z ∧ x) ∨ (¬z ∧ fpi(z)) ≤ 0.
The following result regarding τ∗ modal algebras is also from Pratt’s paper [33].
5.1.8 Lemma. [33] Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π be a τ∗ modal algebra. Suppose f〈pi∗〉(x) is
the least pre-fixed point of tpix,A for all pi ∈ Π and all x ∈ A; then f〈pi∗〉(x) ≤ x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))
for all pi ∈ Π and all x ∈ A.
Proof. (This proof utilises the same proof strategy as found in [33] but we fill out more details).
Let pi ∈ Π and x ∈ A. Since f〈pi∗〉(x) is the least pre-fixed point of tpix,A, to show f〈pi∗〉(x) ≤
x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) it suffices to prove that x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) is a pre-fixed point of tpix,A,
in particular it suffices to prove:
tpix,A(x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))) ≤ x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x));
which is
x ∨ f〈pi〉(x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))) ≤ x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)).
We will now prove this last inequality transitively by deriving a sequence of inequalities starting
from the left hand side. Since A is distributive we have for all y ∈ A:
x ∨ y = 1 ∧ (x ∨ y)
= (x ∨ ¬x) ∧ (x ∨ y)
= x ∨ (¬x ∧ y)
i.e. for all y ∈ A we have the identity x ∨ y = x ∨ (¬x ∧ y). Using this identity with y =
f〈pi〉(x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))) we get:
x ∨ f〈pi〉(x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))) = x ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)))).
Since f〈pi〉 is an operator on A we have
x ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)))) = x ∨ (¬x ∧ (f〈pi〉(x) ∨ f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))))
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and since A is distributive
x ∨ (¬x ∧ (f〈pi〉(x) ∨ f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)))) = x ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))).
By the definition of a meet we know ¬x∧f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x∧f〈pi〉(x)) ≤ f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x∧f〈pi〉(x)) and thus,
since joins preserve order, we have
x ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))) ≤ x ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) ∨ (f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))).
By our initial assumption, we have for all y ∈ A that f〈pi∗〉(y) is a pre-fixed point of tpiy,A and thus in
particular for y = ¬x∧f〈pi〉(x) we have (¬x∧f〈pi〉(x))∨f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x∧f〈pi〉(x)) ≤ f〈pi∗〉(¬x∧f〈pi〉(x)).
This implies, since joins preserve order, that
x ∨ (¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) ∨ f〈pi〉f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) ≤ x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)).
In all we have proven that x ∨ f〈pi〉(x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x))) ≤ x ∨ f〈pi∗〉(¬x ∧ f〈pi〉(x)) and thus the
result holds.
We can use this last result to show that for any regular frame F , the τ∗ modal algebra F+ is a
dynamic algebra.
5.1.9 Theorem. Let F = (W,R〈pi〉)pi∈Π ∈ RFrm. Then F+ = (P(W ),∪,∩,−,∅,W,mR〈pi〉)pi∈Π is
a dynamic algebra.
Proof. F+ is a τ∗ modal algebra. We have that F+ obeys properties (i) and (ii) of dynamic
algebras from Theorem 3.1.6. It can be shown that Theorem 3.2.19 implies mR〈pi∗〉(S) is the least
fixed point (and least pre-fixed point) of tpiS,F+ for all pi ∈ Π and all S ∈ P(W ). Therefore F+ has
property (iii) of dynamic algebras and by Lemma 5.1.8 property (iv) also holds.
5.1.10 Remark. Although the complex algebra of a regular frame is a dynamic algebra, it is
not the case that every dynamic algebra is the complex algebra of a regular frame. To see this
let F = (W,R〈pi〉)pi∈Π be a countably infinite regular frame and consider the τ∗ modal algebra
A = (FC(W ),∪,∩,−,∅,W,mR〈pi〉)pi∈Π where FC(W ) = {S ∈ P(W ) | S is finite or cofinite}. The
operators on A obey the dynamic algebra properties since F is regular. Thus A is a dynamic
algebra. However A is not the complex algebra of any frame since it can be checked that FC(W ) is
countably infinite and by Cantor’s theorem, no power set is countably infinite. In this way dynamic
algebras are more general than regular frames.
5.1.11 Theorem. PDL is complete with respect to D.
Proof. From Theorem 2.6.9 it suffices to show that the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra over PDL is
a dynamic algebra i.e. LPDL(Φ) ∈ D. The algebra LPDL(Φ) is a τ∗ modal algebra (see Lemma
2.6.8). The operators on LPDL(Φ) will be denoted by fL〈pi〉 where pi ∈ Π. Let ϕ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ):
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fL〈pi1;pi2〉[ϕ] = [〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ]
= [〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ]
= fL〈pi1〉f
L
〈pi2〉[ϕ]
where the second equality follows since `PDL 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ ↔ 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ϕ. Similarly since `PDL
〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ϕ↔ 〈pi1〉ϕ ∨ 〈pi2〉ϕ it follows that
fL〈pi1∪pi2〉[ϕ] = f
L
〈pi1〉[ϕ] ∨ fL〈pi2〉[ϕ]
and since `PDL 〈pi∗〉ϕ↔ (ϕ ∨ 〈pi〉 〈pi∗〉ϕ) it follows
fL〈pi∗〉[ϕ] = [ϕ] ∨ fL〈pi〉fL〈pi∗〉[ϕ].
It remains to demonstrate that LPDL(Φ) satisfies property (iv) of dynamic algebras i.e. fL〈pi∗〉[ϕ] ≤
[ϕ] ∨ fL〈pi∗〉(¬[ϕ] ∧ fL〈pi〉[ϕ]). Note that
fL〈pi∗〉[ϕ] ≤ [ϕ] ∨ fL〈pi∗〉(¬[ϕ] ∧ fL〈pi〉[ϕ])
iff [〈pi∗〉ϕ] ≤ [ϕ] ∨ fL〈pi∗〉[¬ϕ ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ]
iff [〈pi∗〉ϕ] ≤ [ϕ ∨ 〈pi∗〉 (¬ϕ ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ)].
For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) we know [ϕ1] ≤ [ϕ2] iff [ϕ1] ∨ [ϕ2] = [ϕ2] iff [ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2] = [ϕ2] iff `PDL
(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)↔ ϕ2 iff `PDL ϕ1 → ϕ2 and thus it remains to show
`PDL 〈pi∗〉ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ 〈pi∗〉 (¬ϕ ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ)).
We shall now give an informal proof of why this is so:
(1) `PDL [pi∗](¬ϕ→ [pi]¬ϕ)→ (¬ϕ→ [pi∗]¬ϕ) u.s. on axiom (vi) of PDL (Definition 3.1.8)
(2) `PDL ¬ 〈pi∗〉 (¬ϕ ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ)→ (ϕ ∨ ¬ 〈pi∗〉ϕ) [pi∗],→ definition, u.s. on tautology
¬¬p↔ p and u.s. on tautology
¬(p ∨ q)↔ (¬p ∧ ¬q)
(3) `PDL 〈pi∗〉 (¬ϕ ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ) ∨ ϕ ∨ ¬ 〈pi∗〉ϕ → definition
(4) `PDL 〈pi∗〉ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ 〈pi∗〉 (¬ϕ ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ)) → definition.
5.1.3 The validities of D and Dfin are the same.
We need the next definition for the discussion that follows.
5.1.12 Definition. Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π be a τ∗ modal algebra, let C ⊆ A, let
Γ ⊆ Tτ∗(Φ) and let pi ∈ Π. Define Cpi = {x ∈ C | f〈pi〉(x) ∈ C} and Γpi = {ϕ ∈ Γ | 〈pi〉ϕ ∈ Γ}.
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5.1.13 Remark. For a homomorphism g : Tτ∗(Φ)→ A we have g(Γpi) ⊆ g(Γ)pi (with equality when
g is injective). To see this let g(ψ) ∈ g(Γpi) i.e. ψ, 〈pi〉ψ ∈ Γ. Since ψ ∈ Γ we know g(ψ) ∈ g(Γ).
As g is a homomorphism f〈pi〉(g(ψ)) = g(〈pi〉ψ). But g(〈pi〉ψ) ∈ g(Γ) as 〈pi〉ψ ∈ Γ and therefore
g(ψ) ∈ g(Γ)
pi
.
To complete the algebraic proof that PDL is decidable it needs to be demonstrated that the
validities of D and Dfin are the same i.e. D 6|= ϕ≈ implies Dfin 6|= ϕ≈. In particular we must
demonstrate that if a dynamic algebra falsifies a PDL equation then there is a finite dynamic
algebra which also falsifies the equation. The strategy for the proof is as follows:
• Suppose A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π ∈ D with A 6|= σ≈ for σ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ), i.e. there is an
h : Φ→ A such that h∗(σ) 6= 1. Define Γ = F (st(σ)) ⊆fin Tτ∗(Φ) and C = h∗(Γ).
• Towards building a finite falsifying dynamic algebra, start with (AC , fR
s
〈a〉)a∈Π0 : the algebraic
filtration of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 with (Rs〈a〉)a∈Π0 (strictly speaking we are taking the
algebraic filtration of the τ0 reduct of A).
• Inductively define a set of operators (f˜〈pi〉)pi∈Π on AC starting with f˜〈a〉 = fR
s
〈a〉 for all a ∈ Π0
and thus show (AC , f˜〈pi〉)pi∈Π ∈ Dfin.
• Define j : Φ → AC by j(p) = h(p). Show by induction that j∗(ψ) = h∗(ψ) for all ψ ∈ st(σ).
Thus it will hold that j∗(σ) 6= 1.
Regarding the induction in the last step: to prove j∗(〈pi〉ϕ) = h∗(〈pi〉ϕ) where 〈pi〉ϕ ∈ st(σ), it
suffices to show that f˜〈pi〉 extends f〈pi〉 h∗(Γpi) i.e. the conditional
x ∈ h∗(Γpi) implies f˜〈pi〉(x) = f〈pi〉(x).
This gives j∗(〈pi〉ϕ) = h∗(〈pi〉ϕ) since j∗(〈pi〉ϕ) = f˜〈pi〉(j∗(ϕ)) and h∗(〈pi〉ϕ) = f〈pi〉(h∗(ϕ)) and
by inductive hypothesis j∗(ϕ) = h∗(ϕ); but h∗(ϕ) ∈ h∗(Γpi) (since ϕ, 〈pi〉ϕ ∈ Γ) and thus by the
conditional f˜〈pi〉(h∗(ϕ)) = f〈pi〉(h∗(ϕ)). Therefore as part of the last step in the proof strategy we
shall prove x ∈ h∗(Γpi) implies f˜〈pi〉(x) = f〈pi〉(x) for all pi ∈ Π using induction on the length of
programs.
It seems natural in light of Chapter 4 to rather prove (by induction on the length of programs)
the stronger statement2 that f˜〈pi〉 extends f〈pi〉 Cpi for all pi ∈ Π (and indeed this would imply
f˜〈pi〉(h∗(ϕ)) = f〈pi〉(h∗(ϕ))). This will work in the base case (i.e. with basic programs) but will
not work for complex programs as Cpi is not necessarily sensitive to program constructs. For
2Stronger since h∗(Γpi) ⊆ Cpi by Remark 5.1.13.
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example suppose x ∈ Ca;b and we want to prove f˜〈a;b〉(x) = f〈a;b〉(x). In particular we want to
show f˜〈a〉f˜〈b〉(x) = f〈a〉f〈b〉(x) (since A and AC are dynamic algebras (will be proven)). However
x ∈ Ca;b does not necessarily imply x ∈ Cb or f〈b〉(x) ∈ Ca (since h∗ is not injective) and thus we
will not be able to conclude f˜〈b〉(x) = f〈b〉(x) or f˜〈a〉f˜〈b〉(x) = f〈a〉f〈b〉(x) respectively. The following
lemma demonstrates that h∗(Γpi) is sensitive to program constructs in this way.
5.1.14 Lemma. Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π be a τ∗ modal algebra, let g : Tτ∗(Φ)→ A be a
homomorphism, let Γ be a F -closed subset of Tτ∗(Φ) and let pi ∈ Π \Π0. Then
x ∈ g(Γpi) implies

x ∈ g(Γpi2) and f〈pi2〉(x) ∈ g(Γpi1) if pi = pi1;pi2
x ∈ g(Γpi1) and x ∈ g(Γpi2) if pi = pi1 ∪ pi2
f〈pi∗1〉(x) ∈ g(Γpi1) if pi = pi
∗
1.
Proof. Consider the first case. Let x ∈ g(Γpi1;pi2), in particular, x = g(ψ) for some ψ ∈ Γ with
〈pi1;pi2〉ψ ∈ Γ. As Γ is F -closed 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ψ ∈ Γ and 〈pi2〉ψ ∈ Γ; the latter giving that ψ ∈ Γpi2
and thus x ∈ g(Γpi2). As g is a homomorphism we have f〈pi2〉(x) = g(〈pi2〉ψ); furthermore since
〈pi2〉ψ ∈ Γ and 〈pi1〉 〈pi2〉ψ ∈ Γ we get 〈pi2〉ψ ∈ Γpi1 and therefore g(〈pi2〉ψ) ∈ g(Γpi1).
Consider the second case. Let x ∈ g(Γpi1∪pi2), thus x = g(ψ) for some ψ ∈ Γ with 〈pi1 ∪ pi2〉ψ ∈ Γ.
As Γ is F -closed 〈pi1〉ψ ∈ Γ and 〈pi2〉ψ ∈ Γ. Thus ψ ∈ Γpi1 and ψ ∈ Γpi2 which gives that x ∈ g(Γpi1)
and x ∈ g(Γpi2).
For the final case let x ∈ g(Γpi∗1 ). Therefore x = g(ψ) for some ψ ∈ Γ such that 〈pi∗1〉ψ ∈ Γ;
therefore 〈pi1〉 〈pi∗1〉ψ ∈ Γ since Γ is F -closed. As g is a homomorphism f〈pi∗1〉(x) = g(〈pi
∗
1〉ψ); since
〈pi1〉 〈pi∗1〉ψ ∈ Γ we know that 〈pi∗1〉ψ ∈ Γpi1 and therefore g(〈pi∗1〉ψ) ∈ g(Γpi1).
5.1.15 Theorem. Let σ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ). Then D 6|= σ≈ implies Dfin 6|= σ≈.
Proof. Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈pi〉)pi∈Π ∈ D with A 6|= σ≈ for σ ∈ Tτ∗(Φ) i.e. there is an h : Φ→ A
such that h∗(σ) 6= 1. Define Γ = F (st(σ)) and C = h∗(Γ). The set C is finite as Γ is finite by
Theorem 5.1.3. Consider (AC , f
Rs〈a〉)a∈Π0 : the algebraic filtration of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 with
(Rs〈a〉)a∈Π0 (recall Example 4.2.9 for the definition of R
s
〈a〉). Towards forming a dynamic algebra,
recursively define the functions (f˜〈pi〉)pi∈Π on AC as:
f˜〈pi〉(x) =

f
Rs〈a〉(x) pi = a ∈ Π0
f˜〈pi1〉(f˜〈pi2〉(x)) pi = pi1;pi2
f˜〈pi1〉(x) ∨ f˜〈pi2〉(x) pi = pi1 ∪ pi2
|AC |∨
n=0
f˜n〈pi1〉(x) pi = pi
∗
1
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where x ∈ AC and f˜0〈pi1〉(x) = x. For a ∈ Π0 the function f˜〈a〉 = f
Rs〈a〉 is an operator on AC . This
forms the base case of a straightforward inductive proof that the functions (f˜pi)pi∈Π are operators
on AC . It still needs to be checked that (AC , f˜〈pi〉)pi∈Π ∈ D. Let x ∈ AC and let pi, pi1, pi2 ∈ Π;
from their definitions it is immediate that f˜〈pi1;pi2〉(x) and f˜〈pi1∪pi2〉(x) obey properties (i) and (ii)
of dynamic algebras. We will now check that f˜〈pi∗〉(x) has properties (iii) and (iv) of dynamic
algebras. To see that f˜〈pi∗〉(x) obeys property (iii), it needs to be demonstrated that
f˜〈pi∗〉(x) = x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(f˜〈pi∗〉(x)).
Since f˜〈pi〉 preserves joins we have
x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(f˜〈pi∗〉(x)) = x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(
|AC |∨
n=0
f˜n〈pi〉(x))
= x ∨
|AC |+1∨
n=1
f˜n〈pi〉(x)
=
|AC |+1∨
n=0
f˜n〈pi〉(x).
We have f˜
|AC |+1
〈pi〉 (x) ∈ {f˜n〈pi〉(x)}
|AC |
n=0 . This is true because if f˜
|AC |+1
〈pi〉 (x) 6∈ {f˜n〈pi〉(x)}
|AC |
n=0 then there
would be no repetitions amongst {f˜n〈pi〉(x)}
|AC |
n=0 and the algebra AC would have |AC |+ 1 elements,
a contradiction. Therefore
|AC |+1∨
n=0
f˜n〈pi〉(x) =
|AC |∨
n=0
f˜n〈pi〉(x) = f˜〈pi∗〉(x).
To check that f˜〈pi∗〉(x) obeys property (iv) of dynamic algebras it suffices to check that f˜〈pi∗〉(x) is
the least pre-fixed point of tpix,AC (by Lemma 5.1.8). We know f˜〈pi∗〉(x) is a pre-fixed point of t
pi
x,AC
since it has just been shown that f˜〈pi∗〉(x) is a fixed point of tpix,AC . Suppose z ∈ AC is a pre-fixed
point of tpix,AC i.e. x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(z) ≤ z. Since f˜〈pi〉 is order-preserving, we get
f˜〈pi〉(x) ∨ f˜〈pi〉(f˜〈pi〉(z)) ≤ f˜〈pi〉(z)
and since joins preserve order
x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(x) ∨ f˜〈pi〉(f˜〈pi〉(z)) ≤ x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(z) ≤ z
where the last inequality follows since z is a pre-fixed point of tpix,AC . Inductively it follows
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x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(x) ∨ ... ∨ f˜ |AC |〈pi〉 (x) ∨ f˜
|AC |+1
〈pi〉 (z) = f˜〈pi∗〉(x) ∨ f˜
|AC |+1
〈pi〉 (z) ≤ z
which gives f˜〈pi∗〉(x) ≤ z and therefore f˜〈pi∗〉(x) is the least pre-fixed point of tpix,AC i.e. f˜〈pi∗〉(x)
obeys property (iv) of dynamic algebras by Lemma 5.1.8. Thus we have that (AC , f˜〈pi〉)pi∈Π ∈ Dfin.
Finally it needs to be checked that (AC , f˜〈pi〉)pi∈Π falsifies σ≈. To this end define j : Φ → AC
by j(p) = h(p); to prove that j∗(σ) 6= 1 it suffices to show j∗(ψ) = h∗(ψ) for all ψ ∈ st(σ).
However, since (AC , f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 is an algebraic filtration, we already have j∗(ψ) = h∗(ψ) for all
ψ ∈ st(σ) ∩ Tτ0(Φ) (by Theorem 4.2.11). We therefore only prove that for all 〈pi〉ϕ ∈ st(σ):
j∗(〈pi〉ϕ) = h∗(〈pi〉ϕ). (5.1.3)
As discussed in the introduction to this subsection, if it can be shown that for all pi ∈ Π that
x ∈ h∗(Γpi) implies f˜〈pi〉(x) = f〈pi〉(x) (5.1.4)
then equation 5.1.3 holds for all 〈pi〉ϕ ∈ st(σ). Thus we will now prove conditional 5.1.4 for all
pi ∈ Π.
Base case: Let k(pi) = 0 i.e. pi = a ∈ Π0 and let x ∈ h∗(Γa). We know by Remark 5.1.13
that h∗(Γa) ⊆ Ca and hence x ∈ Ca. Since fR
s
〈a〉 extends f〈a〉 Ca we have f
Rs〈a〉(x) = f〈a〉(x) i.e.
f˜〈a〉(x) = f〈a〉(x).
Inductive hypothesis: Assume conditional 5.1.4 is true for all pi ∈ Π such that k(pi) < m.
Inductive step: Let pi ∈ Π such that k(pi) = m and let x ∈ h∗(Γpi). Therefore for some pi1, pi2 ∈ Π
we have either:
pi =

pi1;pi2 (I)
pi1 ∪ pi2 (II)
pi∗1 (III).
(I) Since x ∈ h∗(Γpi1;pi2) we have by Lemma 5.1.14 that x ∈ h∗(Γpi2) and thus by the inductive
hypothesis
f˜〈pi2〉(x) = f〈pi2〉(x).
Therefore f˜〈pi1〉(f˜〈pi2〉(x)) = f˜〈pi1〉(f〈pi2〉(x)). By Lemma 5.1.14 we have f〈pi2〉(x) ∈ h∗(Γpi1) which
gives by the inductive hypothesis
f˜〈pi1〉(f〈pi2〉(x)) = f〈pi1〉(f〈pi2〉(x)).
(II) Since x ∈ h∗(Γpi1∪pi2) we have by Lemma 5.1.14 that x ∈ h∗(Γpi1) ∩ h∗(Γpi2) and thus by the
inductive hypothesis
f˜〈pi1〉(x) = f〈pi1〉(x)
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and
f˜〈pi2〉(x) = f〈pi2〉(x)
which gives
f˜〈pi1〉(x) ∨ f˜〈pi2〉(x) = f〈pi1〉(x) ∨ f〈pi2〉(x).
(III) Let x ∈ h∗(Γpi∗1 ). Firstly we will show
f˜〈pi∗1〉(x) ≤ f〈pi∗1〉(x).
Since f˜〈pi∗1〉(x) is the least pre-fixed point of the function t
pi
x,AC
(by Lemma 5.1.7) it will suffice to
show that f〈pi∗1〉(x) is a pre-fixed point of t
pi
x,AC
i.e.
x ∨ f˜〈pi〉(f〈pi∗1〉(x)) ≤ f〈pi∗1〉(x).
Since x ∈ h∗(Γpi∗1 ) we have by Lemma 5.1.14 that f〈pi∗1〉(x) ∈ h
∗(Γpi1) and thus by the inductive
hypothesis
f˜〈pi1〉(f〈pi∗1〉(x)) = f〈pi1〉(f〈pi∗1〉(x)).
Therefore
x ∨ f˜〈pi1〉(f〈pi∗1〉(x)) = x ∨ f〈pi1〉(f〈pi∗1〉(x))
= f〈pi∗1〉(x)
where the second equality follows since A is a dynamic algebra. Thus f〈pi∗1〉(x) is a pre-fixed point
of tpix,AC and f˜〈pi∗1〉(x) ≤ f〈pi∗1〉(x). To complete the proof that f˜〈pi∗1〉(x) = f〈pi∗1〉(x) it remains to
show that f〈pi∗1〉(x) ≤ f˜〈pi∗1〉(x). We thus finish by showing for all α ∈ Π that
f〈α〉(x) ≤ f˜〈α〉(x) for all x ∈ AC . (5.1.5)
Base case: Let k(α) = 0 i.e. α = a ∈ Π0 and let x ∈ AC . By Lemma 4.2.13 we have that
f
Rs〈a〉(x) =
∧
{x′ ∈ AC | f〈a〉(x) ≤ x′}
and thus f〈a〉(x) ≤ fR
s
〈a〉(x) = f˜〈a〉(x).
Inductive hypothesis: Assume statement 5.1.5 is true for all α ∈ Π such that k(α) < m.
Inductive step: Let α ∈ Π such that k(α) = m and let x ∈ AC . Therefore for some α1, α2 ∈ Π:
α =

α1;α2 (i)
α1 ∪ α2 (ii)
α∗1 (iii).
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(i) By inductive hypothesis we have
f〈α1〉(f〈α2〉(x)) ≤ f˜〈α1〉(f〈α2〉(x))
and
f〈α2〉(x) ≤ f˜〈α2〉(x).
Since f˜〈α1〉 is order-preserving, applying it on the last inequality gives
f˜〈α1〉(f〈α2〉(x)) ≤ f˜〈α1〉(f˜〈α2〉(x)).
Thus overall
f〈α1;α2〉(x) = f〈α1〉(f〈α2〉(x)) ≤ f˜〈α1〉(f˜〈α2〉(x)) = f˜〈α1;α2〉(x).
(ii) By inductive hypothesis we have
f〈α1〉(x) ≤ f˜〈α1〉(x)
and
f〈α2〉(x) ≤ f˜〈α2〉(x)
thus giving
f〈α1∪α2〉(x) = f〈α1〉(x) ∨ f〈α2〉(x) ≤ f˜〈α1〉(x) ∨ f˜〈α2〉(x) = f˜〈α1∪α2〉(x).
(iii) To prove f〈α∗〉(x) ≤ f˜〈α∗〉(x) it suffices to show that f˜〈α∗〉(x) is a pre-fixed point of tαx,A (by
Lemma 5.1.7) i.e.
x ∨ f〈α〉(f˜〈α∗〉(x)) ≤ f˜〈α∗〉(x).
By hypothesis
f〈α〉(f˜〈α∗〉(x)) ≤ f˜〈α〉(f˜〈α∗〉(x))
but since joins preserve order and f˜〈α∗〉(x) is a fixed point of tαx,AC we have
x ∨ f〈α〉(f˜〈α∗〉(x)) ≤ x ∨ f˜〈α〉(f˜〈α∗〉(x)) = f˜〈α∗〉(x).
5.2 ΛR has the fmp with respect to R
We lastly turn our attention to Lρ: a modal language with least binders introduced by Pratt [34].
The minimization binder, ρ, of Lρ is interpreted not as a least fixed point but as a least root of a
function. This allows Lρ to express all the PDL formulae as well as formulae involving the converse
modality 〈pi−〉, where 〈pi−〉 is interpreted relationally by means of R〈pi−〉w1w2 iff R〈pi〉w2w1.
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In [34] Pratt posed the open problem of whether it is possible to express every Lρ formula as an
Lµ formula. We now know by the work of Janin and Walukiewicz [20] that this is not the case.
In particular Janin and Walukiewicz demonstrated that Lµ is bisimulation invariant; since Lρ can
express the converse modality, which can easily be shown not to be bisimulation invariant, we know
that Lρ cannot be a fragment of Lµ in this way.
In this final section we will first look at the syntax and algebraic semantics of Lρ (Definitions 5.2.1
and 5.2.10 respectively). We will then finally discuss Pratt’s result (Theorem 3 of [34]) that ΛR has
the finite model property with respect to R (Theorem 5.2.22). In particular, we will offer a proof
based on that of Pratt’s but differing in the construction of the finite falsifying algebra.
5.2.1 Definition. [34] The set V ar denotes a set of variables disjoint from Φ. The formulae of Lρ
are defined recursively as ϕ = ⊥ | p | X | ¬ϕ1 | ϕ1∨ϕ2 | 〈a〉ϕ1 | ρX.ϕ(X) where p ∈ Φ, X ∈ V ar,
a ∈ Π0 and ϕ(X) obeys the following two syntactic restrictions: X does not occur conjunctively in
ϕ(X) (Definition 5.2.2) and ϕ(>) evaluates syntactically to ⊥ (see Definition 5.2.4). The dual of
ρX.ϕ(X) is the formula ¬ρX.¬ϕ(X) and is denoted by ιX.ϕ(X). The collection of Lρ formulae is
denoted by Lρ(Φ, V ar).
5.2.2 Definition. [34] Let X,ϕ(X) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). The formula X is said to occur conjunctively
in ϕ(X) if any of the following hold:
(i) likesigned occurrences of X in ϕ(X) occur in different arguments of a conjunction;
(ii) [a]ψ(X) occurs in ϕ(X);
(iii) ιX.ψ(X) occurs in ϕ(X)
where a ∈ Π0 and ψ(X) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) such that X occurs in ψ(X).
5.2.3 Example. The formula ρX.(¬X ∧ 〈a〉X) is a Lρ formula whilst ρX.(¬X ∧ [a]X) is not as
X occurs conjunctively in ¬X ∧ [a]X by condition (ii).
The following definition is based on a definition found in [34].
5.2.4 Definition. Define the binary relation  on Lρ(Φ, V ar) by
¬>, ψ ∧ ⊥,⊥ ∧ ψ,¬ψ ∧ ψ,⊥ ∨⊥, 〈a〉⊥  ⊥
ψ,ψ ∨ ⊥,⊥ ∨ ψ,ψ ∧ >,> ∧ ψ  ψ
¬⊥, ψ ∨ >,> ∨ ψ,¬ψ ∨ ψ,> ∨>  >
ϕ1  ψ1 implies ¬ϕ1  ¬ψ1
ϕ1  ϕ2 & ψ1  ψ2 implies ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2  ψ1 ∨ ψ2
ϕ1  ψ1 implies 〈a〉ϕ1  〈a〉ψ1
ψ(⊥) ⊥ implies ρX.ψ(X)  ⊥
Section 5.2. ΛR has the fmp with respect to R Page 69
where ψ,ψ1, ψ2, ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) and a ∈ Π0. The formula ϕ evaluates syntactically to ⊥ if
ϕ ∗ ⊥ (where  ∗ is the transitive closure of  ).
5.2.5 Remark. It can be shown that this relation is defined in such a way that ϕ  ∗ ψ implies
A |= ϕ ≈ ψ for any τ0 modal algebra A.
Given a Lρ formula ρX.ϕ(X), the restriction that ϕ(>)  ∗ ⊥ guarantees that 1 will be a root of
ϕ(X) whenever it is interpreted on a τ0 modal algebra i.e. the set of roots of ϕ(X) is not empty.
The fact that X cannot occur conjunctively in ϕ(X) makes Lρ amenable to a filtration argument,
in part by ensuring that the set of roots of ϕ(X) is a lattice (see Lemma 5.2.13).
5.2.6 Definition. The bounded variables of a Lρ formula (denoted b.v.()) are defined inductively
as b.v.(⊥)=b.v.(p)=b.v.(X)=∅, b.v.(¬ϕ)=b.v.(〈a〉ϕ)=b.v.(ϕ), b.v.(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)=b.v.(ϕ1) ∪ b.v.(ϕ2)
and b.v.(ρX.ϕ(X))=b.v.(ϕ(X)) ∪ {X} where p ∈ Φ, X ∈ V ar, a ∈ Π0 and ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2, ρX.ϕ(X) ∈
Lρ(Φ, V ar). The free variables of a Lρ formula (f.v.()) are defined analogously except f.v.(X)={X}
and f.v.(ρX.ϕ(X))=f.v.(ϕ(X)) \ {X}.
5.2.7 Example. For σ = p ∨ ρY.(〈a〉 ¬Y ∧X), we have b.v.(σ) = {Y } and f.v.(σ) = {X}.
5.2.8 Definition. Let σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). The formula σ is in normal form if all of the negations in
σ appear in front of variables i.e. σ is in normal form if ¬ψ ∈ st(σ) implies ψ ∈ Φ ∪ V ar for all
ψ ∈ st(σ).
5.2.9 Remark. Any Lρ formula is equivalent to a formula in normal form. For example the Lρ
formula ρX.(¬X ∧ ¬ 〈a〉X) is equivalent to the Lρ formula ρX.(¬X ∧ [a]¬X). We thus assume all
Lρ formulae to be in normal form.
We now look at the algebraic semantics for Lρ (recall Definition 3.2.7 of an X-variant of a map) as
well as formally define the notion of a root.
5.2.10 Definition. [34] Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈a〉)a∈Π0 be a τ0 modal algebra and let h :
Φ∪ V ar → A. The map h∗ : Lρ(Φ, V ar)→ A is the extension of h to Lρ(Φ, V ar) and is defined as
h∗(ϕ) =

0 ϕ = ⊥
h(p) ϕ = p ∈ Φ ∪ V ar
¬h∗(ϕ1) ϕ = ¬ϕ1
h∗(ϕ1) ∨ h∗(ϕ2) ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
f〈a〉(h∗(ϕ1)) ϕ = 〈a〉ϕ1
smallest x ∈ A s.t. h∗X→x(ϕ(X)) = 0 ϕ = ρX.ϕ(X)
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where h∗X→x is the extension of hX→x to Lρ(Φ, V ar). An element x ∈ A is a root of ϕ(X) in A
under h if h∗X→x(ϕ(X)) = 0; as such h
∗(ρX.ϕ(X)) is the smallest root of ϕ(X) in A under h.
5.2.11 Remark. By the restriction on ϕ(X) that ϕ(>)  ∗ ⊥ we know that A |= ϕ(>) ≈ ⊥ i.e.
h∗X→1(ϕ(X)) = 0. However h
∗ may still be a partial map since h∗(ρX.ϕ(X)) may fail to exist i.e.
the map h∗X→(ϕ(X)) may not have a smallest root.
5.2.12 Definition. [34] Let A be a τ0 modal algebra. A is a ρ-algebra when h
∗ : Lρ(Φ, V ar)→ A
is a total mapping for all h : Φ∪V ar → A i.e. h∗(ρX.ϕ(X)) is well defined for all h : Φ∪V ar → A
and ρX.ϕ(X) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). The class of ρ-algebras will be denoted by R.
In the next lemma we take for granted the non-trivial result of Pratt that for a τ0 modal algebra A, a
mapping h : Φ∪V ar → A and a formula ρX.ϕ(X) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) the set {x ∈ A | h∗X→x(ϕ(X)) = 0}
is a lattice [34]. The result relies heavily on the fact that X does not occur conjunctively in ϕ(X)
and hence that likesigned occurrences of X in ϕ(X) do not occur within distinct arguments of a
conjunction.
5.2.13 Lemma. [34] Let A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈a〉)a∈Π0 be a finite τ0 modal algebra. Then A ∈ R.
Proof. Let ρX.ϕ(X) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). For any τ0 modal algebra A and h : Φ ∪ V ar → A, the set
C = {x ∈ A | h∗X→x(ϕ(X)) = 0} is a lattice (see appendix of [34]). When A is finite the element∧
C will exist in A and will be the least root of h∗X→(ϕ(X)) i.e. h
∗(ρX.ϕ(X)) will be well defined
making A a ρ-algebra.
5.2.1 The validities of R and Rfin are the same.
In this final subsection we will show that ΛR, the equational theory of R, has the finite model
property with respect to R. By definition ΛR is characterised by R. Thus to prove that ΛR has the
finite model property with respect to R, we will demonstrate that if a Lρ formula σ is a validity
on Rfin then σ is a validity on R. This will be done by proving the contrapositive: if there a
ρ-algebra A such that A 6|= σ≈ then there is a finite ρ-algebra A′ such that A′ 6|= σ≈. Pratt gives
a proof of this in Theorem 3 of [34]: suppose A=(A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈a〉)a∈Π0 ∈ R such that A 6|= σ≈;
towards building a finite falsifying ρ-algebra, Pratt takes the Boolean algebra AC generated by
C = {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)} ⊆ A where h : Φ ∪ V ar → A with h∗(σ) 6= 1. For each a ∈ Π0 he then
defines operators f˜〈a〉 : AC → AC by f˜〈a〉(z) =
∧{x′ ∈ AC | f〈a〉(z) ≤ x′} giving rise to the τ0 modal
algebra (AC , f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 . In particular he takes the algebraic filtration of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 with
(Rs〈a〉)a∈Π0 (by Lemma 4.2.13). This algebra is in R by Theorem 5.2.13. Pratt then proceeds to
demonstrate that (AC , f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 also falsifies σ≈ by considering the extension of j to Lρ(Φ, V ar)
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where j : Φ ∪ V ar → AC is defined by j(p) = h(p). In particular Pratt shows j∗(ψ) = h∗(ψ) for
all ψ ∈ st(σ) and when ψ = ρX.ϕ(X), he argues that j∗(ψ) = h∗(ψ) by showing j∗(ψ) is a root of
h∗X→ϕ(X) (hence h
∗(ψ) ≤ j∗(ψ)) and h∗(ψ) is a root of j∗X→ϕ(X) (hence h∗(ψ) ≥ j∗(ψ)).
It seems however that there is an alteration required in the construction of the set C in Pratt’s
proof. To elaborate on this point, we present the following two scenarios:
• Consider σ = ρX.ϕ(X) where ϕ(X) = p ∧ 〈a〉 ¬X. The formula σ is a legal Lρ formula since X
does not occur conjunctively in ϕ(X) and p∧〈a〉 ¬> ∗ p∧〈a〉⊥ ∗ p∧⊥ ∗ ⊥. Let h∗(σ) = x1;
therefore C = {x1, h(p)∧f〈a〉(¬h(X)), h(p), f〈a〉(¬h(X)),¬h(X), h(X)}. The algebra AC will falsify
σ≈ if j∗(σ) = h∗(σ).
j∗(σ) ≥ h∗(σ) since j∗(σ) is a root of h∗X→(ϕ(X)) :
f〈a〉(¬j∗(σ)) ∧ h(p) = f〈a〉(¬j∗(σ)) ∧ j(p) (defn. of j)
≤ f˜〈a〉(¬j∗(σ)) ∧ j(p) (defn. of f˜)
= 0 (defn. of j∗(σ)).
j∗(σ) ≤ h∗(σ) if x1 is a root of j∗X→(ϕ(X)) :
f˜〈a〉(¬x1) ∧ j(p) = f˜〈a〉(¬x1) ∧ h(p) (defn. of j)
?
= f〈a〉(¬x1) ∧ h(p)
= 0 (defn. of x1).
We do not necessarily have f〈a〉(¬x1) ∈ C so it is not guaranteed that f˜〈a〉(¬x1) = f〈a〉(¬x1). This
is fixed by instead building C as {h∗X→x1(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)}.
• The situation becomes more complicated with nested least root formulae. Consider the formula
σ where σ=ρX1.(〈a〉 ¬X1 ∧ ρX2.(〈a〉 ¬X2 ∧ X1)) and let ϕ2(X2)=〈a〉 ¬X2 ∧ X1 and ϕ1(X1) =
〈a〉 ¬X1 ∧ ρX2.ϕ2(X2). It can be checked that σ is indeed a Lρ formula. Let x1 = h∗(σ) and let
z1 = j
∗(σ). For now the set C is constructed as {h∗X1→x1(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)}. The algebra AC will
falsify σ≈ if z1 = x1.
z1 ≥ x1 since z1 is a root of h∗X1→(ϕ1(X1)) :
f〈a〉(¬z1) ∧ h∗X1→z1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) ≤ f˜〈a〉(¬z1) ∧ h∗X1→z1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) (defn. of f˜)
≤ f˜〈a〉(¬z1) ∧ j∗X1→z1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) (inequality 5.2.1)
= 0 (defn. of z1).
We will show
h∗X1→z(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) ≤ j∗X1→z(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) for all z ∈ AC . (5.2.1)
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Let z ∈ AC and let z′ = j∗X1→z(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)). By definition, inequality 5.2.1 is true if z′ is a root of
h∗X1→z,X2→(ϕ2(X2)) :
f〈a〉(¬z′) ∧ z ≤ f˜〈a〉(¬z′) ∧ z (defn. of f˜)
= 0 (defn. of z′).
Therefore inequality 5.2.1 is true which gives z1 ≥ x1.
z1 ≤ x1 if x1 is a root of j∗X1→(ϕ1(X1)) :
f˜〈a〉(¬x1) ∧ j∗X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) = f〈a〉(¬x1) ∧ j∗X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) (f〈a〉(¬x1) ∈ C)
?
= f〈a〉(¬x1) ∧ h∗X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2))
= 0 (defn. of x1).
Thus z1 ≤ x1 if it can be demonstrated that j∗X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) = h∗X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)). Let
x2 = h
∗
X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)). We know from inequality 5.2.1 that x2 ≤ j∗X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)). It
remains to show that j∗X1→x1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2)) ≤ x2. This is true if x2 is a root of j∗X1→x1,X2→(ϕ2(X2)) :
f˜〈a〉(¬x2) ∧ x1 ?= f〈a〉(¬x2) ∧ x1
= 0 (defn. of x2).
We are not guaranteed that f˜〈a〉(¬x2) = f〈a〉(¬x2) since f〈a〉(¬x2) is not necessarily in C. Therefore
the proof will follow if we adjust our C to {h∗X1→x1,X2→x2(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)}.
The alterations of C are necessary since we are evaluating roots from the algebra A in the algebra
AC in the proof that j
∗ and h∗ agree on least root formulae. Notice that in proving j∗(σ) ≥ h∗(σ)
the alterations to C are not needed. We will see that in general (Lemma 5.2.19) this is due both
to the construction of the AC operators (f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 and the prevention of conjunctive occurrence in
least root formulae.
Motivated by the previous discussion we now propose a general proof strategy for proving that
R 6|= σ≈ implies Rfin 6|= σ≈ for σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). However we will first need to make the following
two definitions.
5.2.14 Definition. Let σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) and let X1, X2 ∈ b.v.(σ). Define X1 ≺ X2 iff X2 is in the
scope of the binder binding X1.
5.2.15 Example. Consider σ = ρX.(¬X ∧ ρY.(X ∧ 〈b〉 ¬Y )). We have that X ≺ Y .
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5.2.16 Remark. For a σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) we do not always have that ≺ is a linear order on b.v.(σ).
For example this is true when σ = ρX.(¬X ∧ p) ∨ ρY.(¬Y ∧ q). Therefore we consider a linear
extension of ≺ (denoted ≺′) on b.v.(σ).
5.2.17 Definition. A formula σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) is clean if
(i) no variable occurs both bound and free in σ and
(ii) no two binders bind the same variable in σ.
5.2.18 Remark. Consider the unclean Lρ formula ρX.(¬X ∧ ρX.(¬X ∧ p)) and recall the second
scenario discussed above (which involved a nested least root formula). We would not be able to
construct C as desired since X needs to be mapped to two different elements. Any unclean formula
can be “baptised” into a clean formula by a suitable relabelling of the bound variables. In particular
σ can be rewritten as ρX.(¬X∧ρY.(¬Y ∧p)). Without loss of generality, we assume all Lρ formulae
to be clean.
We now present our general strategy for demonstrating that R 6|= σ≈ implies Rfin 6|= σ≈ for
all σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). This strategy is based on Pratt’s proof strategy in [34] but differs in the
construction of C and hence also j : Φ ∪ V ar → AC .
• Let σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). Suppose A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈a〉)a∈Π0 ∈ R such that A 6|= σ≈ i.e. there
is an h : Φ ∪ V ar → A with h∗(σ) 6= 1.
• Let b.v.(σ) = {X1, ..., Xm} ordered as X1 ≺′ ... ≺′ Xm. Inductively define the following
variants of h up to m:
h1 = hX1→x1 where x1 = h∗(ρX1.ϕ1(X1))
h2 = h1, X2→x2 where x2 = h∗1(ρX2.ϕ2(X2))
...
...
hi = hi−1, Xi→xi where xi = h∗i−1(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)).
• Let C = {h∗m(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)} and consider the algebraic filtration (AC , fR
s
〈a〉)a∈Π0 of A
through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 with (Rs〈a〉)a∈Π0 . For each a ∈ Π0 denote the AC operator f
Rs〈a〉 by
f˜〈a〉; it needs to be checked that (AC , f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 ∈ R and that AC 6|= σ≈. To this end define
j : Φ ∪ V ar → AC by j(p) = hm(p) and prove that j∗(σ) = h∗(σ).
Note that this construction has already partly been seen when using the F -closure in the proof
that PDL is decidable (Section 5.1). For example if we consider the PDL formula 〈a∗〉 p, which
is µX.(p ∨ 〈a〉X) by Theorem 3.2.19, the set C is constructed as {h∗(ψ) | ψ ∈ F (st(〈a∗〉 p))} =
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{f〈a∗〉(h(p)), f〈a〉f〈a∗〉(h(p)), h(p)} i.e. C = {h∗X→f〈a∗〉(h(p))(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(µX.(p ∨ 〈a〉X))}. The
following two lemmas (and corollary) will be used in the last step of the proof strategy i.e. when
proving that j∗ and h∗ agree on least root formulae. For the first lemma recall the definition of an
X-variant (or vector variant) of a mapping from Definition 3.2.7.
5.2.19 Lemma. Suppose η = ρX.ϕ(X) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). Then h∗m(η) ≤ j∗(η).
Proof. The result will be proved by induction on the length of Lρ formulas. For the induction to
work we actually prove a stronger statement i.e. we will show that for every ψ ∈ st(η):
h∗
m, Y→y(ψ) ≤ j∗Y→y(ψ) for all Y = (Y1, ..., Yn) ∈ (b.v.(η))n, y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ AnC and n ∈ N.
(5.2.2)
Base case: Let n ∈ N, let Y = (Y1, ..., Yn) ∈ (b.v.(η))n, let y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ AnC and consider
ψ ∈ st(η) such that k(ψ) = 0 i.e. ψ = ⊥ or ψ = p ∈ Φ ∪ V ar. For either case we have by
definition that h∗
m, Y→y(ψ) = j
∗
Y→y(ψ). As all Lρ formulae are assumed to be in normal form (see
Definition 5.2.8) we deal with negation in the base case and in particular we have h∗
m, Y→y(¬ψ) =
¬(h∗
m, Y→y(ψ)) = ¬(j∗Y→y(ψ)) = j∗Y→y(¬ψ).
Inductive hypothesis: Assume statement 5.2.2 is true for all ψ ∈ st(η) such that k(ψ) < l ≤ k(η).
Inductive step: Let n ∈ N, let Y = (Y1, ..., Yn) ∈ (b.v.(η))n, let y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ AnC and let
ψ ∈ st(η) such that k(ψ) = l. Thus for some ϕ1, ϕ2, θ(Z) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) we have:
ψ =

ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 (i)
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 (ii)
〈a〉ϕ (iii)
ρZ.θ(Z) (iv).
For the cases of [a]ϕ and ιZ.θ(Z), we actually have equality in statement 5.2.2. This is due to
the fact that Yi cannot occur in these subterms for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, otherwise this would serve as a
conjunctive occurance of bound variables in η.
(i) By the inductive hypothesis h∗
m, Y→y(ϕ1) ≤ j∗Y→y(ϕ1) and h∗m, Y→y(ϕ2) ≤ j∗Y→y(ϕ2). Thus
h∗
m, Y→y(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = h∗m, Y→y(ϕ1) ∨ h
∗
m, Y→y(ϕ2)
≤ j∗
Y→y(ϕ1) ∨ j
∗
Y→y(ϕ2)
= j∗
Y→y(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
(ii) Similar to case (i).
(iii) By the inductive hypothesis h∗
m, Y→y(ϕ) ≤ j∗Y→y(ϕ). Since f〈a〉 is an operator on A (and
hence order-preserving) f〈a〉(h∗m, Y→y(ϕ)) ≤ f〈a〉(j∗Y→y(ϕ)). But by Lemma 4.2.13 we have that
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f〈a〉(j∗Y→y(ϕ)) ≤ f˜〈a〉(j∗Y→y(ϕ)) and hence the result holds.
(iv) Let z = j∗
Y→y(ρZ.θ(Z)). We know that h
∗
m, Y→y(ρZ.θ(Z)) ≤ z if z is a root of the mapping
h∗
m, Y→y, Z→(θ(Z)). This is true since
h∗
m, Y→y, Z→z(θ(Z)) ≤ j∗Y→y, Z→z(θ(Z)) (by inductive hypothesis)
= 0 (by defn. of z).
5.2.20 Lemma. Let A ∈ R and let ϕ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). If g1, g2 : Φ ∪ V ar → A are two maps that
agree on f.v.(ϕ) ∪ Φ ∪ {⊥} (i.e. g1(X) = g2(X) for all X ∈ f.v.(ϕ) ∪ Φ ∪ {⊥}) then g∗1(ϕ) = g∗2(ϕ).
Proof. We will show for all ψ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) that:
If g1, g2 : Φ ∪ V ar → A are any two maps agreeing on f.v.(ψ) ∪ Φ ∪ {⊥} then g∗1(ψ) = g∗2(ψ).
(5.2.3)
Base case: Let ψ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) such that k(ψ) = 0 and let g1, g2 : Φ ∪ V ar → A be two maps
agreeing on f.v.(ψ) ∪ Φ ∪ {⊥}. We have that either ψ = ⊥, ψ = p ∈ Φ or ψ = X ∈ V ar. When
ψ = ⊥ or ψ = p, conditional 5.2.3 is true as g1 and g2 agree on Φ ∪ {⊥}. If ψ = X, we have that
g1(ψ) = g2(ψ) since f.v.(ψ) = {ψ}, and thus g∗1(ψ) = g∗2(ψ).
Inductive hypothesis: Assume conditional 5.2.3 is true for all ψ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) with k(ψ) < n.
Inductive step: Let ψ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) such that k(ψ) = n. Thus for some ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ(X) ∈
Lρ(Φ, V ar) and a ∈ Π0 we have:
ψ =

ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 (i)
¬ϕ (ii)
〈a〉ϕ (iii)
ρX.ϕ(X) (iv).
Let g1, g2 : Φ ∪ V ar → A be two maps agreeing on f.v.(ψ) ∪ Φ ∪ {⊥}.
(i) By definition it is true that
f.v.(ϕ1) ⊆ f.v.(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
f.v.(ϕ2) ⊆ f.v.(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
Thus by the inductive hypothesis g∗1(ϕ1) = g∗2(ϕ1) and g∗1(ϕ2) = g∗2(ϕ2) and therefore
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g∗1(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = g∗1(ϕ1) ∨ g∗1(ϕ2)
= g∗2(ϕ1) ∨ g∗2(ϕ2)
= g∗2(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
Cases (ii) and (iii) follow similarly.
(iv) Let z1 = g
∗
1(ρX.ϕ(X)) and let z2 = g
∗
2(ρX.ϕ(X)). We need to show that z1 = z2.
z1 ≤ z2 if z2 is a root of g∗1 X→(ϕ(X)) i.e. if g∗1 X→z2(ϕ(X)) = 0. By assumption the two maps
g1 and g1 agree on f.v.(ρX.ϕ(X)). Thus g1 and g2 agree on f.v.(ϕ(X)) \ {X} as f.v.(ρX.ϕ(X)) =
f.v.(ϕ(X)) \ {X}. Therefore the two maps g1 X→z2 and g2 X→z2 agree on f.v.(ϕ(X)) and thus
by the inductive hypothesis g∗1 X→z2(ϕ(X)) = g
∗
2 X→z2(ϕ(X)). But by definition of z2 we know
g∗2 X→z2(ϕ(X)) = 0. The proof of z1 ≥ z2 follows similarly.
Recall from the proof strategy that b.v.(σ) = {X1, ..., Xm} where X1 ≺′ X2 ≺′ ... ≺′ Xm.
5.2.21 Corollary. Let i ∈ {1, ...,m}; then h∗m(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) = h∗i−1(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)).
Proof. The maps hm and hi−1 can only disagree on elements within Γ where Γ = {Xi, ..., Xm}.
But Γ ∩ f.v.(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) = ∅ and the result follows by Lemma 5.2.20.
5.2.22 Theorem. Let σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar). Then R 6|= σ≈ implies Rfin 6|= σ≈.
Proof. Recall from the proof strategy that σ ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) and A = (A,∨,∧,¬, 0, 1, f〈a〉)a∈Π0 ∈ R
such that A 6|= σ≈ i.e. there is an h : Φ ∪ V ar → A with h∗(σ) 6= 1. Recall hm : Φ ∪ V ar → A
and define C = {h∗m(ψ) | ψ ∈ st(σ)} ⊆fin A. Consider the algebraic filtration (AC , fR
s
〈a〉)a∈Π0 of
A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 with (Rs〈a〉)a∈Π0 . For each a ∈ Π0 denote the AC operator f
Rs〈a〉 by f˜〈a〉;
we will show (AC , f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 is a finite falsifying ρ-algebra. Since AC is a finite τ0 modal algebra
we know by Lemma 5.2.13 that (AC , f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 ∈ R. To prove that (AC , f˜〈a〉)a∈Π0 6|= σ≈ we define
j : Φ∪V ar → AC by j(p) = hm(p) and will demonstrate that j∗(σ) = h∗(σ). Since h and hm agree
on f.v.(σ)∪Φ∪{⊥} we have h∗(σ) = h∗m(σ) by Lemma 5.2.20. Thus we will show for all ψ ∈ st(σ)
that
j∗(ψ) = h∗m(ψ). (5.2.4)
Base case: Let ψ ∈ st(σ) such that k(ψ) = 0 i.e. ψ = ⊥ or ψ = p ∈ Φ ∪ V ar. If ψ = ⊥
then equation 5.2.4 holds as j∗(⊥) = 0 = h∗m(⊥). The same is true for ψ = p ∈ Φ ∪ V ar since
j∗(p) = j(p) = hm(p) = h∗m(p).
Inductive hypothesis: Assume equation 5.2.4 is true for all ψ ∈ st(σ) such that k(ψ) < n ≤
k(σ).
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Inductive step: Let ψ ∈ st(σ) such that k(ψ) = n. Thus for some ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ(X) ∈ Lρ(Φ, V ar) and
a ∈ Π0 we have:
ψ =

ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 (i)
¬ϕ (ii)
〈a〉ϕ (iii)
ρX.ϕ(X) (iv).
Cases (i), (ii) and (iii) follow since AC is an algebraic filtration of A through (C,Ca)a∈Π0 (see
Lemma 4.2.11).
(iv) Recall from the proof strategy that b.v.(σ) = {X1, ..., Xm}; we thus have that ρX.ϕ(X) =
ρXi.ϕi(Xi) where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We need to show that j∗(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) = h∗m(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)). From
Lemma 5.2.19 we immediately know that j∗(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) ≥ h∗m(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)).
j∗(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) ≤ h∗m(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) :
Note that by Corollary 5.2.21 we have h∗m(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) = h∗i−1(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)). Furthermore by defini-
tion we have h∗i−1(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) = xi. Thus we need to show that j
∗(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) ≤ xi. This is true
if xi is a root of j
∗
Xi→(ϕi(Xi)) i.e. if j
∗
Xi→xi(ϕi(Xi)) = 0. By definition of j we have that j = jXi→xi
and thus we are looking to prove j∗(ϕi(Xi)) = 0. By the inductive hypothesis we know j∗(ϕi(Xi)) =
h∗m(ϕi(Xi)). Since hm and hi agree on f.v.(ϕi(Xi))∪Φ∪{⊥} we know that h∗m(ϕi(Xi)) = h∗i (ϕi(Xi))
by Lemma 5.2.20. But h∗i (ϕi(Xi)) = 0 since h
∗
i (ϕi(Xi)) = h
∗
i−1, Xi→xi(ϕi(Xi)) = 0 by the definition
of xi. Thus j
∗(ϕi(Xi)) = 0 and therefore j∗(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) ≤ h∗m(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)). Hence, in all we have
that j∗(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)) = h∗m(ρXi.ϕi(Xi)).
6. Conclusion
We began this work by looking at the tools needed to understand decidability of a logic. We then
analysed the question of decidability for two logics which contain least binders. The first such logic
we looked at was PDL and we reviewed how it can be shown that PDL is be decidable via a
relational argument [11]. We then gave a new proof that PDL is decidable by showing that PDL
is complete with respect to D (Theorem 5.1.11) and that the validities of D and Dfin are the same
(Theorem 5.1.15). The proof that Dfin |= σ≈ implies D |= σ≈ built on the algebraic filtration work
of Conradie et al. [7] reviewed (in part) in Chapter 4.
Notice that in the proof of Dfin |= σ≈ implies D |= σ≈ (Theorem 5.1.15), no reference is made
to the underlying algebraic filtrators and we could have simply taken (AC , f
′
〈a〉)a∈Π0 as a starting
point for our falsifying algebra, where f ′〈a〉(x) =
∧{y ∈ AC | f〈a〉(x) ≤ y} for x ∈ AC . However
relating the construction to the algebraic filtrations of Conradie et al. opens the door towards a
comparison of the algebraic and relational proofs that PDL is decidable and indeed this could be a
possible future research direction. Also notice that, analogously to the finite model property proof
in Section 5.2, we could have directly proved L∗µ is decidable. We instead proved PDL is decidable
since this allows for a more direct comparison with the relational proof in [11].
We then looked at the issue of decidability for ΛR. We demonstrated that ΛR has the finite model
property with respect to R (Theorem 5.2.22). Our proof was based on that of Pratt but differed
in the construction of the generating set used to build the finite falsifying ρ-algebra [34]. If it can
be proven that ΛR is finitely axiomatisable then this serves to demonstrate that ΛR is decidable.
Comparing the two proofs that PDL and ΛR have the finite model property, it is easy to see
the advantage of expressing all of the PDL modalities using only basic modalities and least root
formulae. For example, if instead we were to prove directly that L∗µ is decidable, we would have
avoided the use of Theorem 5.1.3 pertaining to the F -closure.
Possible future research directions include finding richer fragments of Lµ for which decidability can
be shown with algebraic filtrations.
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